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Abstract
This dissertation examines privatization and the relationship between macroeconomic financial 
distress and the propensity to privatize in emerging market countries. The research was 
undertaken to investigate the rationales of privatization and to attempt to explain the pattern 
and behavior of privatization in emerging market countries (EMCs). The central hypothesis 
under investigation is that countries with fiscal pressures such as high debt levels, significant 
budget deficits, and large current account deficits, ceteris paribus, are more likely to increase 
their privatization activities. The study begins by providing a background on privatization and 
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) in EMCs. It then reviews the theoretical literature underlying 
privatization and financial distress. Next it provides a comparative profile of EMCs that have 
or are in the process of privatizing. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between financial distress (with an emphasis on debt as a primary driver 
of distress) and privatization. In particular, higher levels of debt cause financial distress and 
unproductive investment and this in turn causes countries to privatize relatively more assets.
© Copyright by David James Lynn 2005 
All Rights Reserved.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This study describes the effects of financial distress and the motivations to privatize in 
emerging market countries (EMCs). The results presented support the notion that 
financial distress factors have a positive effect on privatization—i.e., that EMCs exhibit a 
higher degree of privatization in the face of macroeconomic financial distress.
The results are consistent with empirical work on financial distress in firms and countries 
that find that financial distress creates imperatives to divest assets. Previous empirical 
work on privatization focused mainly on economic efficiency within a specific industry 
or region or budgetary explanations. The results appear robust across industries and 
regions.
Extending the macro-empirical literature of the reasons surrounding privatization, the 
empirical investigation for this research tests the relationship between the level of 
financial distress and the incentives for privatization in a sample of 42 EMCs in different 
industries, industrial sectors and regions of the world over a ten-year period. The 
theoretical foundation of this relationship draws from general financial distress theory 
(Myers 1977; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The empirical analysis employs various 
econometric specifications to find the best fit between the available data and the 
conceptual hypothesis.
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This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One presents a background on 
privatization and privatization in EMCs, the underlying motives for countries to 
undertake privatization and a background on the concepts of financial distress (with an 
emphasis on debt as the most significant component). Chapter Two provides a literature 
review of privatization and financial distress. Chapter Three discusses the emergence of 
privatization in EMCs and key characteristics of the trend. Chapter Four develops a 
series of testable empirical hypotheses. Chapter Five discusses the methodology and data 
of the analysis. Chapter Six discusses the empirical tests and results, and Chapter Seven 
summarizes the dissertation.
1.2 Emerging Market Countries (EMCs)
The phrase “emerging market country” was coined by Antoine Agtmael of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank (WB). An EMC is defined 
as: “a country with low-to-middle per capita income.” Such countries constitute 
approximately 80% of the global population and represent about 20% of the world's 
economy (Agtmael 1993).
Although a loose definition, countries whose economies fall into this category, vaiying 
from very big to very small, are usually considered emerging because of their 
development and economic restructuring initiatives. Even though China is deemed one 
of the world's economic powerhouses, it is lumped into the category alongside much 
smaller economies with a great deal less resources, like Tunisia. Both China and Tunisia
2
belong to this category because both have embarked on economic development and 
restructuring programs, and have begun to open up their markets and "emerge" onto the 
global scene. EMCs are considered to be fast-growing economies (Ramamurti 1999).
1.3 Defining Privatization
Privatization has many connotations, meanings, techniques, processes, and policies. Moreover, 
no two countries privatize the same way. This section provides a working definition of the 
concept.
Privatization is generally viewed as a relaxation of government restrictions, which 
includes permission for minority private ownership in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
the appointment of private managers to positions of managerial responsibility in SOEs, 
and the participation of private concerns in enterprises previously considered state 
monopolies (Kolderie 1986).
The term privatization can also refer to the shift to private provision of goods and 
services. This may be accomplished through transfer of ownership of an enterprise to 
private investors through an asset sale, equity sale, or equity distribution (Ramanadham 
1989). The final stage is when professional managers replace political managers.
Another type of privatization is franchising and contracting out. Ownership remains in 
public hands, but the management of public assets or services is placed in the private 
sector for specific time periods and terms. Franchising typically implies the sale of a 
specific product directly to the public, for example electricity, water,
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telecommunications, while contracting out implies payment by the government to the 
private provider of the specified product (Kikeri et al. 1992).
Privatization usually entails a reduction of the role of the state in the provision of goods 
and services to the population. In some instances, governments choose to retain 
ownership but transfer the managerial operations to the private sector. Hurl (1988) 
argues that privatization refers to the “sale of all or part of a government’s equity in state- 
owned enterprises to the private sector.” Governments perform two types of functions, 
either of which could be privatized. The first is production and the second is provision. 
Production is the action to produce that good or service, whereas provision is the policy 
to provide a good or service. For example in the case of electricity, government 
production would entail the state building, owning and operating power plants to produce 
electricity. Provision would be where electricity is provided by the state, but produced by 
privately owned and operated power plants.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) view privatization as a move along the continuum towards 
greater specification of property rights. While they maintain that the concept of 
ownership is complex, privatization helps to allocate residual return and control more 
effectively.
Hanke (1987) describes privatization as a transfer of assets and service functions to 
private hands. Hanke cites service activities ranging from selling state-owned enteiprises 
to contracting out public services with private contractors. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988)
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define privatization as the transfer of functions for which the government previously held 
a monopoly into the hands of the private sector. These functions are performed by the 
private sector at prices that clear the market and reflect the full costs of production, 
whereas they were performed at zero or below full-cost prices by the government.
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) see privatization as a range of different policy initiatives 
intended to change the balance between the public and private sectors. They make three 
main distinctions of privatizations: 1) a change in the ownership of the enterprise, 2) 
liberalization or deregulation and 3) transfer of a good or service from the public to 
private sector while the government retains ultimate responsibility for supplying the 
service.
Oman (1986) compares the approaches of industrial countries to less developed countries 
in privatization. He finds that for industrial countries, the sale of stock is essentially a 
financial issue, with issues such as finding the right merchant bankers, getting the correct 
valuation of assets, then finding a good price and putting the company up for sale. 
Developed countries usually have well-developed legal systems, a reasonably 
competitive market without excessive controls over prices and inputs, and a relatively 
open international trading structure. EMCs, on the other hand, are characterized by thin 
capital markets with few potential buyers for the state enterprise, a legal system intolerant 
of private activity, labor laws that are extremely restrictive in terms of who can be hired 
and fired, total or nearly total protectionism in the industrial sector, subsidized access to
5
credit resources, and a government that fixes wage and price levels (Davis and Harper,
1993).
The working definition which will be used for the purpose of the research is:
Privatization is an action that seeks to transfer in fu ll or in part the government
equity ownership or residual ownership (in the form o f managerial control) o f a
¥
public enterprise to private hands.
1.4 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in EMCs
The literature defines a state-owned enterprise (SOE) according to its characteristics and 
functions. An SOE is a distinct legal entity that is a) owned or managed by the government 
(the principle stockholder with 51% or more ownership); b) has an accounting system separate 
from the government unit that controls or supervises it; and c) is engaged in commercial, 
industrial, and financial activities involving the production and sale of goods and services from 
which it is expected to earn a significant portion of its revenue (Jones, et al. 1991, Savas 1982). 
In other words, SOEs constitute the business component of the public sector. It is where the 
state acts as producer of, or trader in, goods and services that are normally produced by a 
private enterprise (Berg and Shirley 1987). This function distinguishes SOEs from other 
public sector activities that are more clearly public goods, such as defense, police, health, and 
education, and therefore unsuitable for sale. These activities fall outside the scope of 
privatization in most EMCs.
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SOEs in EMCs were established to achieve a host of objectives. According to Dinavo (1995). 
the objectives include creating and maintaining employment, redistributing income, reducing 
poverty, providing a more equitable distribution of goods and services and improving their 
range and quality, establishing and developing the infrastructure and industrial base, balancing 
or replacing a deficient private sector or taking over failed private enterprises, reducing 
dependency on foreign capital, filling in the gaps from market failures in the economy, and 
transferring technology to strategic sectors.
Until the 1980s, SOEs had been important financial and economic actors in many EMCs and 
had grown rapidly in both number and size. In most countries, they often dominated important 
strategic sectors like large-scale manufacturing, construction, finance, services, and agriculture. 
SOEs have been major borrowers in domestic and international markets, commanded a 
sizeable share of the state budget, and employed a large segment of the labor force (Jones and 
Mason 1982). Finally, SOEs differ significantly among themselves in several respects such as 
the independence of boards, the role of private shareholders, levels of government subsidies, 
and the extent to which the government is a customer (Vemon 1998).
1.4.1 Origins of SOEs
The emergence and expansion of SOEs can be traced back to the initial stages of 
industrialization and modem economic development in EMCs following World War II (Shirley 
1983). Beginning in the early 1960s, SOEs were established to spearhead the drive to 
industrialization based on an import substitution development philosophy, and were seen as an 
appropriate mechanism to pursue social and economic goals (Ramanadham 1989). The public
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sector was regarded as central to national development by providing crucial goods and services 
to consumers, and materials and resources to various industries within the economy.
A variety of economic and non-economic factors contributed to the establishment of SOEs in 
EMCs. The most common justification for government intervention was to compensate for 
market failures. Stiglitz (1994), addressing the issues of market failures and how to correct 
them, observed that the “SOE is one of the instruments used by public authority to correct 
market failures and reach an improvement in social welfare.” According to Nunnenkemp 
(1986), “the market failure debate in economic theory contributed to a remarkable extension of 
public intervention into private markets in general and state ownership in particular.” The 
“commanding heights” argument is another important reason for the creation of SOEs (Jones 
and Mason 1982). Here it is argued that certain sectors of the economy—owing to their 
strategic position and to the kind of “links” they generate—are so important to the 
development of the national economy that they cannot be left in private hands, regardless of 
whether the investors are domestic or foreign. The state must control these important 
industries (e.g., telecommunications, transportation, electricity, and natural resources). 
Furthermore, the creation of public ownership in many EMCs was a response to the 
unwillingness, inability, or lack of incentives by the private sector to undertake productive 
activities crucial to the economy’s industrialization process, especially in the early stages of 
development. In these thin markets, sometimes governments felt there was no other path to 
initiate growth in critical sectors. The private sector in many cases had neither the capital, nor 
the technical or managerial skills, to establish new large-scale and risky projects in key 
industries (Liberman 1993).
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SOEs also helped to correct social and regional development imbalances, reduced 
unemployment, and promoted public production work force training (Birdsall and Nellis 2002). 
These activities contributed to the rapid growth of the public sector in many EMCs, often 
alongside ideological motives.
The public sector has played a major role in the economies of EMCs. As Table 1.1 shows, by 
the early 1980s, SOEs accounted on average for 17% of the GDP in a thirteen country sample 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 12% in Latin America, and 3% in Asia, compared with the 10% of 
GDP in mixed economies worldwide (Swanson and Wolde-Semait 1989). In some cases, their 
contribution has been considerably higher; for example, they produced 20% to 30% of the 
domestic output in India, Mexico, and Senegal. In Zambia and Venezuela, they accounted for 
more than half of gross domestic investment by 1984 (Milward 1988) yielding at least a quarter 
of the total capital formation. In countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Mexico, the 
share of SOEs in annual gross investment has been upwards of 75%, close to 50% in India and 
Turkey, and has hovered between 25% and 33% in Korea and Brazil (Short 1984).
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Table 1.1_________________________________________________________
SOE SHARE OF GDP AND INVESTMENT IN EMCS, 1976-82
Indicator SOE’s Share (%) Range (%) No. of Countries
GPP
Sub-Saharan Africa______15____________ 4-48______________ 18
Asia__________________ 3_____________1 -7_______________ 6
Latin America__________ 12____________ 2-28_______________ 8
Investments______________________________________________
Sub-Saharan Africa______25____________ 8-54______________12
Asia__________________17____________ 10^6______________ 9
Latin America 19 7-47 17
Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait (1989)
The emergence of SOEs in EMCs has had important international implications as well. In a 
variety of fields, EMCs have come increasingly to represent substitutes for, or competitors to, 
private multinational companies. This has taken place in Indonesia and India in the steel and 
mining sectors, and in Mexico’s petrochemical industry.
1.4.2 Perceived Underperformance of SOEs
While SOE performance varies across regions and sectors, much of the literature argues that 
their economic and financial performance has been deficient (Aharoni 1986, Kikeri 1992, 
Savas 1982). Public investments that were expected to spur growth and provide profits to the 
government became a burden on the economy and a drain on public finances. SOEs also failed 
in many EMCs to enhance export growth or to provide the country with additional foreign 
exchange (Savas 1982). In other words, the claim of greater efficiency, initially used as an 
explanation for the rapidly expanding economic activities of the public sector, was quickly
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replaced by short-term political goals, rendering SOEs primarily large employers and suppliers 
of highly subsidized goods and services to the public (Abu Shair 1997).
Despite the differences in measuring performance across sectors and regions, some general 
conclusions can still be drawn. Shirley (1999) states that “in most developing countries, SOEs 
have drained budgetary resources, contributed to the overall public sector deficit, weakened 
fiscal management, and made negative contributions to value added production.”
Ramanadham (1993) found that capital losses are a fact of most SOEs in countries such as 
India, Pakistan, and Chile. Another study of four African countries—Ghana. Senegal, 
Tanzania, and Zambia—also revealed poor performance. SOEs in these countries proved to be 
a massive drain on government resources, exhibited low labor and capital productivity, and 
were even less successful in generating employment (Karf and Smith 1996).
Vickers and Yarrow (1988), in their extensive analysis of the economics of public sector 
companies, argue that the poor economic and financial performance of SOEs is due to the 
characteristics of state ownership: lack of a stock price to indicate performance, insulation 
from the dissatisfaction of its customers, subjugation to claims of the political process, and 
lack of clearly defined property rights. Ayub and Hegsted (1986), Kirkpatrick (1989), and 
Prager (1992) show that multiple and conflicting goals, the lack of managerial independence 
and skills, over-staffing, the lack of efficient monitoring and incentive mechanisms, and 
protected uncompetitive market conditions were major causes of poor public enterprises 
performance in numerous EMCs. Although created to alleviate the shortcomings of the private
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sector, many SOEs ended up stifling it by capturing a disproportional share of credit squeezing 
out private sector borrowing in a problem known as “crowding out’' (Dombusch 2000).
The reaction to this poor performance was a movement directed at improving the operational, 
managerial, and organizational structure of SOEs, and the economic environment within which 
they operate. One of the most frequently discussed steps is the separation of management 
from ownership through decentralization. Under the umbrella of decentralization, changes 
such as restructuring the enterprise, increasing managerial autonomy, and exposing the firm to 
market competition have been undertaken (Shirley 1983). The aim of these changes, by and 
large, was to maintain the role of the SOE in EMC economies by providing the “political will" 
to minimize bureaucracy and the abuse of power, and the “economic will” to correct 
unnecessary price and market distortions.
A study by the World Bank (1996) details the efforts of 12 EMCs to reform their state 
enterprises. The performance of their public enterprises was measured against metrics of 
success in three areas: financial performance, productivity, and savings/investment (as an 
indicator of the burden that SOEs place on the economy). The results were mixed. Chile,
South Korea, and Mexico achieved the best results, Egypt, Ghana, and the Philippines had 
mixed results, and India and Senegal and Turkey had the poorest results. A breakdown of the 
study’s results demonstrates that the success or failure in reforming SOEs depends directly on 
the ability of policymakers to affect five areas: divestiture, competition, hard budgets, 
financial reform, and changes in the relationship between government officials and SOE 
managers. All these reforms are designed to alter the incentives faced by managers of SOEs
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(Shirley 1999). The conclusion of this study suggests that countries that most improved the 
performance of their SOEs followed a comprehensive strategy of reforms, which included a 
combination of privatization and corporatization measures.
The challenge of improving the efficiency of the public sector in EMCs lies in how to bring 
about sustainable improvements in SOE performance. This is a difficult task for EMCs for two 
reasons. First, there are many difficulties in coordinating the relationships that are required 
between government agencies, financial institutions, and the SOEs themselves. Second, 
previous attempts to increase the efficiency of SOEs have not been entirely successful because 
these changes were introduced in periods of crisis. Once the crisis passed, the changes have 
usually disappeared (backsliding, lack of broad support) and performance improvement has not 
been sustained (Shirley 1999).
To meet this challenge, a drastic shift in SOE restructuring measures began in the early 1980s 
in EMCs with the transfer of ownership of SOEs to the private sector. Faced with mounting 
SOE costs, and beset by increasing needs for funds to be used for many purposes, many EMC 
governments have sought to dispose of SOEs that had become a financial burden. Gradually, 
privatization took a life of its own and quickly became the central issue in the debate over the 
appropriate role of the state in the economy. Many governments began to ask themselves: 
should there be public ownership and state-led growth, or more market-friendly, outward- 
oriented economic strategies such as those that emerged worldwide by the mid-1980s? (Poole 
1996).
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Privatization became an important element in the extensive structural adjustment programs that 
many EMCs adopted in the late 1980s and 1990s. These programs were a response to internal 
economic imbalances and external pressures by multinational and regional lending agencies 
and financial institutions. Privatization was also given impetus by the integration of the global 
economic environment. EMCs have become increasingly integrated into the global economy. 
While this has produced, in many cases, positive results such as increased exports and capital 
flows, it has also led to EMC economies being exposed to elevated levels of competition and 
variability of the global economic system. Since the 1970s, EMCs have had to contend with 
the impact of two oil shocks, sharp declines in the prices of principle export commodities, high 
nominal and real interest rates, stagnation of financial flows, rising protectionism in the major 
export markets, and staggering external debt service burdens (Ramamutri 1992).
In addition, in some economic sectors the conditions conducive to state intervention no longer 
exist. Advances in technology, for example, have introduced competition into activities and 
sectors (e.g., telecommunications) previously monopolized by the state. The private sector in 
many EMCs has evolved and developed to the point where state control is simply no longer 
necessary (Clarke 1996). Finally, growing investor interest stemming from increasing 
globalization and foreign investment flows, especially toward EMCs, has reinforced the need 
to adopt privatization as a policy instrument throughout the world (Molz 1990).
1.5 Rationales for Privatization
The research into rationales for privatization can generally be grouped into three 
categories: 1) economic (Dinavo 1995, Ramanadham 1991), 2) social/political (Poole
14
1987, Schmidt 1996) and 3) financial (Guslain 1997, Barnes 1992, Bell 1995). The 
research has been dominated by economic and social rationales of privatization, in part 
because these explanations tended to focus on wide-scale policy changes that were 
contentiously debated and implemented in many countries around the world during the 
1980s and 1990s and continuing today. These explanations often took center stage for 
many researchers. What research there is on financial factors tends to be focused on 
budgetary explanations, with little attention on overall financial distress factors (Cook 
and Uchida 2001, Krugman 1988, Sachs 1984, Sachs 1986). Barnett (2000) goes the 
farthest in his study on the fiscal and macroeconomic impacts of privatization. He finds 
that privation proceeds are used to reduce domestic financing. However, his aim is not to 
establish causality with privatization, but to explain how privatization proceeds are used 
after the fact.
The connection between financial distress theory and privatization has not been fully 
explored, and poses an opportunity to investigate its impact on the propensity to 
privatize. The central hypothesis of this study centers around the observation that 
countries experiencing “financial distress” such as high budget deficits, large current 
account deficits, low credit ratings, and, most importantly, significant external debt, show 
a disproportionate amount of privatization. The empirical investigation uses various 
econometric specifications to test this hypothesis.
1.5.1 Economic (Efficiency). Economic efficiency has been the most often cited 
rationale for privatization over the last two decades (Mackenzie 1997, and Vernon 1998).
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Many social and political rationales could also be viewed as subsets of the overall 
efficiency rationale (Poole 1996). EMCs hoped that privatization will increase the 
efficiency with which firms use resources and generate more tax revenues as private 
companies (Kikeri, Nellis, Shirley 1992). There are four aspects of this rationale. First, 
privatization increases overall economic efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Ott and 
Hartley 1991) as a result of the better use of inputs within the enterprise after divestment. 
Second, it improves the quality of goods and services, which can lead to the enhancement 
of international competitiveness of the enterprises, infusing them with capital, advancing 
their technology, and providing better management know-how. Third, it attracts new 
foreign and domestic investments that can accelerate economic development. Fourth, it 
develops efficient capital markets where private owners can realize the full value of their 
shares, newly privatized firms can raise funds and trade shares, and institutional investors 
can provide discipline to enterprise management.
1.5.2 Social (including income distribution) and Political (including ideological).
Privatization is pursued in many cases in an attempt to achieve social objectives, such as 
broadening domestic equity ownership of economic assets, or popular capitalism 
(Guslain 1997, Bell 1995, Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang 1994, Birdsall and Nellis 
2002). If the sale of public assets can be made attractive to small investors, then share 
ownership will increase in the population. Other rationales may include developing a 
national middle class or fostering the economic development of a particular group or 
region.
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Political rationales include: a) reducing the degree of corruption and misuse of public 
property by government officials and SOE managers; b) reducing the size and scope of 
the public sector or its share of economic activity; c) reducing or eliminating the 
possibility of nationalization by successor governments; and d) strengthening the private 
sector (Aharoni 1986, Bos and Peters, 1988, and Dinavo 1995).
1.53 Financial. Many EMCs believe that privatization will decrease the demand made 
by SOEs on government budgets (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley 1992). The sale of SOEs 
can be a way of paying down the debt and reducing annual interest charges. Moreover 
since many SOEs also require government subsidies, the shift from government to private 
ownership may therefore involve a twofold ongoing fiscal benefit: the elimination of 
subsidies and increased corporate tax revenues (Poole 1996). This category can be 
divided into two. First, increasing government revenues from SOE asset sales is 
important. Maximizing net proceeds of privatization helps generate the public revenues 
needed to fund government expenditures, reduce taxation, and reduce the public sector 
deficit factors (Barnett 2000). Second, privatization reduces government expenditures 
and external debt through the reduction in the financial drain of SOEs on the state’s 
budget and resources (Boubakri and Cossett, 1998, Zank, Nieder, Vickland and Ivey 
1991). SOEs in EMCs account for one quarter to one half of all outstanding domestic 
debt, and for a substantial portion of foreign borrowing (Shirley 1983). Table 1.2 below 
summarizes the main arguments of each rationale.
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Table 1.2________________________
RATIONALES OF PRIVATIZATION 
1) Efficiency of the Economy and Enterprises
• Create a market economy—the key objective in economies in transition
• Encourage private enterprise and expansion of the private sector in general
• Promote macroeconomic or sectoral efficiency and competitiveness_______
• Foster economic flexibility and eliminate rigidities_____________________
• Promote competition, particularly by abolishing monopolies_____________
• Establish or develop efficient capital markets, allowing better capture and 
mobilization of domestic savings___________________________________
• Improve access to foreign markets for domestic products________________ I
• Promote domestic investment ________________________________
• Promote foreign investment ____________________________________
• Promote integration of the domestic economy into the world economy_____
• Maintain or create employment____________________________________
• Foster the enterprise’s efficiency and its domestic and international 
competitiveness________________________________________________
• Introduce new technologies and promote innovation___________________
• Upgrade plant and equipment_____________________________________
• Increase productivity, including utilization of industrial plant____________
• Improve quality of the goods and services produced____________________
• Introduce new management methods and teams_______________________
• Allow the enterprise to enter into domestic and international alliances 
essential to its survival
2) Social and Political
• Foster broader capital ownership and promote popular or mass capitalism
• Develop a national middle class
• Foster the economic development of a particular group (ethnic or other) in 
society
• Encourage employee ownership (also important for efficiency reasons)
• Restore full rights to former owners of property expropriated by previous 
regimes
• Enrich those managing or implementing privatization projects (rarely an 
admitted objective)
• Reduce the size and scope of the public sector or its share in economic 
activity
• Redefine the field of activity of the public sector, abandoning production 
tasks and focusing on core government functions, including die creation of 
an environment favorable to private economic activity
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Reduce or eliminate the ability of a future government to reverse the 
measures taken by the incumbent government to alter the role of the state in 
the economy
• Reduce the opportunities for corruption and misuse of public property by 
government officials and SOE managers
• Reduce the grip of a particular party or group (communist party, 
nomenclature, or labor unions, for example) on the economy
• Raise the government’s popularity and its likelihood of being returned to 
power in the next elections
3) Financial and Budgetary
• Maximize net privatization receipts in order to fund government 
expenditures, reduce taxation, trim the public sector deficit, or pay off 
public debt
• Reduce the financial drain of SOEs on the state (in the form of subsidies, 
unpaid taxes, loan arrears, guarantees given and so on)
• Mobilize private sources to finance investments that can no longer be 
funded from public finances
• Generate new sources of tax revenue
• Limit the future risk of demands on the budget inherent in state ownership 
of businesses, including the need to provide capital for their expansion or to 
rescue them if they are in financial trouble
• Reduce capital flight abroad and repatriate capital already transferred
Source: Guslain, 1997.
1.6 Summary
This chapter provides a general overview of SOEs in EMCs and privatization. SOEs 
were largely created in EMCs after World War II to achieve various economic, socio­
political, and financial rationales. A large number of SOEs achieved a certain level of 
success. However, a significant proportion exhibited poor operating and economic 
performance. This led many EMCs, beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the 
1980s and 1990s, to adopt various measures to bring enterprises and their management 
under the discipline of the market. Privatization efforts have been largely promulgated as 
proactive and non-deterministic in nature. A central goal of this study is to explore the
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relationship between financial distress and privatization as a possible deterministic 
explanation for at least some of the privatization in EMCs.
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Chapter Two 
A Literature Review o f Privatization and Financial 
Distress
2.1 Introduction
The privatization wave that accelerated in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s 
resulted in a significant body of research. This literature review is divided into three 
sections. The first section discusses “ownership privatization”—the various methods and 
modes of ownership privatization processes—the leading form of privatization in EMCs 
and the focus of this dissertation. The second section focuses on the theoretical 
underpinnings of privatization, centering on efficiency and property rights. The third 
section focuses on the empirical literature of privatization and illustrates that there is no 
conclusive evidence supporting efficiency improvements, leaving open the possibility for 
another explanation. The fourth section discusses financial distress and the potential 
relationship between financial distress and privatization.
The greatest volume of privatization activity occurred from the late 1980s through the 
1990s (OCED 2002), and the literature review reflects this timing bias (Cook and Uchida 
2001). Nevertheless, pertinent research before and after this time period is addressed as 
well. The socio-political motivations, while important, are not discussed here because 
they are normative in nature and can be done irrespective of efficiency goals.
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2.2 Ownership Privatization
While there many privatization models, the below section describes the main features of 
ownership privatization. This is the focus of this dissertation, as ownership privatization 
forms the bulk of financial transactions.
2.2.1 Ownership Privatization Modalities
1. Divestiture. This method involves transfer of ownership from the public to the 
private sector, and is the most common method of privatization. It takes two main 
forms. First, it could be a full sale in which the government bears no further 
responsibilities for the ownership and operation of the assets. Second, it could be 
a partial sale (i.e., partial divestiture) that involves the state retaining partial 
ownership of the assets (a special share), and leaving the management to the 
private sector (Pack 1991). The sale of the enterprise’s assets can be conducted 
using the following techniques.
a) Direct Sale. The owners of the SOE (i.e., the government) directly 
negotiate with a single investor for the transfer of equity. In some cases, 
the parties are brought to the negotiating table by other financial 
intermediaries (Katz and Owen 1993).
b) Initial Public Offering (IPO). The shares of SOEs are offered on local 
and international capital markets. This method can be more difficult and 
costly in countries with weak capital markets, and is generally used for 
large and financially sound SOEs (Allen and Fauldhaber 1989).
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c) Auction. A common type of selling SOE’s assets to the highest bidder in 
open and competitive bidding process. Auctions potentially allow 
government to receive a fair price for assets while keeping the process 
equitable for potential buyers (Branco and Mello 1992).
d) Stock Distribution. In a number of countries, privatization laws mandate 
that a certain percentage of the shares of each SOE being privatized 
(between 10% to 25%) go to the workers or be sold to them at a discount 
(Bell 1995). Financing is often provided to those workers who are unable 
to afford shares.
e) Voucher Privatization. This is a form of ownership transfer and is often 
used in mass privatization programs. These programs enable countries to 
privatize a vast number of SOEs in all sectors using vouchers distributed 
to citizens. Eligible citizens are given or sold coupons or vouchers at a 
nominal price. These can be exchanged for shares in former SOEs 
(Cowan 1990).
f) Management-Employee Buy-outs. This technique has been used when 
assets of the enterprise are sold to its employees and/or managers. It is the 
most politically “acceptable” way for a country to divest itself of an 
enterprise. Occasionally, managers and/or employees may be ideal buyers 
for an SOE, especially for smaller enterprises when management is 
otherwise effective but performance has been affected by government 
directives and other operational controls. This technique is also used in 
cases where it is necessary to secure support from managers and labor
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(who could potentially delay or sabotage the process), to minimize 
unemployment, and to protect against takeovers (Dinavo 1995).
2. Joint Ventures. Divestiture can take the form of joint ventures when foreign 
investors join the SOE to form a distinct legal entity (vehicle company) to which 
each party contributes assets (jointly own equity), allowing the distinction 
between public and private capital to be maintained (Molz 1990).
3. Liquidation. This method involves selling off the assets of the SOE by 
effectively liquidating the company debts. This approach is warranted in cases 
where there is no hope that the firm can be saved through internal restructuring 
(i.e., a combination of new investment, ownership, and operational changes).
Of the above ownership methods of privatization, the direct sale approach is the most 
prevalent, and accounts for the majority of privatization transactions in EMCs.
2.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of Privatization
The theoretical underpinnings of privatization are based on economic efficiency and the 
assignment of property rights.
23.1 Defining Efficiency
Efficiency is one of the primary concepts upon which privatization is based. There are 
two aspects of efficiency used when discussing privatization. The first is productive, or 
technical efficiency, which results when the lowest cost method of producing output is
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utilized. If technical efficiency can be achieved, there are no wasted resources (Begg, 
Fischer, Dombusch 1994). Second, allocative efficiency refers to the situations where 
resources are combined so as to produce the socially optimal level of output. This is also 
called Pareto efficiency. It is a measure of the extent to which relative output prices in 
the economy as a whole reflect their scarcity values, or when the marginal social cost 
equals marginal social benefit (Vickers and Yarrow 1988).
It is important to note that in the neoclassical theory of the firm, the relationship between 
ownership and performance is tenuous. There is no separation between ownership and 
control, and efficiency is seen mainly as a function of market and incentive structures. In 
other words, the claim that private owners are inherently more efficient than public 
owners is not supported in neoclassical microeconomic theory. It makes little difference 
whether a firm is privately or publicly owned as long as it operates in a competitive 
market without barriers to entry or exit, the owners instruct management to follow the 
signals provided by the market, and management is rewarded and sanctioned on the basis 
of performance (Nellis 1999). However, the subsequent development of the behavioral 
and managerial theories of the firm provided a new understanding of the objectives of the 
firm and deviations from the neoclassical assumption of profit maximization.
2.3.2 Property Rights and Ownership
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state “the institution of ownership accompanied by secure 
property rights is the most common and effective institution for providing incentives to 
create, maintain and improve assets.” The economic performance of state owned
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enterprises has been blamed on ownership that was too dispersed for anyone to have clear 
property rights.
In SOEs, the failures in efficiency and investment are attributed to the fact that no one 
has sufficient incentive to maintain and improve the assets, because they cannot 
appropriate any returns from those activities (Grossman and Hart 1986). Managers have 
inadequate incentives to enhance the value of the organizations in their charge, unlike 
owners of private enterprises, because they cannot reap the full benefits of their efforts.
According to Coase (1937), if property rights are clearly assigned early, individuals have 
an incentive to work out efficient economic arrangements. It is argued that private 
ownership allows for a clear objective of profit maximization, which leads to more 
effective monitoring and incentive systems. Private ownership is equated with higher 
levels of managerial supervision, resulting in more efficient decisions in terms of pricing, 
investments, research and development, product innovations. The transfer from public to 
private ownership should result in more measurable objectives, which in turn should 
create the environment and incentives to monitor and control management more 
effectively (De Alessi 1980). While the absence of well-defined property rights 
frequently gives rise to distortions, the clear assignment o f property rights does not 
necessarily lead to efficiency.
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2.3.3 Allocative Efficiency and the Role of the Market
The assertion that private firms are more efficient and thus potentially more profitable 
than public firms cannot be complete without considering the market structure and 
regulation policies within which these firms operate. Possible gains in productive 
efficiency have to be weighed against the potential loss in allocative efficiency. The 
allocative inefficiencies that could result from divesting SOEs could be extensive in cases 
where capital markets are underdeveloped, market failures are common, and the 
institutional capacity of governments to regulate private monopolies is limited. If the 
losses are greater than the gains from productive efficiency, reforming SOEs may be a 
better course of action than full privatization (Galal 1991).
Hemming and Mansour (1988) point out that gains in allocative efficiency can be 
achieved if privatization is accompanied by policies that promote competition. The link 
between ownership change and competition lies in the effect of competition on the cost of 
information. Competition generates information and lowers its cost for the owners of the 
firms in the market (regardless of ownership) resulting in enhanced efficiency and 
improved monitoring of management behavior. One can argue that changes in firm 
performance have more to do with the nature of competition than with the form of 
ownership. Competition also drives price toward their welfare-maximizing levels by 
eliminating monopoly profits. The effects of competition can vary, however, in the case 
of many EMCs. Where SOEs still predominate, the competition from private firms will 
be insignificant. Where only a few sectors of the economy have been privatized, the 
effects of competition are likewise limited (Ott and Hartley 1991). Competition among
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SOEs is often limited or non-existent due to the fact that they were typically established 
and maintained as monopolies.
A synthesis of the theoretical literature shows that the degree of efficiency gained by a 
firm depends on ownership as well as market structure. In general one can say that 
private enterprises with the objective of profit maximization operating in competitive 
markets are superior to large public enterprises facing monopoly markets. Small public 
enterprises facing competitive market conditions can do better than private enterprises in 
the same circumstance, but can do considerably worse. In large monopoly markets, 
theoretical predictions are ambiguous depending on the institutional details in place (i.e., 
how the private and public sectors are structured and motivated). Both private and public 
firms are similar in that they try to minimize transaction costs, but private firms are more 
sensitive to this pressure than SOEs.
It may be too simplistic to view privatization in EMCs as universally effective in solving 
all perceived deficiencies within the public sector. In cases where market failures are 
serious, government intervention frequently continues after privatization.
2.4 Efficiency (Performance) Empirical Studies
The empirical literature on privatization tends to examine privatization at the level of the 
firm itself comparing efficiency differences between public and private firms. This 
literature can be divided into three groups: studies that compare the performance of
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privatized firms to those of SOEs, studies that compare a firm’s pre-divestiture with post- 
divestiture performance, and studies that look at the effects of privatization on welfare 
(i.e., measuring allocative efficiency).
Before reviewing and evaluating the literature in each of the above groups, it is important 
to examine the limitations of the empirical methodologies used in measuring the effects 
of privatization.
The most salient feature of the micro-empirical literature is the diversity of its results.
Two sets of conclusions emerge from this literature. The first finds the performance of 
private enterprises superior to that of public firms. Boycko et al. (1994) state “there is 
virtually a universal consensus that privatization improves efficiency.” As might be 
expected, a second body of work reaches different conclusions. It finds no evidence to 
suggest inferior efficiency performance by SOEs operating at the same scale of operation 
as private firms (Aharoni 1986). Most of these studies emphasize the oft-noted 
observation that the inefficiency of government enterprises is caused by their isolation 
from market competition, as well as their constraints on practicing efficient management 
rather than from their public ownership. How can the two sets of conclusions be 
reconciled? The answer lies in several empirical and methodological limitations that 
account for the discrepancies.
In several studies, ownership tends to be examined independently of other important 
economic factors such as the institutional and regulatory environment, and the market
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structure in which different firms operate. Tandon (1995) argues that ‘There are cases 
where privatization has not led to efficiency improvement; these are generally associated 
with situations where the degree of competition has remained unchanged before and after 
privatization.” Tandon cites that where “there have been efficiency improvements, 
privatization appears to be contemporaneous with deregulation or other types of 
competition-enhancing measures.” For example, a survey of 92 state-owned and 
privately-owned firms in the Republic of Georgia concluded that “it was not private 
ownership that was associated with restructuring [privatization]—or at least with what 
restructuring could be discerned, but rather the introduction of competition and financial 
discipline” (Djankov and Kreacic 1998).
Attempting to measure the contribution of an ownership change on economic growth is 
complicated by the fact that economic performance is likely to be affected by factors that 
affect the wider economic environment in which privatized enterprises operate. 
Privatization is often accompanied in EMCs by changes in economic policies.
Significant attention has been focused on the process of deregulation and the importance 
of competition. Regulation is crucial for the improvement of efficiency in privatized 
enterprises (Vickers and Yarrow 1991). Unraveling the separate effects of policy 
changes and degrees of competition is difficult, and partly explains the relative deficiency 
of empirical analysis in this area. The other major constraint to the development of 
empirical investigations is obviously related to the short time period after privatization. 
Until relatively recently insufficient data was available to carry out studies capable of 
measuring the dynamic effects of privatization (Cook and Uchida 2001).
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Nellis (1999) notes that in many EMCs “mass and rapid privatization had turned over 
mediocre assets to large numbers of people who have neither the skills nor the financial 
resources to run them well.” Often the highest quality assets have been informally 
selected by insiders and elites of the country, and the assets that are available to privatize 
are older, more economically-challenged SOEs and industries. These outcomes occur 
most where EMC state structures are weak. This allows significant parts of the 
government to become captured by groups whose major objective is to use the state to 
legitimate or mask their acquisition of public wealth.
Capitalism requires more than private property. Capitalism functions only because of 
widespread acceptance and enforcement of fundamental rules, safeguards and institutions 
that make transactions secure, predictable, and widespread (Williamson 1985). Where 
such rules and institutions do not exist or are underdeveloped, as in many EMCs, 
performance of privatized companies will be suboptimal. North (1996) argues the way 
institutions evolve shapes long-run economic performance and ultimately the degree of 
privatization. Political and economic constraints, both formal and informal make 
possible successful privatization. Efficiency-enhancing privatization requires more than 
simply transferring assets from public to private hands. More fundamentally, it requires 
the development of a legal system that will embody the correct incentives of adaptive 
efficiency; the creation of effective and impartial enforcement by that legal system; the 
development of organizations made up of entrepreneurs who will invest in the kind of 
skills and knowledge essential to sustained increased productivity. Fundamentally, it
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entails the establishment of an environment that will broadly support and enforce the new 
property rights.
Those studies that find the performance of private firms to be superior to SOEs do so for 
“illegitimate” reasons because they compare competitive private firms with monopolistic 
SOEs. On the other hand, the studies that compare reasonable competitive enterprises in 
both sectors find private enterprises superior for “legitimate” reasons (Yarrow 1986). 
When public and private monopolies are compared, the results are varied.
Furthermore, if comparing public to private firms simultaneously (at the same point in 
time) generates inconclusive results, one might be tempted to compare the performance 
of the same enterprise at different points in time (i.e., before and after privatization).
This is problematic, however, because of the “counterfactual” claim of what would have 
happened if privatization did not take place. Another common problem with many 
empirical studies is selection bias. If a country embarks on a privatization program by 
selling its most valuable SOE, the performance of that enterprise is not necessarily 
indicative of how privatization might affect the public sector in general.
Finally, the lack of available data for empirical research exists here too. The poor 
financial data for SOEs in EMCs before privatization makes it difficult to measure the 
effect of ownership transfers. Even if the data were available, it might not be possible to 
draw firm conclusions because of the time lags involved in the assessment of 
performance, as the effects of ownership transfer may not materialize for years. The lack
32
of available time-series data on some privatization measures is another problem.
Keeping all of this in mind, the following sections survey the conclusions of the three 
groups of micro-empirical literature on privatization.
There are a great number of studies of this nature. Among the studies comparing 
divested and undivested firms is one by Bishop and Kay (1988). It compares the 
performance of a number of divested enterprises in several industries with undivested 
enterprises in other different industries in the United Kingdom over the same period. The 
authors employ several performance indicators including revenue, employment, profits, 
profit margins, and total factor productivity. They find that both types of firms 
experienced improved performance. They leave the question of causality open to include 
the business cycle and the threat of privatization as possible causes. Mbowe (1993) 
compared 24 enterprises in Nigeria across four industries and finds that public enterprises 
produced lower performance (measured by return on investment), and were less efficient 
(measured by the annual turnover ratio). Perera (1992) finds the same with respect to Sri 
Lanka’s public and private bus companies.
Boardman and Vining (1989) analyze the performance of the 500 largest non-U.S. 
manufacturing and mining corporations operating in competitive environments in 1983. 
Their study presents strong evidence that partial (mixed) privatization is worse than either 
complete state ownership or complete privatization in terms of the effect on performance. 
Hachette and Luders (1993) study the financial performance of a large sample of public 
and private firms in Chile during 1980-1987, and conclude that private firms as a group
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were slightly more efficient than SOEs. They attribute the outcome to minimal political 
interference in SOE operations, and the positive effect of the Chilean government's hard 
budget policy during that period.
On the other hand, Millward (1988) evaluates the performance of public and private firms 
in a sample of EMCs over the period 1976-86 and finds no statistically significant 
evidence to suggest that private firms performed better. Likewise, Cakmak and Zaim 
(1991) study the comparative efficiency of private, public, and mixed enterprises in the 
Turkish cement industry, and find that the ownership factor had no effect on the 
economic efficiency of the different plants. They argue that market structure and size 
were the driving forces behind improvements in the productive efficiency of the 41 plants 
in the sample. Potts (1995) in his study of nationalization and privatization of Tanzania’s 
agricultural SOEs, finds no conclusive evidence to suggest that the performance of the 
public sector firms was worse than that of the private sector in general. Similarly,
Rausch (1995) examines the effect of ownership on performance for the largest 500 
industrial enterprises in Argentina and finds no support for the claim that state ownership 
implies poor performance. His results emphasize the important of factors such as 
economies of scale, market structure, and industry trends.
In summary, the empirical literature provides inconclusive evidence about the widespread 
assumption that private enterprises are more efficient than their counterparts in the public 
sector. This does not prove that such differences are non-existent, but suggests that a 
careful analysis is needed to reveal them. The effects of private ownership alone and
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property rights are not entirely supported by in the empirical work. Market structures, 
enterprise size, regulatory regimes, and other institutional factors have been found to play 
an important role in determining the efficiency of an enterprise.
The next section discusses financial distress theory and the potential relationship between 
financial distress and privatization. This discussion provides the foundation for the 
development of a series of financial distress hypotheses that will be tested later in the 
study.
2.5 Financial Distress Theory
Like firms, countries that are deep in debt may be unable to borrow money to finance 
promising new industrial development projects because any profits may have to be paid 
first to existing lenders. Krugman (1988) states that “a debtor country is like a debtor 
firm where creditors view the firm as having a stream of future revenues out of which 
debt service can be paid”. . .“we can think of the expected stream of potential resource 
transfers from a country to its creditors as analogous to the expected stream of earnings 
from a firm”. . .(and).. .“ a country has a debt overhang problem when the expected 
present value of potential future resource transfers is less than its debt.” Barnett (2000) 
links privatization with fiscal and macroeconomic performance, and cites evidence where 
privatization proceeds have been used to pay down domestic budgets, particularly in 
liquidity-constrained governments.
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Bruno and Easterly (1996) argue that financial crises or stress in the form of high 
inflation which in turn triggers fiscal stress causes governments restructure their domestic 
budgets and privatize more assets. The reasons included “fiscal stabilization, central 
bank independence, privatization, and trade liberalization.”
Jensen (1986) cites the costs of excessive leverage. Debt “creates the crisis to motivate 
cuts in expansion programs and the sale of those divisions which are more valuable 
outside the firm.” The proceeds are used to reduce debt to a more normal or permanent 
level.
Lamont (1995) defines the problem of debt overhang as “existing debt deters new 
investment because the benefits from new investment go to the existing creditors rather 
than to new investors.” Debt overhang creates a threshold value for investment returns; 
below it the firm cannot attract funds, and thus cannot invest. As a result, many 
otherwise profitable investments will be turned down. This can have the effect of 
stunting economic growth and, in the aggregate, making national economies more 
vulnerable to recession (Lamont 1995). Lamont argues that debt overhang can crowd out 
productive investment because all revenue must first go towards paying the debt service. 
National investment can suffer as countries must first service their external debt.
Zwiebel (1996) develops a model where managers of firms voluntarily choose debt to 
credibly constrain their own future empire-building. In contrast with standard free-cash- 
flow explanations, where the discipliner (at least implicitly) has more power ex ante than
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ex post, the pressure on management to commit voluntarily to debt is derived from the 
constant presence of a potential discipliner. In particular, a sufficiently high level of 
anticipated future inefficiency is presumed necessary for a takeover. Bankruptcy is 
presumed to lessen this protection. Debt-constrained managers do not refrain from bad 
projects because they lack cash on hand to start up such projects, but rather because 
allocating limited cash flow to these projects increases the chance of future bankruptcy.
Titman and Wessels (1988), in their empirical study of capital structure, argue that 
managers of highly-leveraged firms are less likely to engage in excessive capital 
spending, since lenders are more likely to monitor capital outlays of those firms. The 
costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less 
collaterizable, since monitoring the capital outlays for such firms is more difficult. For 
this reason, firms with less collaterizable assets may choose higher debt levels to limit 
their manager’s spending. They argue that equity-controlled firms have a tendency to 
invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm’s bondholders. The cost 
associated with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing 
industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments.
Like firms, countries that are highly indebted may be unable to borrow money to finance 
promising new industrial development projects because any profits may have to be paid 
first to existing lenders. This situation is inefficient, because “value is lost from the 
underinvestment caused by debt overhang” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Milgrom and 
Roberts illustrate with the following example.
37
Suppose a firm has an outstanding debt of SI 0 million more than the value of its 
assets and that it then obtains an opportunity to make an investment of $5 million 
yielding a sure gross return of $ 12 million for a guaranteed net profit of $7 
million. If the debt covenants give the current debt priority for repayment, then 
no new lender or investor will be willing to finance the investment because the 
first $10 million accrues to holders of it existing debt, leaving only $2 million in 
returns for the $5 million of new investment. As a result, the profitable 
investment may not be undertaken and value may be lost.
Similarly, there is the problem of the cost of capital. Piling up more debt benefits 
shareholders only up to a point. That point, roughly speaking, is reached when 
bondholders are so worried about the company defaulting that the cost of its debt rises to 
unsustainable levels (Gilson 1997). To go on borrowing beyond that point may even lead 
to bankruptcy.
More formally, Myers (1977) compared the difference between managers' incentives to 
undertake one investment project in two different capital structures of the firm. The first 
case describes an all-equity financed firm, the second portrays a firm with a debt-equity 
capital structure. In both cases, the model assumes that managers and shareholders share 
the same information, managers act in the shareholders' interests, there are no taxes or 
bankruptcy costs, and capital markets are perfect and complete.
1. All-equity Financed Firm. A firm’s market share (V) is determined by two 
different types of assets, the value of assets already in place (V„) and the present
38
value of assets coming from the realization of future growth opportunities (Vg), 
such that, V = v,+ve. Without loss of generality, the firm in this case is 
assumed to have no assets in place. Ex ante, its market value is determined by the 
present value of all the investment options available to it. The model also 
assumes that there is just one year of investment that requires a disbursement of 1 
at t = 0. In an all-equity scenario, if the firm decides to undertake the investment, 
new equity is issued to finance its cost. The revenue generated by the project at 
t=l is given by V(s). If, alternatively, the firm decides not to exercise the 
investment option, no more shares are issued and the firm is worth nothing.
The investment should be undertaken if V(s) >= I which means that the Net Present 
Value (NPV) of the project should be greater than or equal to zero. Therefore, the 
firm would not invest in projects that generate a value of V lower than I. Figure 2.1 
below shows this investment strategy. In those situations to the left of S* are 
economically unfavorable; the firm does not invest when they occur. The situations 
to the right of S* reflect profitable investment options, and consequently, the firm 
exercises the investment. The difference between the line V(s) and I indicates the net 
profit level as a function of S.
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Figure 2.1 All Equity Financed Firm
Value of the 
Investment
S* Profitable Investment 
Projects
2. Debt-Equity Financed Firm. Instead assume that initially the firm has a debt- 
equity capital structure. The outstanding debt, promised to be paid within a year, 
has a face value of Vd, and the value of equity is Vc. In this case, the firm issues 
new debt to finance the potential investment project. However, this debt is risky 
since there are states to the left of S* where the firm is worth nothing. The 
relevance of pre-existing debt occurs when the firm is expected to pay it back and 
the investment decision has been made. It is profitable to undertake the 
investment option as long as V(s) -  Vd - 1> 0 or V(s) > [Vd + 1]. If V(s) < Vd + 1 
and the project is taken, the incurred spending would be larger than the market 
value of the shareholders and they would lose.
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Figure 3.2 shows the investment strategy of managers in the presence of debt in the 
capital structure of the firm. Instead of having S* as a decision point, S** is now the 
threshold that makes V(S**) equal to Vd + 1. Potential investment projects between S* 
and S** are neglected positive investment opportunities. The net loss is indicated by 
triangle L. Figure 3.2 shows as debt increases, a greater number of positive net present 
value projects cannot be undertaken.
Figure 2.2 Debt and Equity Financed Firm with Debt Overhang
Value of the 
Investment
Vd+I
Profitable Investment 
Projects
Myers (1977) shows that a debt-equity firm with outstanding risky debt will follow a 
different investment decision rule than the one corresponding to a firm that does not issue 
risky debt or has no debt at all. Managers of a debt-equity firm (with value less than an 
equivalent all-equity financed firm), will demand a return on investments high enough to
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cover at least the investment cost and the corresponding payment owed to debt holders. 
Thus, some investment projects that exhibit a positive net present value but do not satisfy 
the above conditions are neglected, resulting in a suboptimal investment policy.
Barnett (2000) develops a model for an indebted government to show the link between 
the indebtedness level of a country and privatization through the debt effect on the 
government’s public investments. In his model, the government uses proceeds from 
privatization to pay debt service, and carries old debt from previous loans which mature 
in a limited period of time. It also faces new investment opportunities where it is 
expected that the revenues from these new investments will be shared with debt holders.
The model replicates the implications about suboptimal investment decisions reached by 
Myers (1977). It shows that the level of a country’s indebtedness may discourage the 
government from undertaking positive net present value investments that do not benefit 
it. Excessive debt makes the government invest suboptimally in public companies, which 
in turn, reduce the firms’ market value and generate less revenue to the government. 
Consequently, privatization becomes a more attractive alternative because the firm 
becomes more valuable in private hands, and the; government receives the proceeds of the 
sale.
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2.6 Summary
The economic rationale for privatization rests on the premise that the production of goods 
and services can be achieved more efficiently in the private rather than the public sector. 
This argument holds up only if the production costs of private ownership cannot be 
achieved under public ownership. The review of the literature illustrates that there is no 
intrinsic difference between public and private ownership. The observed differences in 
performance are due to differences in ownership objectives and in the nature of the 
market environment. Competition and regulation policies emerge as major determinants 
of the effects of privatization success.
While it is clear that economic performance differences between public and private firms 
provide important insights as to the effects of privatization, the empirical literature does 
not provide conclusive evidence that private ownership is superior. The often intractable 
measurement and data problems at both levels muddy the evidence and demonstrate why 
it is inconclusive. Financial distress theory indicates that divestiture of assets occurs 
when the costs of managing a financially distressed firm become too high. Excessive 
financial distress factors, particularly high external debt levels, create conditions for 
inefficient public domestic investment, which further lowers revenue from SOEs, making 
them more attractive for privatization.
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Chapter Three
The Growth of EMC Privatization
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents some stylized facts and patterns about the growth of EMC 
privatization in order to establish a baseline understanding of the data that will be 
analyzed in later chapters. Much of this data is from the mid-1980s to the mid- 
1990s, because this was the period of the greatest growth in EMC privatization 
yielding ample data and country diversity. Importantly, this period shows significant 
trends and features in EMC privatization (Abu Shair 1997) and sets up the 
discussion of patterns in the 1990s. Most EMCs in this study began their 
privatization efforts during this time. The data are also more complete than more 
recent years. The data show a great diversity in privatization among regions, sectors, 
and types of privatization. Though privatization efforts began earlier in OECD 
countries, it was during this period that EMCs countries began privatizing. By the 
late 1980s they had surpassed their OECD counterparts in the volume of 
privatizations (World Bank 1998).
3.2 The Growth of Privatization
The number of privatizations transactions worldwide grew rapidly during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Between 1988 and 1993, in over 100 countries across and more than 
2,650 privatization transactions with sale value exceeding US$50,000 were recorded, 
generating total sales revenue of US$271 billion (World Bank 1996). Of these
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transactions, close to 900 were carried out in 1993, against only 60 in 1988. Figure
3.1 below shows, EMCs accounted for much o f  this activity with about 85% o f total 
transactions. However, their share in terms o f sales proceeds accounted for only 
35% o f the total revenue from privatization between 1988 to 1996, (from only 7% 
and 12 countries in 1988 to 32% and 60 countries in 1996), amounting to about 
US$96 billion. The industrial countries had proceeds in excess o f  US$175 billion, 
owing to the dominance o f industrial countries in large-scale sales.
Figure 3.1
Number of Privatization Transactions Worldwide, 1988-1993
900
i ■  Emerging Markets 
i  □  Industrialized Countries
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Source: World Bank Global Privatization Database, 1996.
Figure 3.2 shows the value realized from privatization in EMCs from 1988 to 1996. 
One can see the disproportion between the number o f  transactions and values, but 
that ratio changed in favor o f  EMCs over time. The figures show the increase in the 
total proceeds from US$40 billion in 1988 to a peak o f  US$75 billion in 1993. The 
total proceeds for the period were almost US$156 billion.
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Figure 3.2
Value of Privatizations Worldwide, 1988-1996 (USS billions)
■  Emerging Markets 
□  Industrialized Countnes
Source: World Bank Privatization Database. 1996.
Their contribution to the total has also been increasing when taken as a percentage o f  
GDP. Figure 3.3 illustrates that the total o f  this period, and the percentage o f  GDP 
contribution increased 20% (World Bank. 1995).
Figure 3.3 
Privatization Proceeds in EMCs, 1988-96 (% of GDP)
0.70%
0.60%
0.50%
0.40%
0.30%
0 .20%
0. 10%
0.00%
1988-91 1992-96
Source: World Bank, 1998.
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There is a clear pattern between the value of privatization activity and the income 
groups of the geographical regions. Lower incomes are associated with fewer sales. 
For example, OECD countries alone accounted for 70.5% (US$190 billion) of the 
total sales worldwide. Low and middle-income countries that comprise the majority 
of EMCs, on the other hand, accounted for less than 30% of the value of the sales 
between 1988-1994.
The remaining parts of this section present a comparative profile of privatization in 
EMCs between 1988 and 1996.
3.3 Regional Distribution
The level of privatization activities has varied significantly across EMCs.1 As the 
figure below indicates, the most active region during this period of EMCs has been 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with total sales of almost US$83 billion, or 
53% of the total amount of privatization proceeds in EMCs during 1988 to 1996.
1 The regional groupings are based on the World Bank’s classification. See Appendix D.
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Figure 3.4 
Regional Distribution of Privatization in EMCs, 1988-96
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Source: World Bank, 1996.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) are second with sales o f US$30 billion, 
accounting for about 19%, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) with almost 
US$28 billion in sales or 17%. The rest o f the regions were responsible for only 
about 11% o f the value o f assets privatized, with Africa and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) accounting for the least. The rankings o f the top three 
regions were heavily influenced by the average value o f  the assets that were sold. 
Even through the number o f transactions in LAC and EA (783 and 258, respectively) 
were far less than in EECA (1784), the average value o f  an individual transaction 
was much greater. Broadly speaking, only a handful o f  countries in the data sample 
sold a large number o f  SOEs for large amounts in 1988-95 (e.g., M exico’s total 
realized sale value from 211 transactions was only US$27 billion). More countries 
sold relatively small volumes for large values. Brazil and Malaysia earned over 
US$9 billion each in sales, but had only 54 and 38 transactions respectively. Finally, 
some transition economies sold large numbers o f  SOEs for much less than the
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average value of transaction. For example, Bulgaria had 269 transactions for only 
US$296 million.
33.1 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
This region was the strongest privatizer among all regions in terms of sales volume. 
After a strong start in 1988, sales from privatization reached their peak in 1991 
(US$18 billion). They then declined to about US$5 billion in 1995. This reflected 
the fact that several countries in the region (e.g. Mexico, Argentina, and Chile) had 
already sold off most of their SOEs. However, in 1996, the region raised more than 
US$14 billion, mainly as a result of Mexico’s US$5.7 billion in privatization 
proceeds.
Mexico’s privatization accelerated rapidly when President Carlos Salinas Gotari 
took office in 1988. Between 1990 and 1996, the government generated close to 
US$26 billion in revenue from sales of state-owned assets. The most important year 
for privatization was 1991, when the telephone company Telemex was sold (for 
US$5.9 billion) as were the two largest banks, Banamex and Bancomex. By 1995, 
most of Mexico’s SOEs has been sold; privatization transactions and revenues 
declined rapidly.
Chile has been in the leader in privatization in LAC. Its privatization program began 
during the mid-1970s under Pinochet’s dictatorship in reaction to the 
nationalizations of the former socialist government. Since then, the government has 
sold off the vast majority of its SOEs in several phases. By the end of the 1980s it
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retained control of fewer than 50 of the 600 SOEs it had owned during the 1970s 
(World Bank 1996).
Argentina has been another strong privatizer in the region. President Menem, after 
his election in 1989, committed his administration to a massive reduction in the size 
of the public sector. By 1994, the government had sold 106 enterprises with 
proceeds of over US$20 billion. In addition, the government reduced the countiy’s 
external debt by about US$17 billion through debt-equity swaps. In 1993, Argentina 
made a significant move by selling 45% of the shares of its petroleum company, 
YPF, through a public offering for a total of US$3 billion.
Peru’s privatization program peaked in 1994 with revenues from privatization 
amounting to US$3 billion. Brazil only privatized 27 companies between 1988 and 
1994 for a total of US$9 billion, well below the potential of its large, SOE-based 
economy. Venezuela’s privatization program has been moving slowly in recent 
years, but was boosted in 1996 with the sale of the government’s 49% stake of its 
television station for US$1 billion. In smaller countries in the region, such as 
Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, privatization efforts gained momentum in the 
early 1990s, but the process has slowed significantly since then due to political 
instability.
33.2 Europe and Central Asia (EECA)
The former centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Republics of the Soviet Union have engaged in a massive process of selling their 
SOEs as part of the transfer to a market-oriented system. Between 1988 and 1993,
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these countries sold more than 1200 SOEs, representing almost half of all 
privatization transactions in EMCs (excluding voucher privatization). However, the 
revenue generated from privatization in the region was not particularly large, and 
reached its peak in 1995 at US$9 billion.
Hungary was the most active privatizer in the region. The government sold about 
180 SOEs for US$10 billion between 1989 and 1994. The Hungarian privatization 
program focused on privatization as part of an overall market-oriented reform 
program. It focused on revenue generation rather than on mass privatization through 
vouchers. In 1993, Hungary sold 30% of its telecommunication company, MATAV, 
for US$961 million. The country also moved towards complete banking 
privatization in 1996 with the sale of five of its six largest banks.
Poland follows Hungary in the magnitude of its privatization program. It sold 154 
enterprises for a total of US$3.4 billion between 1990 and 1996. Russia, the countiy 
with the greatest potential, opted almost exclusively for voucher programs and 
conducted only a small number of direct sales. Finally, other countries in the region 
such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania have established privatization programs, 
albeit with only minimal progress.
333 East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)
After a slow start between 1988 and 1991, privatization efforts in EAP picked up 
considerably in 1992 and 1993 with total revenues of over US$5 billion and US$7 
billion, respectively. The trend slowed again in 1996 with total sales of about
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US$2.7 billion. The mixed performance of the region’s stock markets might have 
been partly responsible for the absence of privatization-related equity deals.
Between 1988 and 1996, the most intensive privatizers in terms of revenues from 
sales were Malaysia (US$9.3 billion, more than one-third of the region’s total), 
China (US$8 billion), and Indonesia (US$5 billion). Although China does not have 
an official privatization program, it has sold stakes in SOEs to foreign and domestic 
investors on the Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges.
33.4 South Asia (SA)
Privatization transactions in SA reached a peak in 1994 with about US$2.6 billion. 
India dominated the region with more than 70% of the region’s total revenues of 
US$8 billion. In 1996, the government sold US$370 million worth of the State Bank 
of India’s equity, which was the largest equity offering ever from the country. 
Overall, the region’s privatization projects have declined in recent years, owing to 
political and sociocultural obstacles.
33.5 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are the only countries in the region that have 
undertaken significant privatization transactions in the 1990s. Egypt’s share of the 
region’s total privatization revenue amounted to about 55%, followed by Morocco 
with 32%. In contrast to SA and EAP, privatization programs in MENA have 
accelerated in recent years, owing to Egypt’s aggressive selling of a long list of 
SOEs that generated more than US$1 billion in 1996 (compared with only US$700 
million between 1993 and 1995).
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33.6 Sub-Saharan Africa
SSA had the smallest share (2.4%) of the total privatization revenues between 1988 
and 1996, with only US$3.8 billion. Excluding two important South African sales in 
1989 (US$1 billion), Ghana has led the region in terms of sales value (US$804 
million), followed by Nigeria (US$730 million). Other countries in the region have 
created privatization programs that have shown varying degrees of success. 
Mozambique, for instance, privatized around 276 public companies.
3.4 Sectoral Distribution
The regions also differ substantially with respect to the sectoral distribution, 
reflecting the vaiying degrees of public sector involvement. Infrastructure sales 
were significant in LAC as well as EAP. The other regions privatized mostly 
industrial and primary sector enterprises.
In terms of sales revenues based on sectoral distribution between 1988 and 1996, the 
data shows that in 1988, most sales revenues came from the primary sector. Since 
then, however, sales of SOEs in infrastructure and manufacturing sectors have 
grown rapidly, and now dominate privatization transactions in EMCs. The total 
proceeds from sales of SOEs in the infrastructure sector have accounted for 43% of 
the total privatization revenues in EMCs, and were largely concentrated in LAC— 
which helps to explain the high value of assets sold in this particular region. Almost 
no privatization took place in the financial sector until 1991, when many countries in 
LAC (Mexico in particular) began selling commercial banks. Figure 3.5 shows the
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sectoral distribution o f privatization transactions in EMCs for the period 1988 and 
1996.
Figure 3.5 
Sectoral Distribution, 1988-1996
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Source: World Bank. 1996.
3.4.1 Infrastructure
Infrastructure privatizations dominated EMC privatization activity during the 1990s. 
These include sales in the telecommunications, power, and transportation companies. 
Privatizations o f telecommunications assets, amounting to US$30 billion from 1988 
to 1996, were the largest type o f infrastructure sales in EMCs. Telemex, the 
telephone SOE for Mexico, was its largest privatization transaction with a total value 
o f US$4.9 billion. Other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean privatized 
many o f their SOEs in the telecommunications sector as well. East Asia countries, 
on the other hand, were weak in telecommunications sales, with only a small 
minority o f shares sold in South Korea’s company. Countries in other regions 
achieved practically no significant privatization in the telecommunications sector 
until 1994.
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Privatization in power was significant with overall sales worth USS20 billion in 
EMCs between 1988 and 1996. The most important privatizer in this sector was 
Argentina, which sold its electric power utilities for US$2.1 billion and its gas 
distribution network for another US$1.8 billion. South Korea, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines also privatized some of their power utilities.
As for the transportation sector (airlines, railroads, and ports), the most significant 
sales were those of national airlines, which generated close to US$6 billion, or 80% 
of all revenues from transportation privatizations.
3.4.2 Manufacturing (Industrial)
Even though privatization transactions in this sector (steel, chemicals, construction, 
and light manufacturing) were concentrated in EECA, LAC countries produced the 
highest sales volume, with a value of almost US$10 billion between 1988-1994 from 
sales of large chemical and steel plants (e.g., Mexico’s USIMINAS). Other regions 
lagged behind.
3.43 The Primary Sector
Since SOEs in the primary sector (petroleum and mining) often symbolize wealth 
and independence, most governments had not considered privatizing them (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco). When Argentina began to sell its petroleum 
company in 1993, it signaled to the international markets the country’s complete 
dedication to pursuing privatization. Argentina received US$4.3 billion from 
petroleum-related privatizations between 1990 and 1993.
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3.4.4 The Financial Sector
Between 1988 and 1996, sales of publicly held financial institutions amounted to 
almost US$22.5 billion, or 15% of total EMC revenues from privatization. The 
largest share of these revenues came from transactions in LAC, especially Mexico, 
which sold eighteen commercial banks. In EAP, the Philippines privatized seven 
banks for US$800 million. In Egypt, state-owned banks began divesting shares in 
joint venture banks as part of the government’s strategy to withdraw from the 
banking sector.
3.5 Method of Sale
Direct sales were the predominant form of privatizations between 1988 and 1993 in 
EMCs. The direct sales of 1,853 firms represented more than 80% of all transactions 
in this time period and accounted for about 58% of the total revenues generated. 
Public offerings were the second most frequently used sales method and accounted 
for about 38% of the total privatization revenues even though they were only used in 
about 12% of all transactions. The other techniques lagged behind in both frequency 
and revenues they generated.
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Figure 3.6
Privatizations by Method of Sale, 1988-1996
Liquidation
0 .10%
Joint Venture
1.30% MBO
0.20% Concession 
2 .10%
Public Offei 
38.50%
Lease
0 .00%
Direct Sales 
57.80%
□  Concession
□  Joint Venture 
■  Lease
□  Public Offer 
■  Liquidation
□  Direct Sales 
■  MBO
Source: World Bank. 1996.
Sales methods have varied across regions for various reasons, including privatization 
strategy and market conditions. The most preferred method in EAP and SA, where 
stock markets are relatively developed, has been public offers. Between 1988-1993 
approximately 60% and 90% of total privatization revenues in those regions 
respectively were generated through public offerings. In contrast, public offerings in 
SSA generated no more than 2% o f the total revenues, due to the virtual absence o f 
stock markets. Almost all transactions in the region were carried out through direct 
sales. LAC and EECA resorted primarily to direct sales as well, with 60% and 70% 
of total revenues, respectively, to attract management and technological transfers.
3.6 Foreign Participation in Privatization
Foreign investors can participate in privatization transactions either through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) or portfolio equity investment (PEI). Between 1988 and 
1996, foreign investors were involved in a total o f  760 transactions in EMCs,
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generating a total o f US$70 billion in sale, or 45% o f  the total revenue (from 9% in 
1988 to 44% in 1996). FDI and PEI accounted for 62% (US$43 billion) and 38% 
(US$27 billion) o f  the overall foreign exchange earnings resulting from 
privatization. While the level o f  FDI participation in privatizations remained steady 
between 1988 and 1996, the driving force behind the increase in foreign 
participation was PEI; which grew at an explosive rate. It increased from around 
US$100 million in 1990 to US$5.6 billion in 1996; twice as much as in 1995 when 
equity issues plunged in the aftermath o f the Mexican peso crisis.
Figure 3.7
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Portfolio Equity Investment 
(PEI) in Privatization (US$ billions)
□  FDI 
■  PEI
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Source: World Bank, 1998
The heaviest foreign participation (50%) was in LAC followed by EECA (24%), and 
EAP (20%). SA, by contrast has an extremely low share o f  foreign investment 
participation (2.3%) because o f  the limitations placed on foreign participation in 
many countries o f the region.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter presents a comparative account of the growth and differentiation of 
EMC privatization. It presents various ownership privatization methods and 
discusses various measures and policies designed to bring SOEs into the private 
market.
The cross-country profile of the privatization record to date has focused on the 
regional, sectoral, methodological and foreign investment participation perspectives. 
The survey shows that EMC privatization has become widespread, accounting for 
85% of worldwide privatization transactions between 1988 and 1993, and 35% of 
the total revenues from privatization. During this period, countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean rank first in terms of magnitude of their privatization programs, 
followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The most popular sector for 
privatization transactions has been the infrastructure sector, where most of the large- 
scale sales took place. The manufacturing sector is second. Direct sales dominate 
the spectrum of privatization methods used, accounting for 58% of the total value of 
the sales. Finally, foreign investment participation through FDI and PEI has 
contributed substantially to financing privatization projects in EMCs.
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Chapter Four 
Hypotheses
4.1 Introduction
Research on privatization has been dominated by investigations of the efficiency and 
socio-political explanations. This has occurred in part because these explanations tended 
to focus on wide-scale policy changes that were debated in many countries during the 
1980s and 1990s. These debates continue today, and thus economic and socio-political 
explanations often take center stage for many researchers. What research there is on 
financial factors tends to be almost exclusively focused on budgetary explanations, with 
little or no empirical research on financial distress, although it has been mentioned in the 
more theoretical literature (Cook and Uchida 2001, Krugman 1988, Sachs 1984, Sachs 
1986). Barnett (2000) goes the farthest in his study of the fiscal and macroeconomic 
impacts of privatization. He finds that privation proceeds are used to reduce domestic 
financing. However, his aim is to explain how privatization proceeds are used.
The connection between financial distress theory and privatization has not been fully 
explored. The central hypothesis of this dissertation centers on the observation that 
countries experiencing “financial distress,” such as high budget deficits, large current 
account deficits, poor credit ratings, and significant external debt show a disproportionate 
tendency to privatize.
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This chapter presents some background on debt (and other measures of country financial 
distress) and privatization in EMCs and discusses the foundations of the empirical 
predictions to be tested.
4.2 Hypotheses
A popular avenue for economic growth by EMCs has been through external borrowing. 
EMCs have borrowed in world markets to finance an excess of imports over exports. By 
importing capital goods, EMCs were able to supplement domestic savings.
A dramatic increase in debt occurred in almost eveiy EMC during the 1980s, and 
continued in many countries through the 1990s (Figure 4.1 and Appendix C). 
Governments around the world found themselves in a debt trap. Unlike the Baker Plan of 
1985, the Brady relief initiative in 1989 promised for the first time to grant debt and debt 
service relief to countries that followed market-oriented economic reforms to promote 
growth (Todaro 1989). Privatization of SOEs was one of the handful of core reform 
measures expected in exchange for debt relief. Nellis (1989) reported that mandatory 
privatization policies appeared in about 40% of the structural adjustment loan agreements 
signed by the World Bank between 1978 and 1988 and frequently became a condition for 
the release of payments to borrowing countries. This leads to the first hypothesis about 
the relationship between debt and privatization.
HI. As relative debt levels increase, more privatization transactions are 
undertaken.
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Figure 4.1 Total Debt Stocks (US$ millions), 1997
K less than 659.8
r~ 659.8 2.128.7
r~ 2.128.7 5.070.8
r~ 5.070.8 15,608.6
r~ 15.608.6 or more
r~ No data available
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998.
The theoretical relationship betw een the level o f  pre-existing debt and privatization draw s 
from the theory o f  the firm , particularly the concepts o f  debt-over hang and financial 
stress and their effect on investm ent decisions. M yers (1977) w as the first to analyze the 
distorting effects that pre-existing debt is likely to have on m anagers’ decisions regarding 
the level and type o f  investm ents. He show ed that pre-existing debt in a private firm  can 
reduce the incentives o f  m anagers to undertake new  investm ents (causing sub-optim al 
investm ent behavior) out o f  fear that the gains w ould go entirely to the debt-holders. For 
governm ents, w e expect investm ents to decline as debt increases.
H2. As relative debt levels increase, public sector investment declines.
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To reduce debt levels, firms can either persuade creditors to write down their claims, or 
retire their debt by selling assets (Gilson 1997). However, it is often difficult to induce 
creditors to participate in a restructuring plan. Each creditor has an incentive not to 
forgive debt if he believes other creditors will make the concessions needed to return the 
firm to solvency.
Firms that face creditor intractability will have more difficulty in renegotiating their debt 
and will have to begin to liquidate their assets (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991). Gilson 
and Brown et al. (1994) show that distressed firms must sell assets to pay down debt, 
often under pressure from their bank lenders. In Gilson’s study of financially distressed 
firms, 69% of the firms surveyed reported asset sales. As debt increases, we should see 
an increase in privatization as a means to finance their spending problems. Like firms, 
countries are induced to sell assets. One major indicator of financial stress is the current 
account situation. When countries have a negative current account, they have to increase 
their debt to pay for on-going expenses of the country. In most cases, the current account 
deficit is financing bad spending patterns or overconsumption (Dombusch 2001). With a 
negative current account we expect to see a greater level of privatization.
H3. Current account deficits are correlated with more privatization activity.
Finally, the last two hypotheses are related to classic measures of financial distress— 
budget deficits and poor credit ratings.
H4. High, persistent central government budget deficits are correlated with
higher privatization activity.
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Cosset and Roy (1990) argue that countries with poor credit ratings are more indebted 
and are in a relatively poor state of financial health and are more likely to default.
H5. Lower country credit ratings are correlated with increased privatization.
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Chapter Five 
Data and Methodology
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses. It also discusses the 
data: how it was obtained, its features and characteristics, and the criteria applied for 
inclusion into the study. This chapter is divided into five parts. First, the underlying 
methodological philosophy is discussed. Second, the sample and data characteristics 
(descriptive statistics) are presented and explained. Third, the specific methodology used 
is presented. Fourth the variables for the estimation are listed and described. Finally, the 
model limitations are discussed.
5.2 Underlying Methodological Philosophy
The three philosophies most fundamental to the philosophy of research methodology are 
positivism, normativism, and pragmatism (Ethridge 2004). Positivism adheres to the 
view that only “factual” knowledge gained through observation, including measurement, 
is trustworthy. Positivism originated in the physical sciences and became influential in 
the social sciences during the mid-20th century and has maintained its importance to the 
current time. Positivism asserts that only phenomena that can be directly observed or 
measured are meaningful. Castle (1989) argues that theoretical concepts are valid only if 
the theory or its propositions can be quantified.
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Normativism takes the position that knowledge of goodness and badness of conditions, 
situations, things and actions is valid and even necessary in order to produce prescriptive 
knowledge. Normativistic philosophy in social science research emphasizes matters on 
which people place value such as efficiency, welfare, income, standard of living, and 
quality of life (Gerring 2001). Normativism accepts that objective value knowledge is 
sometimes essential for statements or prescriptions about what should be done to 
accomplish specified goals or objectives. For example, “the world is better off if 
governments can be made to operate more efficiently.” Privatization as a public policy 
tool must use normative value judgments and be concerned with values.
Pragmatism is a philosophy that holds that what is important with respect to descriptive 
knowledge is how well it works for the problem at hand (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994). Pragmatists evaluate concepts for their usefulness in solving problems rather than 
for their own sake. In other words, pragmatists are interested in applying concepts to 
solve problems. The selection of methodology is based primarily on the ability of that 
methodology to solve the problem at hand.
This dissertation utilizes both positivism and pragmatism as its guiding research 
philosophies. Part of the value of this study, unlike the great majority of privatization 
research to date, is the fact that it is not normative in nature. Most privatization research 
has been conducted to support or justify policy decisions.
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Positivism in particular has fostered the importance and development of measurement 
and quantification—the use of data to test the validity of theories and derive expected 
magnitudes of effects. The interest in measurement as well as the increasing availability 
of data in the 20th century fostered the development of statistical methods, especially the 
branch of statistics known as sampling. The integration of social science theory and 
mathematics led to the development of econometrics (Ethridge 2004). Econometrics 
includes empirical data and measurements, making it both positivistic and pragmatic. The 
general process of research closely associated with these two philosophies is called the 
“scientific approach.” It is generally accepted in social science research that the logic of 
scientific inference provides the most robust generalized methodological approach (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994).
5.2.1 The Scientific Method and Statistical Econometrics
The scientific approach, which is employed in this study, can be characterized as having 
the following general steps: 1) identify the problem/issue/question; 2) define the research 
objectives; 3) develop approaches for achieving objectives (which may include testing of 
hypotheses of expected outcomes and/or alternative solutions); 4) conduct the analysis 
(obtain appropriate information and evaluate it, which may include testing of 
hypotheses); and 5) interpret the results and draw conclusions, including providing 
prescriptions, if appropriate.
Moreover, the scientific approach consists of ongoing interfacing of deduction and 
induction. Induction is an empirical process of arriving at new generalities from
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observed realities (facts, data, observations) and does not depend of previous knowledge 
(Ethridge 2004). While the process of arriving at hypotheses is largely deductive, the 
testing of hypotheses, statistical or otherwise, is large inductive. Statistical induction is 
one of the most prevalent research approaches in the social sciences, especially 
economics (Wooldridge 2000). Statistical induction is the process of testing whether 
estimates of parameters are different from some specified quantity or whether estimates 
of relationships explain a statistically significant proportion of the variation in variables.
The objective of induction is to show the outcome is derived from available evidence that 
has been generated or obtained from reliable information. Even when the focus is on 
developing theoiy, a deductive process, theory must eventually be evaluated for 
applicability or validity through empirical testing, an inductive process.
Deduction (theory alone) is insufficient in studying real world phenomena because it 
lacks the definitive means of evaluating whether the premises (assumptions) of the ideal 
types match the situation being analyzed (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Induction 
alone (observing, empirical testing) is insufficient because there is always the probability 
of error (Ladd, 1987). Scientific inquiry must rely on the use of both deduction and 
induction in a constant interaction with one another with the methodological framework 
of the scientific approach.
Using the scientific approach, the goal is to collect a substantial quantity of relevant 
evidence and apply analytical techniques to the data. The intent is not to gain significant
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knowledge about specific cases or specific categories (beyond what is necessary to code 
variables), but to cast a wide net and to avoid any restrictions in scope. A variable- 
oriented study such as this one begins by specifying the hypothesis to be tested and then 
delineating the widest population of relevant observations. The wider the population, the 
better (Ragin 1987). Not only does a wide population provide a basis for a more exacting 
test, but it also gives the investigator the opportunity to demonstrate the breadth of an 
argument.
Statistical analysis using econometrics is one of the leading methods of empirical 
investigation in social science (Gerring 2001). Its methodology is well documented and 
widely understood. It is one of the most robust research methodologies in social science. 
Therefore it is particularly useful for the purpose of researchers to replicate and extend 
the findings of this study.
The econometric modeling approach also lends itself to analyzing the large amount of 
data. The researcher was fortunate to have access to ample and applicable data for over a 
ten-year study period through sources including the World Bank, the IMF, the IDB, and 
other multilateral agencies. Without the quantity and quality of the data, different 
research methods may have been used.
Econometric models are not without their limitations. In order to model phenomena, it is 
often necessary to simplify and abstract independent and dependent variables.
Sometimes this abstraction can lead to oversimplification and/or a reduction in accuracy.
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Another limitation, overspecification, is caused when too many independent variables are 
added. The addition of more independent variables cannot decrease the R squared, in 
most cases, will at least marginally increase the R squared (Bertsimas and Freund 2000). 
Thus the model should be kept as simple as possible, which again, can lead to 
oversimplification (Wooldridge 2000). Another pitfall is the problem of 
multicollinearity. This occurs when two independent variables are highly correlated, 
leading to erroneous correlation. Fortunately there are simple tests to this problem that 
are utilized in this study.
Another limitation is that the data need to be uniform and complete. This is not always 
possible when dealing with real world phenomena. This means a number of data need to 
be edited out or simplified, thereby further abstracting the model.
5.2.2 Limitations of Comparative Analysis and Case Studies, Direct Surveys and 
Optimization Models
The comparative analysis approach is useful in many circumstances, especially where the 
number of relevant observations decreases (Smelser 1976). Comparative method is 
essentially a case-oriented strategy with the focus on comparing cases, and cases are 
examined as wholes—as combinations of characteristics (Ragin 1987). The comparison 
of two to four cases is considered the limit for most research. As the number of cases and 
the number of relevant causal conditions increase, the case approach becomes more and 
more difficult to use. Case studies often focus on a single case and so they lack a 
sufficient number of N. Case studies rely on within-case variation in order to develop 
larger causal relationships (Gerring 2001). This can often result in problems with lack of
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generalizable results, lack of replicability and autocorrelation. These problems severely 
limit the robustness of this method. The case study method is often used when the 
number of relevant observations is too small to allow the investigator to establish 
statistical control over the conditions and causes of variation. For the purpose of this 
study, abundant and high quality data were available.
Case studies are often justified on the basis of the particular case or cases as being 
“representative” of the research objective. How does the researcher determine which 
case or cases is representative? There are no concrete or methods for doing this (Gerring 
2001). For example, economic and political science work in general has focused on the 
United States. More studies have been devoted to individual American Cities and States, 
than can be found on many countries around the world. If all countries were like the 
United States, this bias would not be problematic, but this is not the case.
The direct survey method was not used in part because much of the data was already 
available and did not have to be gathered. Moreover, surveys can suffer from interviewer 
or question biases, sampling biases, and often contain an insufficient quantity of data.
Another popular avenue of research has been through pure mathematical modeling and 
optimization. The research has often focused on economic efficiency. This approach is 
limited by the fact that the models have to be overly simplified to the point of being 
unrealistically abstract. Moreover, there have been very few clear-cut results on 
economic efficiency optimization. Quantitative modeling in this manner can lead to less
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accuracy if the quantitative variables and values do not relate closely to the concepts or 
events that they are designed to measure and can lead to serious measurement error and 
problems with causal inference.
5.3 Sample and Data Characteristics
The following characteristics of the sample and data need to be considered. First, the 
results are based on a select sample of countries for a certain period of privatization for 
which data are available. This data does not represent the complete universe of EMC 
privatization activity, but a particularly informative period of privatization. The decade 
of the 1990s was chosen because it is the first complete 10-year period for which a 
significant amount of EMC privatization data has become available (Boubakri and Cosset 
2000). Djankov and Murrell (2000) cite the 1990s as the period of greatest privatization, 
with more than 150,000 SOEs in EMCs undergoing some form of privatization or 
restructuring. This decade also captures both the rapid increase in the early 1990s, and 
stabilization of privatization activity in the mid-to-late 1990s in many EMCs (Small 
2001, and World Bank 2002). The analysis could not extend farther back in time because 
the discontinuity of some of the data series used. Privatization for many EMCs switched 
into high gear during the 1990s. Moreover, this period provides the best ten-year period 
to yield the greatest number of sample observations of EMCs (World Bank 2002).
The raw data is derived from the World Bank (Global Development Finance Database 
1999, World Bank Debt Tables 2002, World Bank Privatization Database 2001, and 
World Development Indicators 2001), Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development, and the International Finance Corporation (Emerging Markets Database 
2000). The initial sample of 125 EMCs was obtained from the World Bank 
“Classification of Economies” (2002). The World Bank classifies economies by gross 
national income (GNI) per capita. Based on their GNI category, economies must then be 
classified as low to middle income to be considered EMCs. This group was 
disaggregated for those EMC that had experienced privatization over the 10-year period 
equal to or greater than 5% of the country’s GNI. This level is generally considered to 
be the threshold for significant privatization activity (Dombusch 2000). Privatization 
was aggregated and measured by revenue proceeds for each country. The sample size 
was then reduced to 65 countries. The final data sample consists of 42 countries EMCs.
The sample exhibits considerable randomness and diversity of privatization revenues, 
sectors privatized, country GNI, and timing of privatization activity and geographic 
distribution. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the 42 countries and the diversity of 
privatization revenues over the ten-year period.
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Figure 5.1 
Value of Privatizations, 1990-1999
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Source: World Bank Privatization Database, 2001.
It is im portant to bear in mind that the aggregate privatization revenues num bers are 
com prised o f  hundreds o f  thousands o f  individual privatization transactions across 
different industries and sectors o f  individual countries. Table 5.3 below  provides a 
sam ple o f  the types o f  com panies and industries o f  C hina in 1997. The com plete dataset 
for privatizations transactions for all countries over the entire 10-year period is included 
in A ppendix D.
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Table 5.1
Sample of Privatization Transactions in China, 1997
YEAR COUNTRY COMPANY SECTOR SALE AMOUNT*
1997 China Nanjing Posts and Telecommunications Equip. Electronics 31.4
1997 China Zhejiang Expressway Transportation 439.0
1997 China Aviation Industries of China Aviation 144.0
1997 China Catic Shenzhen Manufacturing 49.2
1997 China Jiangxi Copper Metallurgy (copper) 207.0
1997 China Shandong Chenming Paper Industrial Paper 66.0
1997 China Tianjin Zhong Xin Pharmaceutical Group Corporation ltd. Pharmaceuticals 67.0
1997 China Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery Port machinery 41.4
1997 China Heilongjiang Electric Power Power 67.0
1997 China Beijing Datang Power Generation Company Power 404.5
1997 China Beijing North Star Company Ltd Real estate 209.0
1997 China Tianjin Development Holdings Ltd. Retail 153.6
•Millions of US$
Source: World Bank Privatization Database, 2001.
In the first six months of 1997 alone, China privatized SOEs in electronics, 
transportation, aviation, manufacturing, paper, pharmaceuticals, power generation, real 
estate, metallurgy, and retail. Most of the privatization reflected a cross-section of the 
SOEs viable for privatization in a particular economy, with no particular bias or 
overrepresentation of industry sectors or types of companies.
The data used for privatization consists of all the partial or complete sales of public 
companies made by governments to the private sector. Privatization data was collected 
by the World Bank (World Bank 2000,2001). Data for public external debt and related 
variables are also annually published by the World Bank (see Appendix B for the data 
sources). The specific values for each individual country are listed in Appendices C and
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D. The tables in A ppendix D show  total assets privatized in each country o f  the sam ple 
and the corresponding receipts in U.S. dollars.
The com bined, aggregate values o f  debt for all countries are listed in Figure 5.3 below. 
Nearly all countries show ed strong debt grow th rates from 1990 to 1999.
Figure 5.2
External Debt and GNI, 1990-1999_______________________
External Debt and GNI, 1990-1999
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As can be seen from Figure 5.3, for m ost countries, it is im portant to note debt is a 
significant proportion o f  the GNI (gross national incom e). S ignificantly, the am ount o f  
debt in the study countries nearly doubled between 1990 and 1999, from  $1 trillion to $2 
trillion.
Figure 5.4 below  tracks privatization proceeds from every year from 1990 to 1999. For 
six o f  the nine years, the rate o f  privatization increased. The 1990s w ere a tim e o f  active
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and increasing privatization for m ost EM C countries. There are also m ajor d ifferences 
am ong privatizing countries in term s o f  absolute values o f  privatization. T hough 
privatization proceeds o f  som e countries m ay be relatively low , the total o f  privatization 
proceeds over the 10-year period w as still significant for the specific country.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the privatization activity over this period. P rivatization revenues 
increased in the early 1990s, declined in 1993, stabilized in 1995 w ith a slight increase in 
1996, and then rapidly increased in 1997, coinciding w ith the w orld financial crisis. In 
1997 EM C s around the w orld faced conditions o f  dram atically  increased financial 
distress, large debts, deteriorating m acroeconom ic conditions, and insufficient sources o f  
revenue.
Figure 5.3
Annual Receipts from Privatization______________________
Annual Receipts from Privatization
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The types of companies being privatized did not change significantly from the early 
1990s, and included a wide range of SOEs. This is an important aspect of the data 
because many countries started their privatization processes in the 1980s, but concluded 
some of their main transactions several years later. Moreover, some countries, especially 
because of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, stepped up their privatization efforts. The 
specific privatization proceeds values for each country are listed in Appendix D.
5.3.1 Debt
Debt is comprised of long-term and short-term components. Long-term debt is defined as 
debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. Long-term debt has 
three components. There is public debt, which is an external obligation of a public 
debtor, including the national government, a political subdivision, or autonomous public 
bodies. There is publicly guaranteed debt, which is an external obligation of a private 
debtor that is guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. There is private 
nonguaranteed debt, which is an external obligation of a private debtor that is not 
guaranteed for repayment by a public entity (World Bank 2002). Short-term debt 
includes the following: interest in arrears on long-term debt, and short-term, officially 
guaranteed suppliers’ credit.
As mentioned previously, “indebtedness” is further subdivided by the World Bank into 
severe, moderate and light indebtedness as shown in Figure 5.5. The study countries 
range in their characterization of indebtedness from “slight” to “severe.” The majority of
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the countries are characterized by the W orld Bank as either lightly or m oderately
indebted.
Figure 5.4
Indebtedness Type ___________________________
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Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2000.
5.4 Methodology
Both cross-sectional and tim e-series data are used. C ross-sectional data consists o f  data 
collected from a population at a  given point in tim e, w here m inor tim e differences in 
collecting the data are ignored. T im e-series data are constructed from  repeated cross- 
sections over the 10-year period. U nlike cross-sectional data, the chronological ordering 
o f  observations in a tim e-series conveys potentially im portant inform ation such as trends 
and changes over time. The tim e period betw een 1990 and 1999 was selected because it 
was a period o f  extensive privatization activity in EM Cs. The year 1990 w as also 
selected as the base year because it m arked the return to m ore norm al global econom ic 
conditions after an abrupt recession caused by the crash o f  m any w orld equities m arkets 
in the late 1980s. A ppendix D provides the cleaned and sum m arized data for the bulk o f
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the analysis. Each data table is individually labeled as to its content and time period. 
Both cross-sectional and time-series tables are included in this Appendix.
5.5 Estimation Techniques
Three estimation techniques are used to analyze the data: ordinary least squares (OLS), 
time-series data analysis, and summary statistical analysis. The fixed effects (FE) model 
was is because it controls for systematic differences in the mean levels of regions and 
years. The assumptions and main specifications of these models and approaches are 
discussed below.
The linear regression model takes the following form:
Yj= p0 + Xjp + Ej i = 1 ,.. .n
Where e is a normally distributed random variable with mean p = 0, a standard deviation 
o, is homoscedastic, and with no autocorrelation.
5.5.1 Estimation Assumptions
It is useful to explain the use of fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) specifications. 
These two models are usually used when the number of cross-sectional units is large and 
the number of time periods over which those units are observed is small. Both effects use 
dummy variables in the context of time-series data. They try to account for the impact of 
certain variables left out of the model that either affect each cross-section to a different 
degree or are unique to each unit. The question is, which model should be used?
80
If the data exhaust the population, then the FE approach that produces results conditional 
on the units in the data set, is a better model to use. The FE model might be viewed as 
applying only to the cross-sectional units of the study, and not to additional ones outside 
the sample.
On the other hand, if the data represents a sample of observations from a large population 
with the intention of making inferences regarding other members of the population, then 
the RE model has advantages over the FE model because it saves degrees of freedom. 
This would be appropriate if the sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large 
population. In this study, however, the sample population is exhausted. In addition, the 
random effects model has a major drawback as it assumes that the random error 
associated with each cross-section unit is uncorrelated with the other regressors—which 
is not always the case. The random effects treatment may therefore suffer from 
inconsistency due to omitted variables.
5.5.2 Multiple Regression Estimation Technique
While analyzing the relationship of debt and privatization, there are other factors that will 
be taken into account to ascertain their effects on privatization as well. Multiple 
regression allows many observed factors to affect y. The general multiple linear 
regression model can be written as:
y  =  00 +  P lX l +  p2*2 +  03*3 +  • • •+  PkXk +  E
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where Po is the intercept, Pi is the parameter associated with Xj, P2 is the parameter 
associated with X2 and so on. There are k independent variables and e is the normally 
distributed variable with p=0 and some standard deviation a.
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) chooses the estimates to minimize the sum 
of the residuals. That is, given n observations on y, x l, and x2, the estimates po + PiXi + 
P2X2 +  P3X3 are chosen simultaneously to make as small as possible.
£  (y i-P o -P iX n - 02x12)’ 
!=1
The terminology 
Y
Dependent Variable 
Explained Variable
Response Variable 
Predicted Variable 
Regressand
or multiple regression is given in the table below. 
Xi, X2, . .  .,Xk
Independent Variables 
Explanatory Variables
Control Variables 
Predictor Variables
Regressors
Source: Wooldridge, 2000.
Given the large number of independent variables, there are potential problems with 
multicollinearity and over-specification. This also raises the problem of which subset of 
possible independent variables should be chosen to arrive at the “best” model. The 
method used to address these problems was stepwise regression, subject to the below 
relationship (Wooldridge 1999). 
if >5(k + 2)
Where
n is the number of data observations, and k is the number of explanatory variables.
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5.6 Variables
The variables (or their proxies) for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
empirical analysis are presented and explained below.
Privatization (PRIV) is the dependent variable in the empirical estimation. It is measured 
as the total amount in millions of U.S. dollars of privatization revenues per year. This 
includes all of the partial or complete sales of public companies made by governments to 
the private sector. It also includes the contracting of government services through 
concession or licensing agreements. Excluded are transactions that do not generate a 
cash flow, such as voucher privatization.
This variable exhibits only non-negative values; zeros when there are no transactions, and 
positive figures (i.e., the value of assets sold) in the case of transactions. Several 
countries began to privatize at or before the beginning of the study time frame (1990), 
while others began later. Some countries have uninterrupted processes whereas others 
have experienced as much as several years without privatization activity.
In an ideal estimation, privatization levels should reflect the public sector’s proportion of 
the assets being privatized. Then it would be possible to control for public sector size 
and be able to know the maximum amount that each country could potentially privatize. 
This is important because the country debt might keep growing but privatization might 
not continue (i.e., there is a finite amount which can be privatized). In the most extreme
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case, the maximum amount of the privatizable assets would precisely be the size of the 
public sector.
To capture the finite amount of assets that can be privatized, one needs a measure of the 
government’s market value of assets. However, this information does not exist. Nor is 
there systematic information about the number of public sector workers which could be 
used a proxy for government size. Instead, three alternative variables have been used to 
weigh privatization levels in each country: gross national income (GNI), government 
share of GNI, and the value of exports of goods and services. They do not measure the 
size of the public sector and since their values can swing up or down, the relative 
amounts privatized maybe inflated (or deflated) depending on the economic performance 
of each country in the years of privatization. Nonetheless, of these three normalizing 
variables, the government share of GNI is expected to be the most accurately correlated 
with the size of government assets.
Different explanatory variables are systematically added to each equation to check the 
robustness of the estimate on privatization, assess whether overall estimates are sensible, 
and mitigate against specification problems due to omitted variables. Finally the 
equations are run using different combinations of samples, which, provides another 
robustness check.
The independent variables used in the estimation are as follows.
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1. External Debt Level (DEBT). The estimation uses the level of external debt 
with the purpose of finding the most suitable definition of debt to test the 
debt-privatization relationship. Total external debt is the sum of public, 
publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt (World Bank 2000) (see glossary for further 
explanation). External debt seems to be the most inclusive and most generally 
acknowledged form of debt for measuring non-domestic indebtedness. To 
weight the debt variable, debt is regressed with GNI (Gross National Income).
2. GNI (GNI). Gross national income is used to weight the privatization and 
debt values by country. GNI, like debt, grew considerably for almost all of 
the countries in the study over the 10-year period, with a slight to moderate 
decline for several Asian countries after 1997. For operational and analytical 
purposes, the World Bank's main criterion for classifying economies is GNI 
(World Bank 2002). It measures the value of output produced within the 
economy. This is derived by adding the combined value of personal 
consumption expenditures, gross private domestic investment, government 
purchases of goods and services, and net exports of goods and services (Begg, 
Fischer, and Dombusch 1994).
3. Current Account Deficit (CA). This measures several important attributes of a 
country’s economy. In the first instance, the current account measures the 
trade balance of goods and services with the rest of the world. When a
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country imports goods and services from the rest of the world, it makes 
payments to foreigners (a current account deficit). When a country exports 
goods and services to the rest of the world, it receives payments from 
foreigners (a CA surplus). The current account includes the balance of 
exports minus imports, but also interest paid to and received from the rest of 
the world.
The CA is important for two reasons. First, it is an indicator of the relative 
importance of its integration (or lack of) into the global economy. Second, it 
is an indicator of financial stress. For example, when a government cannot 
cover its spending with taxes or exports (CA surplus), then it is forced to 
borrow to cover its expenses. Countries with a positive current account 
balance are more likely to service debt (Cossett and Roy 1991). Borrowing to 
finance debt or interest on the debt is particularly onerous because if the 
borrowing does not go towards productive, profitable investments, and only to 
finance its bad spending habits or over-consumption, then the borrowing 
could lead to more debt and financial distress (Dombusch 2001).
4. Central Government Fiscal Deficit (DEFIC). The fiscal deficit variable
measures the government’s domestic financial situation. The budget deficit is 
the excess of government outlays over government receipts. When the 
government is running a deficit, it is spending more than it is taking in. A 
government finances deficits mainly by borrowing from the public through
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selling bonds. As a result of this borrowing, the government builds up its debt 
to the public (Begg, Fischer, Dombusch 1994). Persistent deficits reflect a 
struggle by the government to obtain domestic resources.
5. Credit Rating (CRED). This in an index of international country credit ratings 
developed by Euromoney (1987). Euromoney is a leading international 
financial services publication. Country risk has become a topic of major 
concern for the international lending community. A country risk rating is an 
indicator of the likelihood that a sovereign borrower will default on its debts. 
The rating is a weighted average of two indicators: 1) market indicators, 
covering access to bond markets, selldown performance (a measure of 
oversubscription or otherwise of an issue) and access to trade finance; and 2) 
credit indicators, incorporating payment record and rescheduling difficulties, 
analytical indicators, including political risk, economic indicators and 
economic forecasts. These ratings combine both the market’s perceptions of 
country risk (access to markets and selldown performance) with some 
objective factors (payment records and economic indicators). These ratings 
are important because a systematic relationship between lenders’ country risk 
assessments and credit pricing has been established. Countries with high 
credit scores have been shown to be less indebted (Cosset and Roy 1991).
6. Investment (INVEST). This variable measures the level of government 
investment through “fixed capital formation.” This reflects all country-level
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investments made in the country. There is no reliable set of data that reports 
government investment over this period for the study countries. Fixed capital 
formation is the best proxy for EMCs where the government does most of the 
large capital investment.
7. Income Level (INC). This variable distinguishes between low versus middle 
and high-income countries. According to the World Bank classification, the 
low-income countries include Mozambique and Nicaragua, and middle and 
upper income countries would include Malaysia and South Africa. The 
variable takes a value of 1 for low-income countries and zero for middle and 
high-income countries. All 42 study countries are listed by income group in 
Appendix B.
8. Indebtedness Level (Ddclass). This variable captures an important component 
of financial stress by measuring the degree to which countries are indebted, 
defined by the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative 
(World Bank 2001). External indebtedness is defined as a percentage of GNI, 
exports, government revenue, and total debt. Severely or moderately indebted 
countries are coded441,” and less indebted countries are coded “0.” The 
World Bank classifies countries with a present value of debt service greater 
than 220 percent of exports or 80 percent of GNI as “severely indebted.” 
Countries that were not severely indebted but whose present value of debt 
service exceeded 132 percent of exports or 48 percent of GNI were classified
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as “moderately indebted.” Countries that did not fall into these two groups 
were classified as “less indebted.” Appendix B provides a complete listing for 
the 42 sample countries.
9. Stock Market Capitalization Level (Dmcap). This variable codes countries 
with stock market capitalization greater than $50 billion as “1,” and “0” 
otherwise. Several studies indicate the importance of having a large and 
active stock market in privatization (Agtmael 1993, Boubakri and Cossett 
2000, Kim and Sinai 1993). Stock markets can help facilitate the sale of 
shares of privatizing companies, and are often a more efficient mechanism to 
privatize companies to attract domestic and foreign investors (Kim and Sinai 
1993). The larger the stock market as measured by capitalization, the more 
efficiently the shares of privatizing companies can be sold. Stock markets can 
lower the cost of capital by making the investments more liquid.
10. Regional Dummy Variables (DMENA, DLAC, DECA, DAP AC, DSA,
DSSU). These dummies capture important regional differences in 
privatization and the independent variables above. The distribution of the 
various countries in each region is shown below in Figure 5.1. The countries 
of the sample are distributed among the six regions of the world as defined by 
the World Bank. DMENA stands for Middle East, North Africa. DLAC 
stands for Latin America and the Caribbean. DECA stands for Europe and 
Central Asia. DAP AC stands for Asia Pacific. DSA stands for south Asia. 
DSSU stands for Sub-Saharan Africa. Regional identification is useful
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because patterns am ong country groupings can be ascertained and tracked. 
There are im portant econom ic, historical, institutional and cultural differences 
am ong regions. If  the sam e trends can be em pirically observed across 
different regions, then the results w ill be all the m ore robust.
Figure 5.5
Regional Distribution of Study Countries
Regional Distribution of Study Countries
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Dmena= Middle East and North Africa; Dlac= Latin America and the Caribbean; Deca= Europe and Central Asia; Dapac- Asia 
Pacific; Dsa= South Asia; Dssu= Sub-Saharan Africa.
There is a good distribution o f  all countries in the sam ple w ith the LAC, ECA  and SSU 
regions having the highest representation w ith 10 or m ore countries. South A sia and the 
M iddle East have the fewest num bers o f  countries.
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5.7 Multicollinearity Checks
5.7.1 Cross-Sectional Variables
Overall, there appear to be few problems with multicollinearity as evidenced by the 
correlation matrix. The exception is the high correlation of GNI with Debt.
Table 5.2
Correlation Matrix for Cross-Sectional Variables
DEBT GNI CA CRED DDCLASS DMCAP
DEBT 1
GNI 0.830811 1
CA 0.64556 0.543143 1
CRED 0.290271 0.337547 0.26605 1
Ddclass -0.02211 -0.25728 -0.13537 -0.30428 1
Dmcap 0.579764 0.630936 0.411995 0.491463 -0.14142 1
While the correlation is high at 0.830, it is expected and, as seen later, it is the highest 
among all independent variables. It makes sense that the larger the economy, the greater 
the debt. This correlation does not seem to present a problem.
5.7.2 Time-Series Variables
The time-series correlations reveal no serious problems with multicollinearity, with the 
only exception being GNI and Debt, as expected.
Table 53
Correlation Matrix for Time-Series Variables
PRIV CA DEBT GNI INVEST II
PRIV 1
CA -0.38344 1
DEBT 0.489278 -0.24615 1
GNI 0.465529 -0.06612 0.819439 1
INVEST 0.061059 -0.07222 0.100335 0.221039 i f
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5.8 Descriptive Statistics
This section provides summary statistics on the data and variables.
The mean, standard error, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
characteristics of privatization and debt are given below in Table 5.4. Statistics for 
investment are not given, as these data from the World Bank are reported as index 
numbers, not actual dollar values. The data measure the amount by dollar volume (US$ 
millions) and as a percentage of GNI.
Table 5.4
Privatization and Debt, All Countries
MEAN SD MIN. MAX.
PROCEEDS FROM 
PRIVATIZATION. 90-99 6,801.45 13,050.30 130.3 69,607.70
PRIVATIZATION FIRST FIVE YR. 
TOTAL 90-94 2,411.32 4,771.99 0 21,705.40
PRIVATIZATION SECOND FIVE 
YR. TOTAL 95-99 4,390.13 9,917.90 0 60,805.50
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT, 1999
46,313.45 59,205.44 1,433.00 244.673.00
DEBT AS A % OF GNI, 1999
7.42 3.79 1.9 16.1
‘Amounts in US$ millions
Mean privatization proceeds during the decade were S6.8 billion, with a standard 
deviation of $13 billion, showing again the great variation of privatization among 
countries. The second half of the 1990s shows nearly a doubling of the mean 
privatization amount, from $2.4 billion to $4.3 billion. The average external debt in 1999 
was $46.3 billion, with a maximum of $244.6 billion and a standard deviation of $59 
billion, again exhibiting wide variation. Debt as a percentage of GNI averaged at 7.42%.
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The most indebted country as a percentage of GNI in 1999 was Argentina, at 16.1 %. For 
detailed debt information on specific countries, see Appendix D.
5.8.1 GNI and CA, Early and Late 1990s
EMCs were quite dynamic during the 1990s, many of them expanding, but also incurring 
large current account deficits.
Table 5.5
Descriptive Statistics, GNI and CA, Early and Late 90s
MEAN SD
GNI Lower 75,940.30 152,385.21
Higher 150,449.73 170,058.44
Early 90s 85,529.22 129,336.75
Late 90s 111,997.67 186,518.66
CA Higher (481.66) 4,233.29
Upper (2,307.74) 6,204.14
Early 90s (708.50) 2,612.69
Late 90s (1,362.61) 6,470.62
♦Amounts in US$ millions
Current account deficits were also much higher in the second half of the 1990s— 
worsening from $708 million to $1.36 billion. There was significant variation in GNI 
among the study countries as indicated by the standard deviation of $129 billion. All this 
emphasizes that privatization was quite a dynamic process during the 1990s.
There were also significant differences between lower-income and higher-income 
countries in terms of GNI, current account, credit rating, and national deficits.
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Higher income countries had a mean GNI of more than twice that of their lower-income 
counterparts. Current account deficits were significantly higher, at $2.3 billion, for 
higher income countries.
5.8.2 Credit and Deficit (Lower and Higher-Income Countries)
Credit figures are Euromoney’s country risk credit rating values. Euromoney’s score is a 
weighted average of market indicators, credit indicators, and analytical indicators. The 
scores range from a low of 26.3 for Zambia to a high of 65 for Chile. As expected, 
lower-income countries have a significantly lower credit rating, with a mean of 42.0, 
versus 57.26 for higher-income countries.
Table 5.6
Descriptive Statistics, CRED and DEFIC, Lower and
Deficit figures are a percent of GNI. The mean current account deficit is $ 1.89 billion. 
Interestingly, lower income countries have a lower mean deficit (-1.89) than higher 
income countries (-3.21 of GNI).
Higher-income Countries
MEAN SD ICRED Lower Inc. 42.07 10.42
Higher Inc. 57.26 6.67
DEFIC Lower Inc. (1.89) 2.25
Higher Inc. 3.08
♦Deficit as a % of GNI
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5.9 Model Limitations
The following are three important qualifications that affect the estimation of the model.
Timing of Privatization. The most appropriate time frame to test the relationship 
between debt and privatization is when all countries have finished with their privatization 
efforts. The fact that some countries in the sample have not concluded privatization 
plans, while others are at their peak of the privatization activities, leads to some bias of 
the estimation. The extent of this bias depends, in part, on the future predictions on the 
debt trend and the lag of its effect on privatization. For example, if the debt levels do not 
keep increasing where privatization does, then the coefficients are likely to be 
underestimated. Given the same size and diversity, the timing bias should not be a 
significant factor as all phases of privatization activity are captured.
Timing of the Effect of Debt. The underlying assumption in the estimation is that the 
amount of privatization has been affected by recent debt levels and other problems 
related to financial stress, and not because some governments might want to start 
privatization as a way of preventing future financial difficulties. The history of debt 
crises around the world supports this assumption. The dire predicaments in the early 
1980s (external financial crises and shortage of external funds) in most EMCs (Begg, 
Fischer, and Dombusch 1994) led directly to the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as the renegotiation of debt payments, special loans from commercial creditors and 
international organizations, and privatization (Kikeri et al. 1992).
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Effect of Foreign Revenues. The direct and indirect foreign revenues generated by 
privatization have allowed some countries to reduce foreign loans and/or pay back part of 
their external obligations. In such cases, there is reverse causality between debt and 
privatization. To avoid this complication in the estimation, the debt lags are made long 
enough to avoid the periods when this simultaneous effect might have occurred.
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Chapter Six 
Empirical Tests and Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the general model 
specification. The second part presents and discusses the results of the cross-sectional 
relationship between financial distress factors and privatization. The third part presents 
and discusses the time-series study of the relationship between privatization and debt 
(and other financial distress factors) from 1990 to 1999. This section discusses the 
findings and delves into some of the underlying causes for the results. The fourth section 
summarizes the results.
It is worth restating the main hypotheses for the empirical inquiry. During the course of 
the discussion, additional questions related to each of the hypotheses are posed and 
discussed.
HI. As relative debt levels increase, more privatization transactions are undertaken.
H2. As relative debt levels increase, public sector investment declines.
H3. Current account deficits are correlated with more privatization activity.
H4. High, persistent central government budget deficits are correlated with higher 
privatization activity.
HS. Lower credit ratings are correlated with increased privatization.
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Explanatory variables for each of these hypotheses are tested, along with additional 
variables for income, debt class (Ddclass), market capitalization (Dmcap), and the 
regional dummy variables: Latin America and Caribbean (DLAC), Europe and Central 
Asia (DECA), Asia Pacific (DAPAC), South Asian (DSA), and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(DSSU). These are added to motivate the discussion in terms of the context and 
conditions of financial distress, as well as economic and regional nuances.
6.2 General Model Specification
The general equation for the overall estimation is represented by the following equation:
PRIV= a +fii DEBT+02 GNI+03CA + 0JNVEST+ 0sCRED +06DEFIC + 
0 7INC+ PgDdclass + ptDmcap + PioDLAC+puDECA + pnDAPAC + 
0 J 3 D M E N A  +  P 14D S A  +  P is D S U  +  e
Where
PRIV is amount of privatization revenues (in millions of US dollars),
DEBT is amount of external debt (in millions of US dollars),
GNI is the size of the gross national income (in millions of US dollars),
CA is the trade deficit of goods and services with the rest of the world,
INVEST is fixed capital formation,
CRED is the country’s credit score based on Euromoney’s range, with 0 being the
lowest and 100 being the highest (the data ranges from 27.0 to 65.8),
DEFIC is the country’s deficit represented as a % of GNI,
INC is the dummy variable that distinguishes between low versus middle and high-
income countries,
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Ddclass is the World Bank’s classification for severely, moderately and lightly
indebted. Severely and moderately indebted countries were assigned a value 
of 1 and lightly indebted were assigned a value of 0,
Dmcap is the size of a country’s stock market. Countries with stock markets 
exceeding $50 billion in capitalization were assigned a value of 1 and 
countries less than this threshold were assigned a value of 0,
DLAC is the dummy variable for Latin America and the Caribbean,
DECA is the dummy variable for Europe and Central Asia,
DAP AC is the dummy variable for Asia Pacific,
DMENA is the dummy variable for the Middle East,
DSA is the dummy variable for South Asia,
DSU is the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The experimentation with different and additive (stepwise) forms of the independent 
variables is intended to mitigate the impact of excessive noise in any given variable and 
allow for the possibility that the impact is more pronounced, on a specific variable. The 
different explanatory variables are systematically added to each regression equation to 
check the robustness of the estimate on privatization, assess whether the overall estimates 
are sensible, and mitigate against specification problems due to omitted variables 
(Bertsimas and Freund 2000).
The multiple regression estimation explicitly controls for many factors which 
simultaneously affect the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2000). The more applicable
99
factors added to the model that are useful in explaining the independent variables, the 
more of the variation in the dependent variable that can be explained. This chapter 
summarizes the results of the estimations. Complete estimation results including residual 
coefficients, error terms, F-tests, T-tests, P-values, and confidence intervals of each 
estimation are given for each equation.
It should be noted that correlation does not equal causation. Moreover, some measures of 
correlation in macroeconomic modeling, such as R-squared (coefficient of 
determination), below 0.5 does not necessarily indicate a lack of correlation (Bertsimas 
and Freund 2000).
6.3 Cross-sectional Analysis
These estimations analyze a cross-section of the data. The last year of the period, 1999, 
is selected for the cross-sectional study because it includes the lagged effects of high 
levels of ongoing privatization throughout the decade. It also includes the potential 
lagged effects of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. This presents, in effect, a controlled 
experiment, as this financial crisis, though global in nature, disproportionately affected 
the rapidly growing economies of East Asia. The variable INVEST was included only in 
the time-series regression as there was insufficient data in the cross-sectional analysis.
The regional dummies, DLAC, DECA, DAP AC, DMENA, DSA, DSU could not be 
included in the cross-sectional analysis because of insufficient data for some regions.
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6.3.1 Estimation for Debt
The DEBT variable represents the level of debt for 1999. The equation for this 
estimation is:
PRIV= a+ftj DEBT+ £
Taking the most recent year is the most conservative approach, however, it does 
overestimate debt levels because of the lag.
Table 6.1
Cross-Section Debt Results
Multiple R 0.768
R-Squared 0.590
Observations 42.0
Coefficients Standard Error tStat
Intercept -1143.089 1669.084 -0.685
DEBT 0.170 0.022 7.580**
♦♦Significant at the .05 level 
♦Significant at the .10 level
The coefficient for debt is positive as expected. The degrees of freedom (DF) is more 
than sufficient at 40. The R-squared is high at .59. The regression coefficients are 
significantly different from zero, and the T-statistic is quite significant at the 5% level, 
indicating a very strong relationship between debt and privatization. Given the relatively 
short time dimension of the data, the results need not be interpreted too literally, and 
could be viewed more as an approximation of a larger data set correlation. Nevertheless, 
the statistical significance level of debt does suggest that this variable as could be viewed 
as highly explanatoiy, lending support for Hypothesis 1 “As relative debt levels increase, 
more privatization transactions are undertaken.” Plots of the residuals (Figures 6.1 and
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6.2) indicate that the independent variable exhibits no evidence o f  m ulticollinearity , 
autocorrelation or heteroscadasticity.
Figure 6.1 
Debt Residual Plot
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Figure 6.2 
Debt Line Fit Plot
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Linearity seems to be sufficient, as depicted in the plot of the residuals and the line fit 
above.
It is clear that there is a strong positive relationship between the amount of privatization 
and debt, supporting the central hypothesis.
63.2 Estimation for Deficit
The equation for this estimation is: 
PRIV= a +P6DEFIC+ e
The results show that national deficit is significantly correlated at the 10% level with 
privatization which lends support for Hypothesis 3: “current account deficits are 
correlated with privatization activity.” As expected, the coefficient is negatively 
correlated with privatization. Though national deficits occur for countries in good as well 
as poor financial health, they are frequently an early indicator of financial stress.
Table 6.2 Cross-sectional Deficit Results
Multiple R 0.270
R-Squared 0.073
Observations 42
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 4245.188 2412.597 1.760*
DEFIC -1246.348 703.919-1.770*
“ Significant at the .05 level 
‘Significant at the .10 level
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6.33 Test for Over-Specification
The number of variables is expanded to include GNI and current account (CA). This 
provides a more detailed insight into the roles of the various factors affecting 
privatization. When adding independent variables, it is important to test for multi­
collinearity. In order to do this, a correlation matrix is created (Table 6.3) of these 
variables. Except for the expected GNI/Debt high correlation, all other variables are 
within acceptable ranges. GNI and Debt are highly correlated (.830) and pose the only 
problem, but this is expected as increased privatization would be associated with larger 
GNI. This is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988) who found that debt levels were 
positively related to country or economy size. That is, ceteris paribus, the larger the 
country, the more the assets there are to privatize.
Table 63 Correlation Matrix for Cross-Sectional Regression
PRIV DEBT GNI CA CRED DDCLASS DMCAP DEFIC I
PRIV 1
DEBT 0.768073 1 I
GNI 0.706439 0.830811 1
CA 0.897373 0.64556 0.543143 1
CRED 0.321829 0.290271 0.337547 0.26605 1
Ddclass -0.03037 -0.02211 -0.25728 -0.13537 -0.30428 1 I
Dmcap 0.542886 0.579764 0.630936 0.411995 0.491463 -0.14142 1 I
DEFIC -0.26959 -0.45461 -0.34415 -0.22694 -0.12202 0.069333 -0.14108
63.4 Test for Linearity
The next test is to see if there is a linear relationship between privatization and debt over 
the study period by squaring the debt term. The results indicate a strong linear 
relationship, since the coefficient on the squared term is basically zero.
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Table 6.4 Test for Linearity
Intercept 372.216 140.494 2.649
Debt -0.027 0.006 -4.321
Debtsq 0.0000002 0.00000003 6.793
6.3.5 Debt, GNI and Current Account (CA)
The equation for this estimation is:
PRIV=a+ 0J DEBT+fi2 GNI+p3CA+ £
The R-squared is high. Here the T-statistics for GNI and CA are significant at the 5% 
level.
Table 6.5 Cross-Sectional Debt, GNI, and CA Results
CROSS-SECTIONAL DEBT, 
GNI, AND CA RESULTS
Multiple R 0.947
R-Squared 0.879
Observations 42
Coefficients Standard Error tStat
Intercept -336.434 935.688 -0.359
DEBT 0.034 0.025 1.388*
GNI 0.013 0.007 2.03**
CA 1.829 0.196 9.300***
♦♦Significant at the .05 level 
♦Significant at the .10 level
For CA data, it should be noted that only absolute values are used. While the association 
is strong, it would normally be a negative correlation. That is, the more negative the 
current account, the more privatization will occur. The statistical significance is high at
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the 10% level. This is in line with theories of financial stress (Cossett and Roy 1991). 
The error terms are very small and indicate a strong linear relationship.
It should also be noted that the CA is subject to two-way causation. Financial distress 
can cause current account deficits, but current account deficits can also cause financial 
distress. With this caveat, a CA deficit can still be a strong indicator of financial distress, 
however, one must be careful with causation for this variable.
A current account deficit, particularly a large one, indicates difficulties in a government’s 
ability to pay current expenditures. If it continues, an on-going current account deficit 
can lead to national budget deficits. Both countries and lenders see this situation as a 
problem. While a firm can eventually go bankrupt, a countiy must try to renegotiate 
debt, and if it cannot, it must resort to asset sales in order to reduce its debt. Such was the 
situation of several countries, such as Argentina, for the second half of the 1990s 
(Dombusch 2001).
63.6 Debt, GNI and Current Account (CA), Credit Rating (CRED), Debt Class 
(Ddclass), Stock Market Capitalization (Dmcap) and Deficit (DEFIC)
The equation for this estimation is:
PRIV = a +fii DEBT+fi2 GNI+foCA +fisCRED + fieDEFIC+figDdclass +  
p9Dmcap+ e
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As mentioned above, a potential problem with adding variables is over-specification. 
This can result in an artificially high R-Squared. At 34 degrees of freedom, the model is 
still robust.
Table 6.6 Results for Debt, GNI, CA, DDCLASS, DMCAP and DEFIC
RESULTS FOR DEBT, 
GNI, CA, DDCLASS, 
DMCAP AND DEFIC
Multiple R 0.950
R-Squared 0.902
Observations 42
Coefficients Standard Error tS ta t
Intercept -6263.705 3781.068 -1.657*
DEBT 0.008 0.027 0.280
GNI 0.019 0.007 2.596-
CA 1.887 0.192 9.849-
CRED 59.750 71.687 0.833
Ddclass 4671.907 1799.181 2.597-
Dmcap 1370.126 2327.954 0.589
DEFIC 40.591 286.071 0.142
‘•Significant at the .05 level 
•Significant at the. 10 level
The coefficients are positive, as expected. Debt is not significant in this test. It may be 
related to other variables, such as the CA, affecting the results of debt, given the 
relatively high correlation coefficient of .64.
GNI is significant at the 5% level, indicating again that larger countries tend to do more 
privatizing. Current account is the most significant at a nearly 1% level. Again, this 
could be because current account deficits seem to be typically associated with financial 
stress. It is also due to the fact that many EMCs have relatively thin economies and rely 
heavily on cross-border trade. This is particularly true in the case of many commodity 
and extractive industry based EMCs. A negative and worsening current account can
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thrust a country into deep financial stress m uch faster than a larger O ECD  country . The 
strong linear relationship between privatization and current account is illustrated by the 
line fit below.
Figure 6.3
Line Fit for Current Account
CA Line Fit Plot
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The credit rating (CRED ) variable is not significant. This may be because o f  the 
idiosyncrasies o f  m easuring only one particular period. C redit ratings tend to change 
considerably from over tim e, and therefore m any long-term  trends can be obscured. A 
cross-sectional view  o f  the effect o f  this variable may not be particularly m eaningful. 
H ypothesis 5, “high, persistent central governm ent budget deficits are correlated with 
higher privatization activity,” is not be supported by the data.
On the other hand, Debt Class is significant at the 5% level. O ne w ould expect this as 
highly-indebted countries have greater incentive to privatize. H ighly-indebted countries 
are also under m uch greater financial stress than lightly-indebted countries. Interestingly,
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stock market capitalization (Dmcap) is not significant. This goes against prevailing 
wisdom of privatization prescriptions that privatization is best done in countries with 
deep capital markets. This makes sense, as the majority of privatizations are not share 
privatizations, but rather asset sales to either domestic or foreign companies.
Deficit is as not significant in this regression as other variables such as CA and debt class 
became more important. For many EMCs, the current account is more critical than 
national deficits, as many of these economies are highly dependent on international trade 
and transfers.
63.7 Debt for Lower-income and Higher-income Countries
Testing for debt and income level, I find a correlation in lower-income and even stronger 
correlation in higher-income countries with privatization.
The equation for both of these estimations is: 
PRIV= a+ fli DEBT+fl7INC  +  s
Table 6.7
Debt for Lower-income and Higher-income
Lower Higher
Multiple R 0.649 0.918
R-Squared 0.421 0.843
Coefficients Stand. Error tStat
Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher
Intercept 802.020 -2687.026 743.485 3344.693 1.079 -0.803
DEBT 0.056 0.257 0.012 0.033 4.427** 7.688**
♦•Significant at the .05 level 
•Significant at the. 10 level
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The results for low er-incom e countries w ith debt are interesting in that the T -statistic, 
although significant at the 5%  level, is m uch low er than for higher-incom e countries. 
This contrasts w ith the high T-statistic o f  debt o f  higher-incom e countries. This m akes 
sense from a variety o f  standpoints. It is expected that higher-incom e countries have 
greater access to international debt m arkets. The line fit below  indicates a strong linear 
relationship betw een higher-incom e countries and debt.
Figure 6.4
Debt Line Fit for Higher-income Countries
DEBT Line Fit Plot
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The T-statistic for debt becom es insignificant w hen it is regressed with additional 
variables. In fact, the only variable o f  significance is GNI for low er-incom e countries.
6.4 Time-Series Analysis
The tim e-series data allow  us to analyze trends over tim e, specifically for the study 
period from 1990 to 1999. Because past events can influence future events and lags in 
behavior are prevalent in privatization, tim e is a critical dim ension. The 1990s were a
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particularly dynamic and high-growth period of privatization. During the decade, 
privatization spread far and wide to a whole host of EMCs and across a wide variety of 
industries. Time-series analysis (stochastic) can provide more robust and accurate results 
because a much larger data set is available, minimizing irregularities of data that might be 
present in just one cross-sectional year. The bulk of the analysis and interpretation of the 
results in this chapter will be derived from the time-series analysis.
6.4.1 Model Specification
For the 10-year time-series, it is not possible to examine the variables of credit score 
(CRED), deficit (DEFIC), indebtedness class (Ddclass) and stock market capitalization 
(Dmcap) because of gaps in the data series. The equation for this estimation is 
represented by:
PRIV = a + ft jDEBT+ fi2 GNI+ fi3CA + fiJNVEST+ fi7INC +  fiI0DLAC +  
pnDECA + PnDAPAC+ fiJ3DMENA +  0I4DSA + pJ5DSU + e
The dummy variables represent the six regions of the study. One of the objectives of this 
analysis is to obtain as geographically wide a data set as possible. This is because most 
previous studies of privatization focused on evidence in one or two geographical regions, 
limiting the robustness of the data. Few have attempted to draw conclusions from a 
globally and regionally diverse data set. This is important because it means the 
conclusions will be less limited by differences in political, cultural, and historical 
idiosyncrasies. However, many countries, particularly those in Africa and former 
communist/socialist countries do not have privatization and other macro-economic and
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financial data extending back in complete from before the mid-1980s. In fact, the data 
used in this study for many formerly non-capitalistic countries have been available only 
since the beginning of the 1990s.
In addition, privatization in many EMCs was not underway until the late 1980s or early 
1990s. For all of these reasons, 1990 was the earliest year for which fairly complete 
time-series data is available for the various variables examined in this study. The time- 
series data covers a 10-year period from 1990 to 1999. While many countries privatized 
over this period, only those EMCs that privatized a significant amount of assets are 
included in the study. A significant level is defined in this study as at least 5% of GNI 
over the 10-year period. This criteria yields a total of 42 countries for potentially 504 
observations per variable and 5,040 observations for all variables. The full data sets for 
all the tests are included in the appendices.
First, I examine potential problems in multicollinearity with the correlation of the 
independent variables below.
6.4.2 Tests for Multicollinearity, Heteroscadasticity and Autocorrelation
As with the cross-sectional tests, I check for multicollinearity with a correlation test. 
Table 6.8
PRIV CA DEBT GNI INVEST
PRIV 1
CA -0.38344 1
DEBT 0.489278 -0.24615 1
GNI 0.465529 -0.06612 0.819439 1
[NVEST 0.061059 -0.07222 0.100335 0.221039 1
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The correlation m atrix above show s no serious problem s w ith m ulticollinearity , except 
for the expected high correlation between debt and GNI.
Figure 6.5 Debt Residual Plot
DEBT Residual Plot
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The plots o f  the residuals do not indicate problem s w ith m ulticollinearity, 
hetereoscadasticity or autocorrelation.
Figure 6.6 Debt Line Fit Plot
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6.4.3 Privatization and Debt
Next, I estim ate privatization and debt over the 10-year period. The equation for this 
estim ation is represented by:
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PRIV= a+/li DEBT+ e
The very high T-statistic, at 11.318, is significant at the 1 % level, indicating a high 
degree of correlation of privatization and debt over the period. This lends strong support 
for Hypothesis 1 that privatization increases with debt. The high level of statistical 
significance is even more impressive than the cross-sectional estimation given that this 
estimate covers a much more extensive time period.
Table 6.9
Privatization and Debt
Multiple R 0.489
R-Squared 0.239
Coefficients Standard Error tSlal
Intercept -231.174 128.508 1 <0 00
DEBT 0.025 0.002 11.318*1
♦♦Significant at the .05 level 
♦Significant at the .10 level
6.4.4 DEBT, GNI, CA, and INVEST
Adding these variables to the debt regression provides a more complete picture of how 
the various variables may have affected privatization during the study period. The 
equation for this estimation is represented by:
PRIV= a +0! DEBT+p2 GNI+P3CA +pJNVEST + e
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Table 6.10
DEBT, GNI, and INVEST
Debt, GNI, CA and INVEST
Multiple R 0.591
R-Squared 0.350
Coefficients Stan, Error tStat
Intercept 166.163 299.884 0.554
DEBT 0.006 0.004 1.584*
GNI 0.005 0.001 4.777**
CA -0.154 0.020 -7.779**
INVEST -3.640 2.817 -1.292*
••Significant at the .05 level 
•Significant at the .10 level
CA is very significantly negatively correlated with privatization at the 5% level. This is 
because the current account data for the study countries over this period, are, by and 
large, negative. This T-statistic is among the highest in the study. This is indicative of 
the fact that most countries in the study have been running multi-year current account 
deficits. This lends support for Hypothesis 3 that states that “current account deficits are 
correlated with privatization.” According to the hypothesis, the larger and more negative 
the current account, the more privatization there will be. This is because current account 
deficits are the source of significant financial stress for countries. CA deficits often have 
a cumulative effect, with each year of an increasing deficit leading to increasing financial 
stress.
Few countries, particularly smaller countries, can sustain year after year of negative 
current accounts without facing serious financial distress. Larger countries have greater 
wherewithal, and because they can often finance their CA deficit for many years.
Smaller countries often lack easy access to the capital markets. One only has to consider
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the United States as the most obvious and extreme example. CA deficit is the most 
significant variable correlated with privatization over this period.
GNI is also significant, indicating a strong correlation with country (economy) size and 
privatization. This supports the view that privatizing countries need a critical amount of 
privatizable assets, as well as sufficiently deep economies to foster the privatization of 
SOEs. While “world class” SOEs can develop in thin economies, SOEs with high quality 
products and services, ceteris paribus, are more likely to be grown and developed in 
deeper economies (Djankov and Murrell 2000). In a “deep” as opposed to “thin” 
economies, SOEs develop the scale and scope for investment and product line 
enhancement, and are better able to keep pace with global innovation in their particular 
industry.
Debt is also significant at the 10% level. This estimation provides an indication about 
how countries can build up unsustainable levels of debt. The fact that CA and GNI are 
significant at the 5% level may indicate a degree of causality, in that large countries can 
incur large CA deficits then finance the negative account through debt borrowings. This 
cause and effect has been cited by Dombusch (2000) in the cases of Brazil, Argentina and 
several other EMCs, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.
INVEST is significant at the 10% level lending support for Hypothesis 2 that as “debt 
increases, public sector investment declines.” The coefficient and T-statistic are negative 
meaning that as debt increases, investment will become increasing negative, as predicted
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by the hypotheses and the findings of Krugman (1988), Gilson (1997), Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Barnett (2000), et al.
6.4.5 Early 1990s and Late 1990s
Next, I examine how the nature of privatization and the factors affecting it may have 
changed over the decade of the 1990s due to financial distress. For this purpose, I divide 
the sample data into two periods: 1990-1994, and 1995-1999. The decade of the 1990s is 
especially useful for an empirical study as this is when privatization changed from a 
sporadic, regional phenomenon to an international, pervasive policy instrument in a wide 
variety of EMCs. Significantly, the 1990s were time of dramatic socio-economic change 
for many EMCs and entire regions. The 1990s saw the transformation of the Soviet 
Union, creating new countries, many of which began to immediately initiate privatization 
programs. The 1990s also saw the meteoric rise of economies of the Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NICs), then their equally meteoric, if temporary, economic fall 
for many. On the other hand, many countries in Latin America, while active privatizers, 
fell deeper into debt and financial distress. Most sub-Saharan countries actually lost 
economic ground and shrank in terms of GNI and suffered grave financial consequences. 
South Asia and Middle East, North African countries generally grew moderately, if at all.
In this backdrop of study countries, one can see a variety of economic situations, 
economic systems, institutions, and political governing systems. Statistically significant 
trends observed across these differences may be seen as more generalizable and robust 
than the standard anecdotal regional or country account. Few EMCs went into this
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decade and emerged unchanged in terms of their debt, privatization and macroeconomic 
conditions. Analyzing the decade in two periods may allow one to discern changes that 
occurred over the period.
The variable INVEST could not be included in the part of the analysis focusing on the 
first half of the 1990s versus the second half of the 1990s because of discontinuities in 
several of the data series.
6.4.6 Early 1990s
The “early 1990s” estimation focuses on the first five years of the 1990s. This was a time 
when many smaller EMCs were just beginning to engage in privatization for the first time 
(Kikeri 1998). Several larger EMCs had begun their privatization efforts in the 1980s 
and now their programs were either continuing, or winding down. The equation for this 
estimation is represented by:
PRIV=a +  fii DEBT+p2 GNI+ p3CA + s
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Table 6.11
Early and Late 1990s
Early an d  Late 90s R esu lts
Early 90s Late 90s
Multiple R 0.472 0.635
R-Squared 0.222 0.404
Adjusted R-Squared 0.210 0.395
Observations 197
Coefficients
210
Stand. Error tS tat
Early 90s Late 90s Early 90s Late 90s Early 90s Late 90s
Intercept -76.296 -225.926 115.979 202.891 -0.658 -1.114*
DEBT 0.020 0.003 0.005 0.005 3.992 0.463
GNI -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.486 4.665"
CA -0.005 -0.179 0.032 0.026 -0.155 -6.753"
••Significant at the .05 level 
•Significant at the .10 level
Interestingly, GNI exhibits a negative coefficient. Moreover, the T-statistic is not 
significant. This may be because smaller countries were more active in privatization than 
larger ones in the early 1990s. Many of the larger countries had gone through a bout of 
privatization in the 1980s, and now many smaller countries were beginning to privatize 
(Ramamurti 1999). Interestingly, CA does not show a strong coefficient or T-statistic. In 
fact, they are both negative. It can be deduced from this that CA did not pose a problem 
for most privatizing EMCs during the early 1990s.
6.4.7 Late 1990s
The late 1990s convey a different story that reflects, in part, a change in the 
macroeconomic situation of many EMCs as well as trends in privatization. Debt is no 
longer significant, however, GNI and CA are significant at the 5% level. In the later half 
of the 1990s, larger countries picked up their pace of privatization (World Bank 2001). 
They also faced deepening CA deficits due, in large part, to several global financial crises
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of the late 1990s that disproportionately affected EMCs. The 1990s were the decade of 
renewed and accelerated globalization (Dicken 2003). Many EMCs rely on foreign 
exchange for a significant proportion of their economic growth and the exports of many 
EMCs tend to be dominated by commodities. The 1990s were a time of extreme price 
fluctuations in the prices of commodities, causing many EMCs to experience large 
negative CA balances.
6.4.8 Higher and Lower-income Countries
As is done in the cross-sectional analysis, I now divide EMCs by higher and lower- 
income. The equation for this estimation is represented by:
PRIV= a+fij DEBT+ f} 2 GNI+ P3CA + c
Table 6.12
Higher and Lower-income Countries
Higher and Lower- 
incom e R esu lts
Higher Lower
Multiple R 0.675 0.564
R-Squared 0.456 0.319
Adjusted R-Squared 0.443 0.311
Observations 125 284
Stand.
Coefficients Error tStat
Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower
Intercept -119.806 91.317 376.698 46.546 -0.318 1.962-
DEBT 0.023 0.004 0.014 0.002 1.689 2.594-
GNI -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.393 3.528*-
CA -0.316 0.038 0.056 0.010 -5.640 3.893*-
♦•Significant at the .05 level 
•Significant at the .10 level
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The estimation for higher-income countries shows that Debt plays a significant role in 
privatization, while GNI is not significant.
Lower-income countries show a strong correlation with all three variables. Over the 
decade, these three variables were good determinants of privatization. All three are 
statistically significant at or beyond the 5% level, which is striking, lending support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 3. Interestingly, CA is positively correlated with privatization. Lower- 
income countries with a positive CA were privatizing. There are two possible 
interpretations of this statistic. First, it could mean assets privatized contribute to the 
positive CA, which is supported by the findings of Barnett (2000). Second, it could be 
due to the fact that debt overhang in lower-income countries is so severe that these 
countries must maintain a strong CA just to pay their debt service. This was in fact the 
case with many poor, particularly commodity-based economies of the 1990s (Dombusch 
2000).
For lower-income countries, there is a strong correlation with GNI. The interpretation of 
this, once again, is that poorer countries with large economies privatize more. Some of 
the reasons for this, as with all countries, could be that there are more assets to privatize 
and the economies are deeper.
For higher-income countries, the greater the CA deficit, the more these countries 
privatized. GNI is not really a factor. Debt is significant at the 10% level. As pointed 
out earlier, higher-income countries tend to be more integrated into the world economy. 
Information is better, and it would be easier for higher-income countries to find buyers
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and investors for their privatizing companies. The SOEs of higher-income countries are 
also likely to be more desirable because they tend to be larger, better-managed and higher 
quality assets (Nellis 2001). Many lower-income countries are unable to privatize their 
SOEs because there are few buyers and the due diligence costs for buyers to investigate 
potential purchases are too onerous to justify minimal upside potential. Also the market 
may simply be too small to be of interest to all but a few buyers. This was the case in 
Egypt’s foray into privatization in the 1990s, when it discovered that many of its SOEs 
had little or negative value to the domestic and international private markets (Abu Shair 
1997).
6.4.9 Regional Analysis
Figure 6.3 portrays the level and intensity of privatization has varied considerably among 
regions in the 1990s, with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) being one of the most 
active privatizers of the world, accounting for nearly 60% of privatization in the 1990s 
and with South Asia (SA) and the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) being among the 
least active, both in terms of the number of privatization transactions and the overall 
revenue volume.
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Figure 6.7
Privatization by Region, 1990-1999___________
Privatization by Region, 1990-1999
□  LAC
■  ECA
□ APAC
□  MENA
■  SA
□  SSU
168,101 41,402 43,833 11,706 11,780 6,909
*billions o f  USS
Source: World Bank Data Tables, 2001.
Latin A m erica clearly privatized more than the other regions by a significant m argin.
After Latin Am erica, Asia Pacific and Europe and Central A sia w ere roughly tied for 
second at about 15% share each.
6.4.10 Regional Dummy (Binary) Variables
Including dum m y variables for regions controls for regional effects. W hen I include the
regional dum m ies, I can see that the relationship betw een debt and CA and privatization
is still strong and significant. The equation for this estim ation is represented by:
PRIV = a + p !  DEBT + p2 GNI + p3CA + fiI0DLAC + p 1,DECA + fi]2DAPAC + 
PisDMENA + p I4DSA + p ISDSU+ e
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MENA
4 .1%
APAC
15 .4 %
1 4 .6%
Table 6.13
All Regions
ALL REGIONS
Multiple R 0.604
R-Squared 0.365
Adjusted R-Squared 0.352
Observations 409
Coefficients Standard Error tStat
Intercept -152.370 197.261 -0.772
DEBT 0.007 0.004 1.854**
GNI 0.005 0.001 4.731**
CA -0.144 0.020 -7.205**
LAC 330.604 277.156 <o CO
ECA -35.851 278.505 -0.128
APA -454.628 355.508 -1.279*
MENA -227.133 355.763 -0.638
SA -759.883 397.821 -1.911*
SSU 57.560 233.368 0.247
“ Significant at the .05 level 
’Significant at the .10 level
This estimation shows that there is a general relationship between privatization and 
financial distress variables and is strong across diverse regions.
Next I disaggregate by region. The estimation results are shown in Table 6.14.
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Table 6.14
Individual Regions
Individual R eg ions
LAC ECA APAC MENA SA SSU
Multiple R 0.700 0.625 0.598 0.567 0.737 0.401
R-Squared 0.490 0.390 0.358 0.322 0.543 0.161
Adjusted R-Squared 0.476 0.369 0.316 0.276 0.489 0.131
Observations 110 89 50.000 49.000 30.000 90.000
Intercept -328.013 131.236 218.598 163.410 61.803 34.759
(-0.844) (1.507*) (0.631; (2.480**) (0.468) (1.082)
DEBT 0.035 0.012 0.006 -0.012 0.008 0.000
(-2.030**) (3.861**) (1.251*) (-1.972*) (1.098) (-0.096)
GNI -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.002
(-0.894) (-1.555*) (1.055) (2.917**) (0.654) (3.558**)
CA -0.334 -0.180 0.064 0.029 0.084 -0.006
(-5.408**) (-6.738**) (2.628**) (1.006) (1.792*) (-0.381)
♦•Significant at the .05 level 
♦Significant at the .10 level 
Note: T-stalistics in parentheses
6.4.11 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
The equation for this estimation is represented by:
PRIV=a+ fit DEBT+fi2GNI + fi3CA + fisDLAC + £
By some measures (dollar volume and number) LAC is perhaps the best region for a 
study of privatization, because it was the most active privatizer in the 1990s, with over 
$168 billion of privatization value over the decade. Significantly, this region had the 
highest debt levels of any region in the world and had the highest number of severely 
indebted countries in the sample. Not surprisingly debt’s T-statistic is significant at the 
5% level. Given the theory that countries were compelled to privatize more for financial 
stress reasons, it is no surprise that GNI is not a significant factor. Countries, large and 
small, were in financial trouble. CA is also significant at the 5% level and, as expected, 
negatively correlated. High CA deficits, typically over the course of many years, seem to 
be a factor in privatization activity.
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6.4.12 Europe and Central Asia (ECA)
P R iy= a + p JDEBT+P2GNI+p3CA+P6DECA+ s
The Europe and Central Asia region presents a very interesting set of results. Most of the 
countries in the sample are those of economies in transition (EIT), who were 
transforming their nations from planned socialist economies to market economies.
Unlike countries like China, for example, most of the countries in this region chose to 
make the transition as quickly as possible (“shock therapy”) instead of gradually as China 
has done. The result has been a significant amount of privatization. At the same time, in 
the course of the transition, these countries piled up a large amount of debt in a very short 
period of time to finance the fast transition (Nellis 2000). This debt in turn, made 
privatization not just an ideological statement, but also a necessity. I see a high T- 
statistic at the 5% significance level. There is a negative correlation with GNI, as all 
countries, regardless of size, were actively engaged in privatization. The correlation with 
CA is even stronger than for debt, at the 1% level, perhaps indicating strong financial 
pressures to finance the CA.
6.4.13 Asia Pacific (APAC)
The equation for this estimation is:
PRIV^a+PtDEBT+p2 GNI+p3CA+p12DAPAC+ £
The Asia Pacific region represents a whole different set of macroeconomic conditions 
than most of the world during most of the 1990s. During much of the 1990s, many of the
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economies in the study were booming. They benefited from very strong balance sheets 
(with relatively less debt than other EMCs), strong GNI growth, and, for the most part, 
positive CAs as many of these nations were characterized as being Asian export-oriented, 
manufacturing and trading centers. This changed dramatically for many countries in this 
region in the face of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. It brought about one of the 
quickest and most destructive financial reversals of fortune experienced since the World 
War II (International Monetary Fund 1999). The financial crisis that erupted in mid-1997 
led to sharp declines in the currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices of a number 
of Asian countries, threatened these countries' financial systems, and disrupted their real 
economies, with large contractions in activity. The crisis started in Thailand, and soon 
spread to nearly all countries in Asia, with the exceptions of very poor countries 
(Myanmar, Vietnam, etc.), China, and entrepots and entrepreneurial centers such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, though they too suffered. There is strong T-statistic of 
debt at the 10% level, and an especially strong T-statistic at the 5% level for CA, because 
after the crisis, many countries in Asia privatized to improve their balance sheets.
6.4.14 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
The equation for this estimation is:
P R IV -a + p i  DEBT+fl2 GNI+ /?jC4 + fi&DMENA + £
The MENA region had slow or virtually no economic growth during this period. These 
economies are characterized by lack of depth and diversity. The range, number and 
quality of privatizable assets are quite limited. I see that the T-statistic for GNI is
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significant at the 5% level. Only those countries with a sufficient number of attractive 
assets to privatize did so during the 1990s. Debt is also significant at the 10% level. For 
example, few MENA countries have the economic depth and sophistication of SOEs to 
attract large numbers of buyers of assets. Even the largest MENA countiy, Egypt, has 
difficulty in selling all but the most successful SOEs.
6.4.15 South Asia (SA)
The equation for this estimation is:
P R IV = a+ pJDEBT+p2 GNI+p3C A+ p9DSA+ e
The sample number of countries for South Asia is the smallest of any region, and 
includes only three countries—India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is difficult to conclude 
very much from this small set of data. Moreover, for most of the 1990s, these economies 
were growing only slowly and privatized very little. These economies were also not 
impacted by the Asian financial crisis in any significant way. Thus, only CA of the three 
factors studied is significant. This makes sense in light of the history of fiscal 
mismanagement all three of these countries have. The main driver of privatization is in 
response to the fiscal pressures brought about by CA deficits and budget overruns.
6.4.16 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSU)
The equation for this estimation is represented by:
PRTV=a+pJDEBT+p2 GNI+p3CA+pI5DSU+ s
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Many SSU economies performed poorly during the 1990s. The countries were adversely 
affected by declining commodity prices, political instability, public health crises, and 
relatively less FDI. While many SSU countries were heavily indebted, and increased 
their debt during the 1990s, privatization was not a priority for many of these countries 
given the more dire problems with which they were contending. Current accounts in 
many countries were mixed, but did not generate financial pressure. GNI has the only 
significant T-statistic.
SSU also suffers from the same problems as MENA, in that most economies are too 
underdeveloped and small to attract sufficient buyers for privatizable assets. The 
economies that are large and deep enough, such as South Africa, had a disproportionate 
amount of privatization activity. South Africa’s size, as well as the quality of its assets, 
enable it to privatize relatively more than its other African neighbors.
6.5 Summary
The empirical exercises explore the relationship between privatization and a variety of 
financial distress variables. External debt, the primary explanatory variable, appears to 
exhibit a robust correlation with privatization amounts. The major finding is that more 
privatization is strongly correlated with negative or deteriorating macroeconomic 
performance, as manifested in the financial distress factors modeled in this study.
Specifically, more privatization appears to be positively correlated with 1) increases in 
the level of external debt; 2) declining public sector investment; 3) a negative and
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worsening current account; and 4) central government budget deficits. There does not 
seem to be a positive relationship between low country credit ratings and privatization. 
This could reflect the lack of sufficient data, and the fact that only one year could be 
surveyed.
There is strong statistical support for Hypotheses 1 (External Debt), 2 (Public Sector 
Investment), 3 (Current Account), and 4 (Budget Deficits) and insufficient support for 
Hypothesis 5 (Country Credit Ratings). These findings are consistent with and extend the 
empirical work of Krugman (1988), Gilson (1997), Zwiebel (1996), Lamont (1995), and 
Titman and Wessels (1988).
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Chapter Seven 
Summary
7.1 Introduction
This study describes the effects of financial distress and the motivations to privatize in 
EMCs. The results support the hypothesis that financial distress factors have a positive 
effect on privatization. Among EMCs that privatize, those that experience 
macroeconomic financial distress exhibit a higher amount of privatization.
Extending the macro-economic literature of the reasons surrounding privatization, the 
empirical investigation tests the relationship between the level of financial distress and 
the incentives for privatization in a sample of 42 EMCs in different industries, industrial 
sectors and regions of the world over a ten-year period. The theoretical foundation of this 
relationship draws from general financial distress theory (Myers 1977; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). The empirical analysis employs various econometric specifications to 
find the best fit between the available data and the conceptual hypotheses.
The results are consistent with empirical work on financial distress in firms and countries 
that find that financial distress creates imperatives to divest assets. Previous empirical 
work on privatization focused mainly on economic efficiency within a specific industry 
or region or budgetary explanations. The results appear robust across industries and 
regions and are qualitatively the same for both cross-sectional and time-series samples.
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7.2 Summary
Debt is significant, both in the cross-sectional and the time-series series analysis. Debt is 
significant across regions of the world, even those regions that were not very active 
privatizers in the 1990s. Debt is more significant in the late 1990s. coinciding with a 
time of increased financial distress for many countries, particularly in Asia. This lends 
support for Hypothesis 1, which states, “as relative debt levels increase, more 
privatization transactions are undertaken.”
There is strong support for Hypothesis 2, which states, “as relative debt levels increase, 
public sector investment declines.” The coefficient and T-statistic are negative, meaning 
that as debt increases, investment will become increasing negative, as predicted by the 
hypothesis and the findings of Krugman (1988), Gilson (1997), Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992), and Barnett (2000), et al.
There is strong support for Hypothesis 3, which states, “current account deficits are 
associated with privatization activity.” The current account (CA) shows a strong 
significant correlation with privatization, and in some cases, even stronger that debt. This 
is interesting and unexpectedly strong, and is perhaps a result of the incredible economic 
challenges faced by many EMCs during the 1990s. In small and thin economies, the CA 
can be a significant component of economies; particularly those that rely on foreign 
exchange of commodity goods whose prices fluctuate with the global markets (Ossowski, 
Richardson, and Barnett 2000). The average worsening of the CA suggests that those 
countries with more dire balance sheets privatize relatively more of their assets due to
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financial pressures. The relationship between the CA and privatization is even stronger 
in smaller countries where there is much less financial slack.
Countries with poor budgetary discipline, such as Argentina, use privatization as a means 
to finance their domestic spending for much of the decade. The worsening economic 
conditions of many EMCs in the 1990s saw deterioration in the CA and a subsequent 
dramatic increase in privatization. With worsening CA deficits, many EMCs were unable 
to pay their debt service, and had to even take on more debt to pay their existing debt 
service.
There is strong support for Hypothesis 4, which states, “high, persistent central 
government budget deficits are correlated with higher privatization activity.” I find that 
the national deficit is significantly correlated at the 10% level with privatization, which 
lends support for this hypothesis. As expected, the coefficient is negative, indicating that 
deficits are inversely correlated with privatization. Though national deficits occur in 
countries in good as well as poor financial health, they are frequently an early indicator of 
financial stress.
Hypothesis 5, which states, “lower credit ratings are correlated with increased 
privatization” is found to be inconclusive. Intuitively it would seem that EMCs with 
higher credit ratings would have more debt, because lenders would provide more debt to 
countries with greater credit worthiness. This is not the case. Like firms, countries with 
mid-to-poor credit ratings tended to have more debt. This is because their very
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indebtedness impairs their ability to pay debt service, and degrades their credit rating. 
There does not seem to be a positive relationship between low country credit ratings and 
privatization. This could also reflect the lack of sufficient data and the fact that only one 
year of data is available.
7.2.1 Other Variables
GNI. This variable is found to be highly correlated with privatization. It makes sense 
that larger countries would have more assets to privatize, most likely higher quality 
assets, and greater access to global markets.
Stock Market Capitalization Dummy (Dmcap). As far as stock market size, what 
emerges from the research is that most privatization transactions in EMCs are not equity 
sales (as is more common in developed countries), but rather outright sales of entire 
SOEs or assets. Therefore, the stock market is much less important.
Indebtedness Dummy (Ddclass). On the other had, Debt Class is a significant indicator 
of the propensity to privatize. I would expect this to be the case, as highly indebted 
countries would have greater incentives to privatize. Highly indebted countries are also 
under much greater financial distress than slightly indebted countries. Highly indebted 
countries have been under pressure for some time to become less indebted. Therefore, 
they have most likely explored a wide range of options before divesting assets. This is in 
line with Gilson’s theory of the “fi re-sale.”
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Regional Dummies (DMENA, DLAC, DECA, DAPAC, DSA, DSSU). These variables 
uncover important regional differences and commonalities in financial distress and 
privatization. The Asia Pacific region presents a good example. The evidence shows 
clearly the rapid increase in privatization in the region (APAC) after the Asian Financial 
Crises, which hit in 1997 and caused extended regional macroeconomic distress for many 
countries. There is a strong positive correlation for privatization in the years after the 
crisis, particularly in those countries that were especially hard hit. The same 
phenomenon is seen in the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) during their 
period of regional financial distress.
7.3 The Significance and Contribution of the Research
The research is important in many ways. First this paper demonstrates another leading 
cause of privatization, one that has received relatively little attention, and virtually no 
extensive empirical investigation. While financial distress as a leading cause of emerging 
market privatization has been conjectured, this paper provides empirical evidence 
supporting it as a major cause.
This study is one of the most significant positivistic (as opposed to normative and 
pragmatic) studies in recent years. Privatization research has suffered from being overly 
politicized with normative studies with often political agendas dominating as well as 
pragmatic cookbook-like “how to” studies, “best practices” and “lessons learned” which 
suffer from lack of generalizable results and relatively low intellectual and academic 
rigor.
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The research may also serve governments in how they view and promulgate privatization. 
The results of this study may induce governments to be more sensitive as to the timing, 
methods, procedures, and conditions of privatization—so that they may be more inclined 
to create conditions and to develop strategies that would be more advantageous.
Countries may be influenced to try harder to privatize in a way that achieves maximum 
value and social utility for governments and their constituents. For example, 
governments may realize that perhaps the best time to privatize is not when they are in 
debt, overextended financially, and in need of capital quickly, but when they can 
undertake privatization in a measured pace, free of the pressures of having to sell assets 
to service debt or other financial obligations.
Privatization in this situation often leads to insufficient planning of the selection, 
preparation, and sale of assets. Timing of the privatization process is accelerated with 
insufficient regard for the synchronicity with micro and macro economic factors and the 
consideration of public sentiment. In essence, financial distress puts the needs of 
financial obligations above the needs of the privatizing country.
Countries could be more sensitive to their debt levels, budget planning, current account 
balance and other major factors influencing national financial and economic health.
Many SOEs play a vital role in social and economic welfare of a country and should be 
divested carefully, after considerable analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
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privatization. Particularly in EMCs, where markets are thin, developing or nonexistent, 
SOEs provide goods, services, and investment where private firms could not. Sudden, 
reactionary privatization of these SOEs and, in some cases, whole industries, can be 
detrimental or even catastrophic for EMC economies. Overly rapid privatization in 
response to financial distress can also flood the market with too many privatization sales 
resulting in artificially low prices and at poor terms. If countries recognize the symptoms 
of reactionary privatization due to financial distress, then perhaps they may improve how 
they manage this complex and important process.
Typically, the best assets are sold first because they will generate the greatest sales 
revenues in the shortest period of time. These are usually the “crown jewels.” Because 
these assets are often the most valuable, their privatization should given more care, time 
and consideration in how they are sold or divested.
Rushing the process also makes it easier for the privatization to be corrupted by 
unscrupulous governmental officials as well as private investors, resulting in scandals, 
graft and outright theft of public assets. The fact that the most valuable assets and public 
companies are often privatized first and at the quickest pace only makes the perception of 
privatization all the more unsavory in the eyes of the public. The privatization process 
can become a lightning rod for criticism about the public purpose, corruption, and 
efficacy of achieving simultaneous public and private objectives.
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This study also lends empirical support to the application of financial distress theory, 
which enjoys strong theoretical acceptance in the field of financial economics. This is 
significant because both the existing theoretical explanations of efficiency and the socio­
political causes have shown to be incomplete explanations for privatization, particularly 
in emerging markets. Financial distress theory illustrates a clear causality whereas the 
other two explanations are perhaps best described as justifications for the implementation 
of privatization policy. In other words efficiency and socio-political rationales are often 
normative and pragmatic in nature, and financial distress theory is explanatory and 
positivistic with a high correlation of causality.
Privatization has promised much in the way of unlocking unrealized value of public 
assets, of increasing public shareholding, of generating increased competition, and of 
improving efficiency. However it has fallen short in most of these potentials. Moreover, 
it has often created new problems in terms of public accountability, graft, and the dubious 
perception of public and private partnerships. This paper has shown that most 
privatization in emerging market countries (during a period of the greatest amount of 
privatization) has been deterministic and driven by financial forces, not policy, efficiency 
gains or ideology.
The findings of this study show that countries with smaller GDPs tend to be more 
sensitive to financial distress because they have less financial slack and fewer financial 
options, a smaller pool of creditors, less advantageous international credit terms, fewer 
assets to privatize, a generally less attractive economic environments for FDI, and
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generally more volatility in their national economies. This study could encourage smaller 
countries to exercise more rigorous financial management discipline than their larger 
cohorts.
The research could also be useful to investors wishing to pursue investment opportunities 
in emerging markets, helping to match sellers (governments) with buyers (private 
capital). By better understanding the relationship between financial distress and 
privatization, investors could better time when to invest in privatization, enabling them to 
invest earlier in the cycle and to perhaps develop more cooperative relationships with 
governments earlier on, helping to design privatization strategies and programs that 
would be perhaps more attractive and practical to the private sector.
7.4 Implications for Future Research
The implications for further research are many. This study has focused on emerging 
markets. A similar study might focus on industrialized countries. Such as study might 
investigate if financial distress has equally robust explanatory power in these countries.
It would be useful to ascertain if there are indeed differences in the types of assets 
privatized, how financial distress is manifested in the privatization process, the timing of 
privatization, and the processes of privatization. For example, anecdotally, it would 
appear that more “share privatizations” and fewer outright total sales of companies and 
assets are undertaken in industrialized countries. Is this actually the case and if so, why? 
Other questions that could be addressed are the differences among industries that are 
privatized in industrialized countries? Why are some industries, such as water utilities
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and public pension system rarely privatized in industrialized countries but readily 
privatized in emerging markets?
It would appear that privatization activity in emerging markets tends to be more extensive 
than in most industrialized countries. Why does not financial distress affect 
industrialized countries in the same way?
There is also an opportunity to investigate why industrialized countries seem to go 
through less extreme financial distress and with a lower degree of frequency than 
emerging market countries. While this paper has addressed some of those causes, it was 
not the primary focus of the research. The seemingly endless financial crises in many 
emerging market countries not only affects privatization, but creates a whole array of 
deleterious conditions for these countries and the quality of life for their residents.
Additional research could look into a potential opportunity for industrialized countries to 
examine emerging market countries as models for how to reduce the share of government 
as a percentage of GDP. Reducing government through privatization is the stated goal of 
many industrialized countries. Thus far, emerging market countries appear to have been 
more successful at rapid and substantial privatization.
This research may also stimulate the investigation of the applicability of other aspects of 
financial economics to macroeconomic and social phenomena. This interdisciplinaiy 
approach is infrequently employed, yet holds significant potential. For example, how
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might the theory of capital structure be applied to macro economies? There would 
seemingly be endless possibilities for this kind of interdisciplinary-theoretic approach 
with increasing global capital flows, investment, and greater economic global 
interconnectedness.
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Appendix A
Definitions of Pertinent Terminology
Commercialization. Status of a state enterprise that is financed mainly by internally 
generated revenues (tariffs) and thus has financial autonomy to operate as a business; 
its access to government support is very circumscribed, e.g., limited to public services.
Concession. An arrangement whereby a private party leases assets from a public 
authority for an extended period, and has responsibility for financing specified new 
fixed investments during the period; these new assets then revert to the public sector at 
expiration of the contract.
Contracting Out. This is the simplest form of privatization and it is widely used. It 
involves contracting of service provision to the private sector, usually for a defined 
period of time.
Cross-subsidy. The charging of some customers more than the cost of service in order 
to subsidize the other customers.
Current Account. The balance of payments current account; the sum of net exports of 
goods and non-factor services, net factor service income, and net current transfers.
Emerging Market Country (EMC). The distinction between an “emerging market 
economy” and a “developed” economy is taken from the groupings devised by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These categories are determined by per capita
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output (gross domestic product per capita). Typically, countries labeled as having 
“developed” markets are those with large industrial bases and per capita incomes 
around $20,000 per year. The lower-income economies are labeled as “emerging" 
markets, and they generally have a per capita income between $300 and $2,000 per 
year.
External Debt. Long-term debt is defined as debt that has an original or extended 
maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in 
foreign currency, goods, or services. Long-term debt has three components: public 
debt, which is an external obligation of a public debtor, including the national 
government, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous public 
bodies; publicly guaranteed debt, which is an external obligation of a private debtor that 
is guaranteed for repayment by a public entity; and private nonguaranteed debt, which 
is an external obligation of a private debtor that is not guaranteed for repayment by a 
public entity. Short-term debt includes the following: interest in arrears on long-term 
debt, which is interest payment due, but not paid, on a cumulative basis; and short-term 
officially guaranteed suppliers' credit. Total external debt is the sum of public, 
publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and 
short-term debt.
FDI. Foreign Direct Investment
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Indebtedness. The World Bank definitions of indebtedness were used to classify 
economies. Severely indebted means either of the two key ratios is above critical 
levels: present value of debt service to GNI (80%) and present value of debt service to 
exports (220%). Moderately means either of the two key ratios exceeds 60% of, but 
does not reach, the critical levels. Slightly indebted means either of the key ratios are 
below 60%.
Initial Public offering (IPO). Initial public offering of shares of a company on the 
market (usually through a stock exchange).
Management Contract (or management privatization). An arrangement where a 
private contractor assumes responsibility for a full range of operation and maintenance 
functions, with authority to make day-to-day management decisions. Compensation 
may be based partially on services rendered (as for service contracts) and partially on 
performance achieved (as in profit sharing). Under the agreement, the government still 
retains complete ownership of the state-owned enterprise. This form is effective in 
tapping the talent and efficiency of the private sector without relinquishing control.
The private sector may be forced to produce goods and services which do not conform 
to an efficient production set.
Sale of Assets. Divestiture is a total sale of all or part of the company to private 
investors. There is actual change of ownership of an enterprise from the public to the 
private sector. This form of privatization is easier in developed, industrialized 
countries where capital markets are well organized and developed (Pack 1991). Equity 
can be sold off easily. The sale of assets in whole or part is a very difficult task and
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sensitive in EMCs where capital markets are less developed or nonexistent (Jones, 
Leroy, Tandon, Vogelsand 1991).
SOE. State Owned Enterprise
Transaction costs. Any activity which is engaged in to satisfy each party to an 
exchange that the value given and received is in accord with his expectations. They are 
the costs of carrying out a transaction of the opportunity costs incurred when an 
efficiency-enhancing transaction is not realized.
Unbundling. In reference to a sector or enterprise, segmentation or disaggregation of 
constituent activities into separate parts. Vertical unbundling refers to the separation of 
formerly integrated activities, as in the separation of power, production, transmission, 
and distribution activities. Horizontal unbundling refers to the splitting up of a sector 
segment into multiple independent entities (for example, competing power generators 
or separate regional distribution companies). The term also refers to the separation of 
infrastructure services from the underlying infrastructure, as in the separation of 
responsibility between of various attributes of property rights (for example, shares can 
be unbundled into voting rights and claim on cash flow).
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Appendix B
Regional and Economic
Regional Groupings of the 42 Study Countries
Argentina Bulgaria China Egypt India Cote d'Ivoire
Bolivia Croatia Indonesia Morocco Pakistan Ghana
Brazil Czech Malaysia Turkey Sri Lanka Kenya
Chile Estonia Philippines Tunisia Mozambique
Colombia Hungary Thailand Nigeria
Jamaica Lithuania South Africa
Mexico Macedonia Tanzania
Nicaragua Poland Zambia
Panama Romania Uganda
Peru Russia
Venezuela
Econom ic Classifications
Low, Middle, and High Income Countries
Classification of econom ies
For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying 
economies is gross national income (GNI) per capita. In previous editions of our publications, 
this term was referred to as gross national product, or GNI. Based on its GNI per capita, every 
economy is classified as low income, middle income (subdivided into lower middle and upper 
middle), or high income. Other analytical groups, based on geographic regions and levels of 
external debt, are also used.
Low-income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing 
economies. The use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in 
the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a 
preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect 
development status.
Definitions of groups
These tables classify all World Bank member countries (183), and all other economies with 
populations of more than 30,000 (207 total).
Income group: Economies are divided according to 2000 GNI per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income. $755 or less; lower middle income. 
$756- $2,995; upper middle income. $2,996- $9,265; and high income. $9,266 or more.
Indebtedness: Standard World Bank definitions of severe and moderate indebtedness are 
used to classify economies in this table. Severely indebted means either of the two key ratios 
is above critical levels: present value of debt service to GNI (80 percent) and present value of 
debt service to exports (220 percent). Moderately indebted means either of the two key ratios 
exceeds 60 percent of, but does not reach, the critical levels. For economies that do not 
report detailed debt statistics to the World Bank Debtor Reporting System (DRS), present- 
value calculation is not possible. Instead, the following methodology is used to classify the 
non-DRS economies. Severely indebted means three of four key ratios (averaged over 1997- 
99) are above critical levels: debt to GNI (50 percent); debt to exports (275 percent); debt 
service to exports (30 percent); and interest to exports (20 percent). Moderately indebted 
means three of the four key ratios exceed 60 percent of, but do not reach, the critical levels. 
All other classified low- and middle-income economies are listed as less-indebted.
East Asia and Pacific (developing only: 23)
American Samoa
Cambodia
China
Fiji
Indonesia
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep.
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. Sts
Mongolia
Myanmar
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Tonga
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia (developing only: 28)
Albania Hungary Russian Federation
Armenia Isle of Man Slovak Republic
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Tajikistan
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Belarus Kyrgyz Republic Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina Latvia Turkmenistan
Bulgaria Lithuania Ukraine
Croatia Macedonia, FYR Uzbekistan
Czech Republic Moldova Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.
Estonia Poland
Georgia Romania
Latin America and the Caribbean (developing only: 32)
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Paraguay
Argentina El Salvador Peru
Belize Grenada Puerto Rico
Bolivia Guatemala St. Kitts and Nevis
Brazil Guyana St. Lucia
Chile Haiti St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Colombia Honduras Suriname
Costa Rica Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
Cuba Mexico Uruguay
Dominica Nicaragua Venezuela, RB
Dominican Republic Panama
Middle East and North Africa (developing only: 16)
Algeria Jordan Syrian Arab Republic
Bahrain Lebanon Tunisia
Djibouti Libya West Bank and Gaza
Egypt, Arab Rep. Morocco Yemen, Rep.
Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman
Iraq Saudi Arabia
South Asia (8)
Afghanistan India Pakistan
Bangladesh Maldives Sri Lanka
Bhutan Nepal
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only: 48)
Angola Gabon Niger
Benin Gambia, The Nigeria
Botswana Ghana Rwanda
Burkina Faso Guinea Sao Tome and Principe
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Senegal
Cameroon Kenya Seychelles
Cape Verde Lesotho Sierra Leone
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Central African Republic Liberia Somalia
Chad Madagascar South Africa
Comoros Malawi Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Swaziland
Congo, Rep Mauritania Tanzania
Cote d’Ivoire Mauritius Togo
Equatorial Guinea Mayotte Uganda
Eritrea Mozambique Zambia
Ethiopia Namibia Zimbabwe
Low-incom© economies (63)
Afghanistan Ghana Nicaragua
Angola Guinea Niger
Armenia Guinea-Bissau Nigeria
Azerbaijan Haiti Pakistan
Bangladesh India Rwanda
Benin Indonesia Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan Kenya Senegal
Burkina Faso Korea, Dem Rep. Sierra Leone
Burundi Kyrgyz Republic Solomon Islands
Cambodia Lao PDR Somalia
Cameroon Lesotho Sudan
Central African Republic Liberia Tajikistan
Chad Madagascar Tanzania
Comoros Malawi Togo
Congo, Dem. Rep Mali Uganda
Congo, Rep. Mauritania Ukraine
Cote d'Ivoire Moldova Uzbekistan
Eritrea Mongolia Vietnam
Ethiopia Mozambique Yemen, Rep.
Gambia, The Myanmar Zambia
Georgia Nepal Zimbabwe
Lower-middle-income economies (54)
Albania
Algeria
Belarus
Belize
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Cape Verde
China
Colombia
Cuba
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kiribati
Latvia
Lithuania
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Russian Federation
Samoa
Sri Lanka
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
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Djibouti Macedonia, FYR Thailand
Dominican Republic Maldives Tonga
Ecuador Marshall islands Tunisia
Egypt, Arab Rep. Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Turkmenistan
El Salvador Morocco Vanuatu
Equatorial Guinea Namibia West Bank and Gaza
Fiji Papua New Guinea Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.
Upper-middle-income economies (38)
American Samoa Grenada Poland
Antigua and Barbuda Hungary Puerto Rico
Argentina Isle of Man Saudi Arabia
Bahrain Korea, Rep. Seychelles
Botswana Lebanon Slovak Republic
Brazil Libya South Africa
Chile Malaysia St. Kitts and Nevis
Costa Rica Mauritius St. Lucia
Croatia Mayotte Trinidad and Tobago
Czech Republic Mexico Turkey
Dominica Oman Uruguay
Estonia Palau Venezuela, RB
Gabon Panama
High-income economies (52) 
Andorra Germany New Caledonia
Aruba Greece New Zealand
Australia Greenland Northern Mariana Islands
Austria Guam Norway
Bahamas, The Hong Kong, China Portugal
Barbados Iceland Qatar
Belgium Ireland San Marino
Bermuda Israel Singapore
Brunei Italy Slovenia
Canada Japan Spain
Cayman Islands Kuwait Sweden
Channel Islands Liechtenstein Switzerland
Cyprus Luxembourg United Arab Emirates
Denmark Macao, China United Kingdom
Faeroe Islands Malta United States
Finland Monaco Virgin Islands (U.S.)
France Netherlands
French Polynesia Netherlands Antilles
High-income OECD members (23)
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Australia Greece Norway
Austria Iceland Portugal
Belgium Ireland Spain
Canada Italy Sweden
Denmark Japan Switzerland
Finland Luxembourg United Kingdom
France Netherlands United States
Germany New Zealand
Severely indebted (46)
Afghanistan Ethiopia Nicaragua
Angola Gabon Niger
Argentina Guinea Nigeria
Benin Guinea-Bissau Pakistan
Bolivia Guyana Peru
Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Rwanda
Brazil Iraq Sao Tome and Principe
Bulgaria Jordan Sierra Leone
Burundi Kyrgyz Republic Somalia
Cameroon Lao PDR Sudan
Central African Republic Liberia Syrian Arab Republic
Comoros Madagascar Tanzania
Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi Uganda
Congo, Rep. Mali Zambia
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania
Cuba Myanmar
Moderately indebted (43)
Algeria Honduras Samoa
Armenia Hungary Senegal
Bangladesh Jamaica St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belize Kenya Thailand
Burkina Faso Lebanon Togo
Cambodia Malaysia Tunisia
Chad Mauritius Turkey
Chile Moldova Turkmenistan
Colombia Mongolia Uruguay
Ecuador Morocco Venezuela, RB
Estonia Mozambique Vietnam
Gambia, The Panama Yemen, Rep.
Georgia Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe
Ghana Philippines
Haiti Russian Federation
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Less indebted (57)
Albania
Antigua and Barbuda
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Belarus
Bhutan
Botswana
Cape Verde
China
Costa Rica
Croatia
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic 
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea
Fiji
Grenada
Guatemala
India
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Kazakhstan
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep.
Latvia
Lesotho
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Maldives
Mexico
Namibia
Nepal
Oman
Paraguay
Poland
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Slovak Republic
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
Suriname
Swaziland
Tajikistan
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
Vanuatu
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep
Not classified by indebtedness (61)
American Samoa Greenland New Zealand
Andorra Guam Northern Mariana Islands
Aruba Hong Kong, China Norway
Australia Iceland Palau
Austria Ireland Portugal
Bahamas, The Isle of Man Puerto Rico
Barbados Israel Qatar
Belgium Italy San Marino
Bermuda Japan Singapore
Brunei Kuwait Slovenia
Canada Liechtenstein Spain
Cayman Islands Luxembourg Sweden
Channel Islands Macao, China Switzerland
Cyprus Malta United Arab Emirates
Denmark Marshall Islands United Kingdom
Faeroe Islands Mayotte United States
Finland Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Uzbekistan
France Monaco Virgin Islands (U.S.)
French Polynesia Netherlands West Bank and Gaza
Germany Netherlands Antilles
Greece New Caledonia
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Appendix C 
External Debt Levels
Total Long-term yeMialy Private Use o f M F
eiteraal debt yuraatred  debt nongv aranteed credit
M l ecteraal
debt
BRO loans and
Total DA credits
fm lions 8 millions Sm ttons Smifcons tm iions SmMions
1990 1999 1990 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999
1 Argentina 62232 147.880 48.676 1H.887 46,876 84,568 2609 8,314 1800 27.320 3.083 4,478
2 Bolivia ♦275 6.157 3,864 4,508 3287 3,864 587 tno 177 643 257 247
3 Brazil 119.877 244273 94.340 206,326 87.669 95233 8.427 6.822 6*71 1H093 1821 8.827
4 Bulgaria 10,865 9.872 9.809 8246 9.809 7.602 0 829 0 644 0 1250
5 Chile 19226 37.762 14,687 32269 10.425 5.655 1*74 885 4263 26*14 1156 0
S China 55,301 154223 45,515 136.541 45.515 108.163 5.881 19208 0 28278 469 0
7 Colombia 17222 34,538 15.784 30,572 14,671 19.434 3*74 1968 1113 11139 0 0
8 Cote d'Ivoire 17251 13.170 13223 11295 10,665 9.699 1*20 2068 2558 1596 431 620
9 Croatia _ 9.443 8,555 5.443 _ 387 _ 3.112 197
10 Czech Republic 6.383 22,582 3,983 15.317 3.983 13,440 0 324 0 1878 0 0
11 Egypt. Arab Rep. 32,949 30.404 28.372 26.110 27,372 25,998 2401 2*34 1000 112 125 0
12 Estonia _ 2279 1612 206 _ 88 - 1407 - 25
13 Ghana 3.881 6.928 2.816 5.907 2.783 5,647 1423 3.117 33 260 745 310
14 Hungary 21202 29.042 17,931 25.499 17.931 16,064 1512 654 0 9.436 330 0
15 India 83,717 94.393 72.550 90.324 71,062 82280 20,996 26.746 1488 7.944 2623 26
IS Indonesia 69.872 150296 58242 119,819 ♦7,982 72*54 10.385 Q.106 10261 47265 494 10248
17 Jamaica 4.674 3.913 3,970 3.071 3237 2205 672 393 34 166 357 83
18 Kenya 7,058 6,562 5,642 5.604 4.762 5285 2056 2311 880 220 482 132
19 Lithuania _ 3.584 2.806 .. 1*92 _ 200 _ 915 230
20 Macedonia. FYR 1433 1264 1135 333 _ 129 _ ®2
21 Malaysia 15.328 45,939 13.422 38,390 11.592 18229 U02 900 1830 19.460 0 0
22 Mexico 104,442 166260 81.809 138.424 75.974 87.531 11,030 11.027 5.835 50.893 6.551 4.473
23 Morocco 24.458 19,060 23201 18.877 23.101 17284 3.138 3*21 200 1593 760 0
24 Mozambique 4.650 6.959 4231 6.372 ♦211 4*25 268 702 19 1747 74 200
25 Nicaragua 10.707 6.986 8281 5,905 8281 5.799 299 607 0 DG 0 155
26 Nigeria 33.439 29.358 31935 22,673 31545 22423 3.321 2613 391 250 0 0
27 Pakistan 20.663 34269 16.643 30.736 16.506 28.594 3,922 7220 138 2221 836 1704
28 Panama 6.678 6.837 3,988 6245 3.988 5.678 462 288 0 567 272 149
29 Peru 20.064 32284 13,959 25,194 13.629 20.709 1188 2417 330 4,485 755 735
30 Phiippines 30,580 52.022 25241 44,454 24,040 33,568 4,044 4246 1201 10.886 912 1*22
31 Poland 49,366 54268 39263 48.325 39263 33.151 55 2165 0 15,174 509 0
32 Romania 1140 9.367 230 7.968 223 5,985 0 1*62 7 1.984 0 458
33 Russian Federation 59.340 173,940 ♦7.540 142,958 ♦7.540 120,375 0 6.707 0 22583 0 15238
34 South Africa 24.158 10,378 .. 9.146 0 1 „ 1230 0 0
35 Sri Lanka 5.863 9.472 5,048 8268 4.947 8.182 946 1671 102 86 410 258
36 Tanzania 6,451 7.967 5.793 6.628 5.781 6,595 1.493 2610 12 32 140 312
37 Thailand 28.165 96.335 19,842 69.486 12.531 310H 2530 2816 7.311 38.475 1 2431
38 Tunisia 7,690 11.872 6,880 10259 6.662 9,487 1.406 1264 2® 772 176 76
39 Turkey 49.424 101,796 39.924 77.433 38,870 50.095 6.429 3*09 1064 27238 0 890
40 Uganda 2.583 4.077 2.161 3.564 2w 3,564 969 2*43 0 0 282 372
41 Venezuela. RB 33.170 35.852 28.159 32.842 24.509 25216 974 1130 3.650 7.627 2012 741
42 Zambia 6.916 5.853 4.554 4.571 4.552 4.498 813 1736 2 73 949 1171
Source: World Bank Debt Tables, 2001.
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Appendix D
Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Data Tables1
PROCEEDS FROM PRIVATIZATION, 1990-1999 (US$ MILLIONS)
C ountry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
1998 1999
Argentina 7.559.6 2.840.6 5.741.5 4,670.1 893.6 1,207.6 642.2 4.365.9 510.4 16.156.5
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 8.7 13.0 0.0 788.6 34.0 39.9 9.9 151.3
Brazil 44.0 1,633.4 2,400.7 2,620.6 2,103.5 991.5 5,770.2 18,737.4 32.426.6 2.879.8
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 146.7 110.8 48.0 527.4 569.0 1,752.3
Chile 98.0 364.3 8.0 105.8 127.6 13.1 187.0 0.0 181.4 1,053.2
China 0.0 10.9 1,262.2 2,849.2 2,226.1 648.7 918.5 9,1204 611.0 2.946.1
Colombia 0.0 168.3 5.4 390.8 170.0 0.0 1,850.9 2,876.0 518.1 0.0
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0 2.0 10.1 5.3 18.6 74.0 103.3 263.1 93.7 27.3
Croatia 0.0 0.0 44.8 24.1 13.0 3.0 161.4 0.0 222.0 850.0
Czech 22.0 527.0 1,359.8 645.1 7.0 1,645.0 0.0 71.5 180.7 1,175.0
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 393.2 261.9 0.0 855.1 538.7 856.5
Estonia 0.0 0.0 38.0 25.9 107.9 78.6 39.9 177.0 43.0 267.9
Ghana 10.3 3.0 15.2 27.5 475.9 79.6 185.6 67.6 20.7 3.0
Hungary 483.2 797.5 779.2 1,654.8 1,506.6 3,987.6 945.3 2,139.0 341.6 1,364.1
India 0.0 931.0 1,097.7 861.3 1,505.0 810.0 495.0 1,373.1 52.2 1.858.1
Indonesia 0.0 190.4 13.9 31.1 1,747.6 2,0312 . 1,007.6 141.0 122.1 849.9
Jamaica 49.0 83.2 30.4 78.4 75.0 1.1 68.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 12.0 0.5 11.5 10.0 18.9 13.0 137.1 24.1 29.6 61.6
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.7 21.5 41.4 43.6 783.6 9.0 582.5 53.3
Macedonia 258.2 281.5 0.0 0.0 24.9 12.4 0.0 24.5 19.8 58.0
Malaysia 375.2 387.4 2,883.4 2,148.4 798.0 2,518.9 214.3 704.0 0.0 130.0
Mexico 3.0 11,289.4 6,923.8 2,131.5 766.3 167.0 1,526.1 4,496.2 998.7 291.0
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 273.4 346.6 239.7 270.6 716.4 92.2 1,163.3
Mozambique 3.5 4.7 9.3 5.7 1.7 26.0 37.7 21.0 28.6 0.0
Nicaragua 1.1 31.5 11.2 66.1 16.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nigeria 15.9 35.3 114.1 541.0 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 11.0 62.7 342.9 16.9 1,106.1 36.5 316.7 58.2 41.3 0.0
Panama 0.6 2.0 16.8 20.7 59.7 0.0 72.0 652.0 301.8 301.7
Peru 0.0 2.7 212.4 126.6 2,840.1 1,276.3 1,751.4 1,158.9 480.0 286.0
Philippines 0.0 243.8 754.0 1,637.6 494.0 207.5 21.7 371.4 0.0 230.0
Poland 62.2 337.6 240.2 733.4 641.3 979.6 604.9 2,246.3 2,436.1 3,890.3
Romania 0.0 0.0 2.6 51.2 4.4 130.0 174.0 404.5 1,006.0 93.0
Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,001.6 0.0 0.0 909.0 761.0
South Africa 0.0 1,073.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 122.0 1,286.6 247.3 235.0
Sri Lanka 18.3 2.1 105.5 52.1 42.2 65.4 77.1 360.6 80.6 0.6
Tanzania 0.0 0.0 2.7 26.8 4.9 76.7 13.4 16.3 110.8 20.7
Thailand 0.0 0.0 237.5 471.0 241.8 0.0 290.9 47.8 353.0 1,343.8
Tunisia 1.8 16.8 60.4 0.0 0.0 32.5 35.9 2.8 364.4 8.4
Turkey 436.5 212.2 780.2 482.6 354.3 571.8 297.0 465.5 1,016.3 38.0
Uganda 0.0 0.0 11.8 19.1 23.6 46.7 30.3 20.0 14.8 8.1
Venezuela 9.7 2,277.8 140.2 35.5 7.8 38.8 2,017.0 1,387.3 112.4 45.6
Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 13.8 69.1 29.8 302.0 408.8 0.0
1 All tables from World Bank data tables, 2001.
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Privatization and Debt Summaries
COUNTRY PROCEEDS FROM FIRST FIVE SECOND FIVE TOTAL AS A % OF 
PRIVATISATION, YEAR TOTAL YEAR TOTAL EXTERNAL GNI, 1999
1990-1999 90-94 95-99 DEBT, 1999
Argentina 44,588.0 21,705.4 22,882.6 147,880 9.3
Bolivia 1,045.4 21.7 1,023.7 6,157 6.1
Brazil 69,607.7 8,802.2 60,805.5 244,673 9.2
Bulgaria 3,199.0 191.5 3,007.5 9,872 9.3
Chile 2,138.4 703.7 1,434.7 37,762 7.7
China 20,593.2 6,348.4 14,244.8 154,223 2.1
Colombia 5,979.5 734.5 5,245.0 34,538 7.9
Cote d'Ivoire 597.4 36.0 561.4 13,170 13.9
Croatia 1,318.3 81.9 1,236.4 9,443 8.5
Czech Republic 5,633.1 2,560.9 3,072.2 22,582 6.9
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,905.4 393.2 2,512.2 30.404 1.9
Estonia 778.2 171.8 606.4 2,879 10.5
Ghana 888.4 531.9 356.5 6,928 6.9
Hungary 13,998.9 5,221.3 8,777.6 29,042 16.1
India 8,983.4 4,395.0 4,588.4 94,393 2.3
Indonesia 6,134.8 1,983.0 4,151.8 150,096 13.5
Jam aica 385.5 316.0 69.5 3,913 11.2
Kenya 318.3 52.9 265.4 6,562 6.8
Lithuania 1,535.6 63.6 1,472.0 3,584 2.7
Macedonia, FYR 679.3 564.6 114.7 1,433 13.4
Malaysia 10,159.6 6,592.4 3,567.2 45,939 6.4
Mexico 28,593.0 21,114.0 7,479.0 166,960 8.5
Morocco 3,102.2 620.0 2,482.2 19,060 9.1
Mozambique 138.2 24.9 113.3 6,959 3.3
Nicaragua 130.3 126.3 4.0 6,986 9.1
Nigeria 730.2 730.2 0.0 29,358 2.9
Pakistan 1,992.3 1,539.6 452.7 34,269 4.8
Panam a 1,427.3 99.8 1,327.5 6,837 6.3
Peru 8,134.4 3,181.8 4,952.5 32,284 5.8
Philippines 3,960.0 3,129.4 830.6 52,022 8.4
Poland 12,171.9 2,014.7 10,157.2 54,268 5.4
Romania 1,865.7 58.2 1,807.5 9,367 9.3
Russian
Federation 2,671.6 0.0 2,671.6 173,940 3.1
South Africa 2,964.2 1,073.3 1,890.9 24,158 3.8
Sri Lanka 804.5 220.2 584.3 9,472 3.4
Tanzania 272.3 34.4 237.9 7,967 2.2
Thailand 2,985.8 950.3 2,035.5 96,335 13.6
Tunisia 523.0 79.0 444.0 11,872 7.6
Turkey 4,654.4 2,265.8 2,388.6 101,796 7.4
Uganda 174.4 54.5 119.9 4,077 2.9
Venezuela, RB 6,072.0 2,471.0 3,601.0 35,852 5.6
Zambia 826.0 16.3 809.7 5,853 14.6
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Balance of paym ents cu rren t acco u n t
Goods and services
Exports 
$ millions
Imports 
$ millions
Current
account
balance
$ millions
1 9 9 0 1999 19 9 0 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 9
1 Argentina 14,800 27,747 6,846 32,589 4,552 -12,312
2 Bolivia 977 1,311 1,086 1,989 -199 -556
3 Brazil 35,170 55,746 28,184 63,648 -3,823 -25.073
4  Bulqaria 6,950 5,793 8,027 6,558 -1,710 -885
5 Chile 10,221 19,406 9,166 18,058 -485 •60
6  China 57,374 218,494 46,706 189,797 11,997 15.667
7  Colombia 8,679 13,865 6,858 13,351 542 -61
8  Cdte d'Ivoire 3,503 5,346 3.445 4,137 -1,214 38
9  Croatia 8,118 9,791 -1,522
10 Czech Republic 33,188 33,989 -1,032
11 Egypt, Arab Rep. 9,151 13,537 13,710 21,109 •634 -1,708
12 Estonia 664 3,943 711 4,248 36 -265
13 Ghana 983 2,584 1,506 3,839 -223 -766
14 Hungary 12,035 27,496 11,017 28,302 379 -2.101
15 India 23,028 54,047 31,485 67,250 -8,145 -3,699
16 Indonesia 29,295 55,821 27,511 42,151 -2,988 5,785
17 Jamaica 2,217 3,356 2,390 3,928 -312 -256
18 Kenya 2,228 2,653 2,705 3,153 -527 11
19 Lithuania 4,238 5,337 -1,194
20 Macedonia, FYR 1,441 1,926 -109
21 Malaysia 32,665 95.971 31,765 76,140 -870 12,606
22 Mexico 48,805 148,125 51,915 156,268 -7,451 -14,166
23 Morocco 6,239 10,624 7,783 11,960 -196 -167
24 Mozambique 229 586 996 1,638 -415 -429
25 Nicaragua 392 839 682 2,011 -305 -587
26 Nigeria 14,550 13,855 6,909 12,063 4,988 506
27 Pakistan 6,217 8,838 9,351 11,688 -1,352 -2,187
28 Panama 4,438 6,888 4,193 7.700 209 -1,333
29 Peru 4,120 7,636 4,087 8,853 -1,416 •1,822
30 Philippines 11,430 39,012 13,967 36,767 -2,695 7,910
31 Poland 19,037 38,522 15,095 52,213 3,067 -12,487
32 Romania 6,380 9,868 9,901 11,380 -3,254 -1,297
33 Russian Federation 53.883 84,889 48.915 52,571 468 20,960
34 South Africa 27,119 33,320 21,017 30,005 2,065 -464
35 Sri Lanka 2,293 5,566 2,965 6,717 -298 -493
36 Tanzania 538 1,190 1,474 2,241 -559 -593
37 Thailand 29,229 71.410 35,870 56,345 -7.281 12.428
38 Tunisia 5,203 8,793 6,039 9,249 •463 -443
39 Turkey 21.042 45,724 25,652 48,726 -2,625 -1,364
10 Uganda 246 726 676 1,834 -429 -746
♦1 Venezuela, RB 18.806 22,122 9,451 16,985 8,279 3,689
12 Zambia 1.360 904 1,897 1,036 -594
Cross Sectional Data, 1999
Country Cumulative
Privatization
1990-1999
External 
Debt, 1999
GNI in 
1999
Current 
Account 
1999. 
♦BP * 0
Country
Credit
Rating
Indebted
Class
Stock
Market
Cap.
Central
Gov.
Deficit
Kof
GDP
Reg
1
Reg
2
Reg
3
Reg
4
Reg
5
Reg
s
PR1V DEBT GNI CA CRED Ddclass Dmcap DEFIC1Dmena
Dlacj l)ec
a
Dap
ac
Usa Lies
u
Argentina 44.588.00 147,880.00 276.097 12,312 55.0 1 1 -1.49 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bolivia 1,045.41 6,156.9 8,092 556 42.5 1 0 -2.32 0 1 0 0 0 0
Brazil 69,607.67 244,611.00 730,424 25,073 51.3 1 1 -7.34 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 3,199.01 9,872.3 11,572 685 42.5 1 0 2.78 0 0 1 0 0 0
Chile 2,138.35 37,762.1 69.602 80 65.8 1 1 0.39 0 1 0 0 0 0
China 20,593.15 154,220.00 979,894 0 59.8 0 1 -2.23 0 0 0 1 0 0
Colombia 5.979.50 34.537.60 90,007 61 48.9 1 0 -5.12 0 1 0 0 0 0
Cote d'Ivoire 597.43 13,170.0 10,387 0 32.5 1 0 -1.27 0 0 0 0 0 1
Croatia 1,318.30 9.443.3 20,222 1,522 49.7 0 0 0.64 0 0 1 0 0 0
Czech 5,633.10 22,582.5 51,623 1,032 63.1 0 0 -1.65 0 0 1 0 0 0
Egypt 2,905.43 30,403.8 86,544 1,708 56.4 0 0 -2.02 1 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia 778.19 2,879.3 4,906 295 55.7 1 0 •0.06 0 0 1 0 0 0
Ghana 888.40 6.928.00 7,451 766 37.6 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hungary 13,998.90 29,042.2 46,751 2,101 65.2 1 0 •6.18 0 0 1 0 0 0
India 8,983.39 94,392.00 441,834 3,699 53.8 0 1 -4.80 0 0 0 0 1 0
Indonesia 6.134.82 150,096.30 125,043 0 38.5 1 0 -2.69 0 0 0 1 0 0
Jamaica 385.50 3,913.3 6,311 256 42.7 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 0 0 0
Kenya 318.30 6.561.5 10,696 0 37.6 1 0 -0.91 0 0 0 0 0 1
Lithuania 1,535.60 3.584.3 9,751 1,194 50.8 0 0 -0.43 0 0 1 0 0 0
Macedonia 679.30 1,433.2 3,348 109 37.4 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 0
Malaysia 10,159.60 45.939.4 76,944 0 61.1 1 1 2.92 0 0 0 1 0 0
Mexico 28,593.00 166.959.60 428,877 14,166 59.7 0 1 -1.45 0 1 0 0 0 0
Morocco 3,102.23 19,059.9 33,715 167 55.1 1 0 0.00 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 138.20 6,958.8 3,804 429 28.6 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nicaragua 130.30 6,986.3 2,012 587 26.3 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 730.20 29,357.7 31.600 0 32.1 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
Pakistan 1.992.30 34,269.3 62,915 2,187 32.0 1 0 •6.42 0 0 0 0 1 0
Panama
1,427.30 5.836.8 8,872 1,333 52.2 1 0 -0.69 0 1 0 0 0 0
Peru
8,134.35 32,283.5 53,705 1,822 39.1 1 0 -0.09 0 1 0 0 0 0
Philippines 396.00 52,021.5 77,967 0 52.8 1 1 -1.87 0 0 0 1 0 0
Poland 12,171.93 54,268.2 157,429 12,487 63.6 0 0 -1.00 0 0 1 0 0 0
Romania 1,865.70 9,366.7 33,034 1,297 36.6 0 0 -3.91 0 0 1 0 0 0
Russia 2,671.60 173.940.40 328,995 0 37.9 1 0 -5.30 0 0 1 0 0 0
South Africa 2.964.2C 24,157.6 133,569 464 57.7 0 1 -2.62 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sri Lanka
804.46 9,472.5 15,578 493 39.8 0 0 -8.01 0 0 0 0 1 0
Tanzania
272.29 7,967.5 8,515 593 28.9 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
Thailand 2,985.79 96,335.00 121,051 0 59.5 1 0 -7.69 0 0 0 1 0 0
Tunisia 523.00 11,872.3 19,757 443 57.5 1 0 -0.40 1 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 4,654.40 101,795.80 186,490 1,364 52.7 1 1 -8.40 1 0 0 0 0 0
Uganda 174.44 4,076.8 6,794 746 33.7 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
Venezuela 6,072.05 35,852.0 87,313 0 43.8 1 0 -3.67 0 1 0 0 0 0
Zambia 826.00 5,852.8 3,222 0 27.0 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1
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External Debt 
Management
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia
Cflte d ’Ivoire
Croatia
C zech Republic
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Estonia
G hana
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jam aica
Kenya
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panam a
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
R ussian Federation
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Venezuela, RB
Zambia
% o f
GNI
% of exports of 
goods and 
services
% of central 
governm ent
current revenue
% o f 
total debt
1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999
4.6 9.3 37.0 75.9 32.5 16.8 21.3
8.3 6.1 38.6 32.0 41.3 17.3 3.6 22.8
1.8 9.2 22.2 110.9 3.9 19.8 12.1
7.2 9.3 19.4 19.1 12.9 14.5 9.7 3.8
9.7 7.7 25.9 25.4 25.6 5.1 17.6 14.5
2.0 2.1 11.7 9.0 23.9 16.8 11.5
10.2 7.9 40.9 42.9 61.2 44.7 8.4 11.5
13.7 13.9 35.4 26.2 22.1 42.3 20.8 9.5
8.5 19.4 7.7 7.3
6.9 10.3 13.7 37.6 32.2
7.3 1.9 22.3 9.0 16.3 13.5 14.1
10.5 13.2 3.8 43.1
6.4 6.9 36.9 19.9 26.2 8.2 10.3
13.4 16.1 34.3 26.6 21.4 17.7 13.9 12.2
2.6 2.3 32.7 15.0 14.5 14.2 10.2 4.3
9.1 13.5 33.3 30.3 34.4 35.3 15.9 13.3
17.4 11.2 26.9 17.4 7.4 19.4
9.8 6.8 35.4 26.7 26.6 13.2 12.6
2.7 6.3 6.0 15.3
13.4 29.9 4.7
10.3 6.4 12.6 4.8 31.4 12.4 16.4
4.5 8.5 20.7 25.1 19.5 15.4 14.4
7.2 9.1 21.5 24.3 21.3 1.7 1.0
3.3 3.3 26.2 20.0 7.4 5.6
1.6 9.1 3.9 16.1 2.6 22.7 13.3
13.0 2.9 22.6 6.0 4.5 22.8
4.6 4.8 23.0 28.3 18.1 15.6 15.4 5.3
6.9 8.3 6.2 8.7 10.4 36.2 6.5
1.9 5.8 10.8 32.7 4.9 22.9 26.7 19.7
8.1 8.4 27.0 14.3 39.5 41.7 14.5 11.0
1.7 5.4 4.9 20.4 4.3 19.4 11.0
0.0 9.3 0.3 31.3 0.0 79.8 10.0
2.0 3.1 13.5 10.7 19.9 9.1
3.8 13.9 8.5 57.0
4.8 3.4 13.7 7.9 16.7 14.4 6.9 10.0
4.4 c 2.2 c 32.9 c 15.6 c 8.0 12.9
6.3 13.6 16.9 22.0 20.7 21.7 29.5 24.3
12.0 7.6 24.5 15.9 32.2 22.4 8.2 13.0
4.9 7.4 29.4 26.2 30.9 18.1 19.2 23.1
3.4 2.9 58.9 23.7 5.4 3.5
10.6 5.6 23.2 23.2 36.2 23.3 6.0 6.3
6.7 14.6 14.9 46.6 20.4 1.9
Total GN11999, A tlas m ethod
(millions of
Economy_____________________US dollars)
7 China 979,894
8 Brazil 730,424
1 1 1ndia 441,834
12 Mexico 428,877
16 Russian Federation 328,995
17 Argentina 276,097
22 Turkey 186,490
25 Poland 157,429
28 South Africa 133,569
31 Indonesia 125,043
32 Thailand 121,051
37 Colombia 90,007
38 Venezuela, RB 87,313
39 Egypt, Arab Rep. 86,544
41 Philippines 77,967
42 Malaysia 76,944
43 Chile 69,602
44 Pakistan 62,915
46 Peru 53,705
48 Czech Republic 51,623
51 Hungary 46,751
55 Morocco 33,715
56 Romania 33,034
57 Nigeria 31,600
64 Croatia 20,222
66 Tunisia 19,757
76 Sri Lanka 15,578
81 Bulgaria 11,572
83 Kenya 10,696
84 Cote d'Ivoire 10,387
85 Lithuania 9,751
86 Panam a 8,872
90Tanzania Ic 8,515
94 Bolivia 8,092
97 G hana 7,451
98 Uganda 6,794
101 Jam aica 6,311
112 Estonia 4,906
122 Mozambique 3,804
129 Macedonia, FYR 3,348
131 Zambia 3,222
147 Nicaragua 2,012
Time Series Data
(A rgentina
I Bolivia
I Brazil
| B ulgaria
(Chile
I C hina
r PRIV DEBT GNI CA DEBTSQ
1990 7,559.6 62,232.00 135,150.00 4,552.0 3,872.821.824
1991 2,840.6 65,405.00 188,573.00 (647.0) 4,277,814,025
1992 5,741.5 68,345.00 224,521.00 (5,714.7) 4,671,039,025
1993 4,670.1 64,718.00 233,817.00 (8,157.9) 4.188.419,524
1994 893.6 75,139.00 254,182.00 (11,158.3) 5.645.869.321
1995 1,207.6 98,802.00 253,816.00 (5,190.7) 9.761,835.204
1996 642.2 111,418.00 267,152.00 (6.842.5) 12.413.970,724
1997 4,365.9 128,410.00 286,989.00 (12,328.4) 16.489,128.100
1998 510.4 141,549.00 291,101.00 (14,603.3) 20,036,119.401
1999 16,156.5 147.880.00 276,097.00 (12,312.4) 21.868,494.400
1990 0.0 4,275.0 4,626.5 (198.9) 18,275,625
1991 0.0 4,061.3 5,100.8 (262.6) 16.494.158
1992 8.7 4,234.7 5,315.3 (533.9) 17,932,684
1993 13.0 4,306.9 5,523.7 (505.5) 18,549,388
1994 0.0 4,876.6 5,793.5 (90.2) 23.781.228
1995 788.6 5,272.0 6,468.0 (302.5) 27,793,984
1996 34.0 5,191.3 7,191.1 (379.7) 26,949,596
1997 39.9 5.232.9 7,706.3 (553.5) 27,383,242
1998 9.9 6.460.4 8.354.6 (678.1) 41,736.768
1999 151.3 6,156.9 8,122.2 (555.6) 37,907,418
1990 44.0 119,800.00 452,000.0 (3,823.0) 14,352,040,000
1991 1,633.4 120,900.00 398,000.0 (1,450.0) 14.616.810.000
1992 2,400.7 128,710.00 383,000.0 6,039.0 16,566,264,100
1993 2,620.6 143,400.00 427,100.0 28.0 20.563,560,000
1994 2,103.5 151,222.00 537,300.0 (1,153.0) 22.868,093.284
1995 991.5 159,011.00 693,400.0 (18,136.0) 25,284,498,121
1996 5,770.2 181,345.00 762.100.0 (23,248.0) 32.886,009,025
1997 18,737.4 198,500.00 787,000.0 (30,491.0) 39,402,250.000
1998 32,426.6 244,800.00 755,100.0 (35,829.0) 59,927.040.000
1999 2,879.8 244,611.00 729.424.0 (25,873.0) 59,834,541,321
1990 0.0 10,864.6 19,082.6 (1,710.0) 118,039,533
1991 0.0 11,715.8 9,833.5 (76.9) 137,259,970
1992 0.0 11,809.7 10,203.5 (359.9) 139,469,014
1993 44.8 12,173.8 10,640.6 (1,098.8) 148,201,406
1994 146.7 9,744.0 9,580.2 (31.8) 94,945.536
1995 110.8 10,245.8 12,679.6 (25.8) 104,976,418
1996 48.0 9,991.8 9,441.3 15.7 99,836,067
1997 527.4 9,754.0 9,708.9 426.9 95,140,516
1998 569.0 9,800.6 12,257.3 (61.8) 96,051,760
1999 1,752.3 9,872.3 12,402.4 (684.7) 97,462,307
1990 98.0 19,225.8 28,563.0 (484.5) 369,631.386
1991 364.3 17,946.9 32,690.0 (98.7) 322,091,220
1992 8.0 19,133.7 39,960.0 (957.9) 366,098,476
1993 105.8 20,636.9 42,767.0 (2,554.4) 425,881,642
1994 127.6 24,728.4 48,367.0 (1,584.9) 611,493.767
1995 13.1 25.562.2 62,427.0 (1,349.6) 653,426.069
1996 187.0 27,403.9 65,767.0 (3,510.0) 750,973.735
1997 0.0 31,443.1 72,562.0 (3,727.7) 988,668,538
1998 181.4 36,321.0 70,856.0 (4,139.0) 1,319,215,041
1999 1,053.2 37,762.1 65,609.0 (80.0) 1,425,976,196
1990 0.0 55.300.0 355,600.0 1,200.0 3,058,090,000
160
Egypt
Czech
[Croatia
Cote d'Ivoire
Colombia
1991 10.9 60,261.00 377,411.0 1,327.0 3,631,388,121
1992 1.262.2 72,430.00 418,400.0 6,401.0 5,246.104.900
1993 2,849.2 85,939.00 430.900.0 (11,611.0) 7,385,511,721
1994 2.226.1 100,460.00 541.512.0 6.911.0 10,092.211.600
1995 648.7 118,822.00 688,401.0 1,622.0 14.118,667,684
1996 918.5 128,102.00 804,000.0 7,245.0 16,410,122,404
1997 9,120.4 146,711.00 887,233.0 36,963.0 21,524.117.521
1998 611.0 154.60 929.000.0 31,477.0 23,901
1999 2,946.1 154,220.00 979,894.0 15,676.0 23.783,808,400
1990 0.0 17,222.10 38,193.00 542.0 296,600,728
1991 168.3 17,200.80 39.643.00 2,348.8 295,867,521
1992 5.4 17,277.10 47,149.00 900.7 298,498.184
1993 390.8 18,941.70 53,939.00 (2,102.4) 358,787,999
1994 170.0 21,939.60 79.164.00 (3,675.0) 481,346,048
1995 0.0 25,047.60 89,491.00 (4,596.0) 627.382,266
1996 1,850.9 28,899.50 93,171.00 (4,753.0) 835,181,100
1997 2,876.0 31,799.60 104,311.00 (5,864.0) 1,011,214,560
1998 518.1 33,264.00 97,366.00 (5,209.0) 1,106,493,696
1999 0.0 34,537.60 84,093.00 (61.0) 1,192,845,814
1990 0.0 17,251.1 2,507.3 (1,214.2) 297.600.451
1991 2.0 18,174.0 2,573.2 (1,074.1) 330.294.276
1992 10.1 18,546.5 2,595.9 (1,012.7) 343,972,662
1993 5.3 19,070.9 2,559.6 (891.7) 363,699,227
1994 18.6 17,395.2 3,826.4 (13.8) 302,592,983
1995 74.0 18,898.5 4,494.8 (492.4) 357,153,302
1996 103.3 19,523.6 5,005.1 (164.8) 381,170,957
1997 263.1 15,608.7 5,703.0 (128.0) 243,631,516
1998 93.7 14,851.8 6,162.8 (211.5) 220,575,963
1999 27.3 13,170.0 10,387.0 38.2 173.448,900
1990 0.0 910.0 11,453.00 311.0 828,100
1991 0.0 1,102.0 1,651.00 392.0 1.214,404
1992 44.8 1,333.0 795.00 494.0 1,776,889
1993 24.1 1,613.9 5,395.00 623.1 2,604.673
1994 13.0 2,054.2 13,921.00 853.7 4,219.738
1995 3.0 3,728.8 17,532.00 (1,441.7) 13,903,949
1996 161.4 4,932.7 18,305.00 (1,091.4) 24,331,529
1997 0.0 6,845.8 18,705.00 (2,324.9) 46,864,978
1098 222.0 9,159.2 19,555.00 (1,530.8) 83,890,945
1999 850.0 9,443.3 20,222.00 (1,522.3) 89,175,915
1993 645.1 9,156.0 34.880.00 466.3 83.832.336
1994 7.0 10,680.8 41,070.00 (819.9) 114,079,489
1995 1,645.0 16,217.6 51,930.00 (1,373.5) 263,010,550
1996 0.0 20,190.5 57,199.00 (4,298.9) 407,656.290
1997 71.5 23,627.0 51,855.00 (3,270.9) 558,235,129
1998 180.7 24,006.7 54.725.00 (1,386.9) 576,321,645
1999 1,175.0 22,582.5 52,372.00 (1,031.7) 509,969,306
1990 0.0 32,949.0 42.065.00 (634.0) 1,085,636.601
1991 0.0 32,564.1 36.490.00 3,820.5 1,060,420,609
1992 0.0 31,066.5 41,915.00 2,669.9 965,127,422
1993 0.0 30,508.7 47,000.00 2,295.1 930,780,776
1994 393.2 32,314.0 51.432.00 409.9 1,044,194,596
1995 261.9 33,266.2 60.300.00 385.9 1,106.640.062
1996 0.0 31,299.5 68,189.00 (185.4) 979,658,700
1997 855.1 29,849.6 76,572.00 118.9 890,908,620
1998 538.7 31,965.3 83,925.00 (2,478.6) 1,021,780,404
1999 856.5 30,403.8 90,144.00 (1,708.5) 924.391.054
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Estonia
Ghana
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
1992 38.0 5,840.0 4,172.9 36.2 34.105,600
1993 25.9 1,539.0 3,888.5 21.6 2.368,521
1994 107.9 1,861.0 3,887.6 (166.3) 3.463.321
1995 78.6 2,864.0 4,792.5 (157.8) 8.202.496
1996 39.9 1,533.6 4,372.8 (398.3) 2.351.929
1997 177.0 2,561.6 4,597.9 (561.9) 6.561,795
1998 43.0 2,924.8 5,119.5 (477.9) 8.554.455
1999 267.9 2,879.3 5,129.7 (294.7) 8.290.368
1990 10.3 3,880.90 5,773.0 ( 2232 ) 15.061.385
1991 3.0 4,380.20 6.477.0 (252.1) 19.186.152
1992 15.2 4,508.10 6,306.0 (377.0) 20,322.966
1993 27.5 4,886.60 5,854.0 (559.8) 23,878,860
1994 475.9 5,469.20 5,329.0 (254 6) 29.912.149
1995 79.6 5,935.80 6,324.0 (144.6) 35.233.722
1996 185.6 6,439.50 6.844.0 (324.7) 41,467,160
1997 67.6 6,346.30 6,812.0 (549.7) 40.275.524
1998 20.7 6,883.40 7,337.0 (380.0) 47,381.196
1999 3.0 6,928.00 7,633.0 (766.0) 47.997.184
1990 483.2 21,201.5 31,606.0 378.6 449,503.602
1991 797.5 22,630.8 32,073.0 403.2 512,153,109
1992 779.2 22,028.1 35,993.0 351.9 485.237,190
1993 1,654.8 24,363.6 37,410.0 (4,262.5) 593.585.005
1994 1,506.6 28,274.9 40,103.0 (4,053.6) 799.469,970
1995 3.987.6 31,590.2 42.875.0 (2,529.5) 997,940.736
1996 945.3 27,207.8 43,708.0 (1,688.7) 740.264,381
1997 2,139.0 24.496.2 44,303.0 (982.0) 600,063,814
1998 341.6 28,310.0 45,177.0 (2,304.0) 801,456,100
1999 1,364.1 29.042.2 46,806.0 (2,101.2) 843.449.381
1990 0.0 83,716.00 312,124.0 (8,144.6) 7,008,368,656
1991 931.0 85.421.00 262,556.0 (427.6) 7,296,747,241
1992 1,097.7 90.264.00 254,363.0 (3,116.2) 8,147,589,696
1993 861.3 94,342.00 270,021.0 (786.1) 8.900.412,964
1994 1,505.0 102,482.00 317,469.0 (3,745.0) 10,502,560,324
1995 810.0 94,469.00 349,192.0 (6,726.0) 8,924,391,961
1996 495.0 93.470.00 379,955.0 (5,578.0) 8,736,640,900
1997 1,373.1 94.320.00 404,335.0 (5,145.0) 8,896,262,400
1998 52.2 97,638.00 415,511.0 (3,449.0) 9,533,179,044
1999 1,858.1 94,392.00 444,158.0 (3,698.6) 8,909,849,664
1990 0.0 69,871.00 109,208.000 (2,988.0) 4,881,956,641
1991 190.4 79,547.00 122,572.000 (4,260.0) 6,327,725,209
1992 13.9 88,002.00 132.937.000 (2,780.0) 7,744,352,004
1993 31.1 89,171.00 151,992.000 (2,106.0) 7,951,467,241
1994 1,747.6 107,823.00 172,149.000 (2,792.0) 11,625,799,329
1995 2,031.2 124,398.00 196,187.000 (6,431.0) 15,474,862,404
1996 1,007.6 128,941.00 221,276.000 (7,663.0) 16,625,781,481
1997 141.0 136,173.00 209,439.000 (4,889.0) 18.543.085.929
1998 122.1 150,883.90 93,444.000 4,096.0 22.765.951.279
1999 849.9 150,096.30 125,043.000 5,785.0 22,528,899,274
1990 49.0 4,673.6 3,804.00 (312.1) 21,842,537
1991 83.2 4,413.0 3,317.00 (240.1) 19.474.569
1992 30.4 4,260.4 2,887.00 28.5 18,151,008
1993 78.4 4,105.9 3,813.00 (184.0) 16,858,415
1994 75.0 4,316.6 4,088.00 93.2 18,633,036
1995 1.1 4,271.4 4,275.00 (74.1) 18,244,858
1996 68.4 3,995.4 4,287.00 (111.6) 15.963.221
1997 0.0 3,912.0 6,562.00 (310.6) 15,303,744
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Kenya
Lithuania
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
1998 0.0 4,016.5 6,671.00 (302.4) 16,132,272
1999 0.0 3,913.3 6,556.00 (255.7) 15,313.917
1990 12.0 7,058.1 8,088.00 (527.1) 49,816,776
1991 0.5 7.452.9 7,586.00 (213.3) 55.545,718
1992 11.5 6,898.1 7,613.00 (180.2) 47,583,784
1993 10.0 7,111.3 4,560.00 71.2 50.570.588
1994 18.9 7,202.3 6,757.00 97.9 51.873.125
1995 13.0 7,412.4 8,686.00 (400.4) 54.943,674
1996 137.1 6.931.0 8.950.00 (73.5) 48,038,761
1997 24.1 6,602.8 10,392.00 (377.3) 43,596,968
1998 29.6 6,943.3 11,291.00 (362.9) 48,209,415
1999 61.6 6,561.5 10,475.00 11.0 43,053,282
1993 21.5 332.8 6.118.1 (85.7) 110.756
1994 41.4 502.7 5,840.8 (94.0) 252,707
1995 43.6 769.5 6,430.9 (614.4) 592,130
1996 783.6 1,258.2 7,801.3 (722.6) 1,583,067
1997 9.0 2,405.4 9,386.7 (981.3) 5.785.949
1998 582.5 2,755.7 10,492.0 (1,298.2) 7,593,882
1999 53.3 3,584.3 10,376.0 (1,194.0) 12.847.206
1993 0.0 1,041.8 2,100.0 (230.0) 1,085,347
1994 24.9 1,103.6 2,394.00 (240.0) 1,217,933
1995 12.4 1,277.1 2,477.00 (250.0) 1,630,984
1996 0.0 1,818.4 2,773.00 (288.1) 3.306,579
1997 24.5 1,233.4 3,136.00 (275.5) 1,521,276
1998 19.8 1,775.5 3,405.00 (311.7) 3.152.400
1999 58.0 1,433.2 3,408.00 (109.3) 2.054,062
1990 375.2 15.328.4 42,152.00 (0.9) 234.959,847
1991 387.4 17,079.8 46,661.00 (4.2) 291,719,568
1992 2.883.4 20,017.9 56,008.00 (2.2) 400.716.320
1993 2,148.4 26.148.5 63,683.00 (3.0) 683.744,052
1994 798.0 30,335.6 70,894.00 (4.5) 920.266.829
1995 2.518.9 34,342.6 64,688.00 (8.6) 1.179,414.175
1996 214.3 39,673.3 96,160.00 (4.5) 1,573,970.733
1997 704.0 47,228.2 94,802.00 (5.9) 2,230,502,875
1998 0.0 44,769.2 68,580.00 9.5 2,004,281,269
1999 130.0 45,939.4 73,542.00 12.6 2,110,428.472
1990 3.0 104.442.00 254,083.0 (7.5) 10,908,131,364
1991 11,289.4 114,067.50 305,842.0 (14.9) 13,011,394,556
1992 6.923.8 112,314.70 354,014.0 (24.4) 12,614,591,836
1993 2,131.5 131.726.30 391,766.0 (23.4) 17,351,818,112
1994 766.3 140.193.30 407,763.0 (29.7) 19,654,161,365
1995 167.0 166,873.70 272,877.0 (1.6) 27,846.831,752
1996 1,526.1 157,495.90 318,398.0 (2-3) 24.804.958,517
1997 4,496.2 148,695.60 388,301.0 (7.5) 22,110,381,459
1998 998.7 159,777.70 402,832.0 (15.7) 25.528.913.417
1999 291.0 166,959.60 428,877.0 (14.2) 27,875,508,032
1990 0.0 24,458.4 24,835.00 (195.6) 598.213.331
1991 0.0 21,865.5 26,721.00 (413.3) 478,100,090
1992 0.0 22,060.6 27,393.00 (432.7) 486,670,072
1993 273.4 21,459.1 25,593.00 (521.4) 460.492.973
1994 346.6 22.157.9 29,180.00 (722.9) 490,972,532
1995 239.7 22,665.4 31,668.00 (1,185.9) 513,720,357
1996 270.6 21,851.1 35,330.00 35.0 477,470,571
1997 716.4 20,161.6 32,239.00 (87.2) 406,490,115
1998 92.2 20,490.7 34,634.00 (143.8) 419,868,786
1999 1,163.3 19,059.9 34,024.00 (167.1) 363.279.788
1990 3.5 4,649.7 2,366.0 (415.3) 21,619,710
163
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
P eru
1991 4.7 4,718.4 2,339.0 (344.3) 22,263,299
1992 9.3 5,130.3 1,772.0 (352.3) 26,319.978
1993 5.7 5,211.6 1,924.0 (446.3) 27,160.775
1994 1.7 7,271.7 2.064.0 (467.2) 52,877.621
1995 26.0 7,458.4 2,207.0 (444.7) 55.627.731
1996 37.7 7,566.3 2.725.0 (420.5) 57,248,896
1997 21.0 7,637.8 3,331.0 (295.6) 58,335,989
1998 28.6 8,314.9 3.694.0 (429.3) 69,137.562
1999 0.0 6,958.8 3,804.0 (429.0) 48,424,897
1990 1.1 10,707.1 987.8 (305.2) 114.641,990
1991 31.5 10.912.5 1,200.8 (2642 ) 119,082,656
1992 11.2 11,227.6 1,349.3 (769.0) 126,059,002
1993 66.1 11,261.0 1,390.0 (604.3) 126,810,121
1994 16.4 11,908.9 1,283.8 (651.8) 141,821,899
1995 4.0 10,359.4 1,530.6 (484.0) 107,317,168
1996 0.0 5,931.6 1,649.8 (438.3) 35,183,879
1997 0.0 6,215.9 1,774.1 (534.7) 38,637,413
1998 0.0 6,442.2 1,878.6 (490.5) 41,501,941
1999 0.0 6,986.3 2,012.2 (587.1) 48,808,388
1990 15.9 33,438.9 25.584.0 4,988.2 1,118,160,033
1991 35.3 33,527.2 24,857.0 1,202.6 1.124.073,140
1992 114.1 29,018.7 29,760.0 2.267.8 842,084,950
1993 541.0 30,735.6 19,006.0 (780.4) 944.677.107
1994 23.9 33,092.3 21,310.0 (2,127.9) 1,095,100,319
1995 0.0 34,092.5 25.888.0 (2,578.4) 1,162,298,556
1996 0.0 31,406.6 33,068.0 3,506.9 986,374,524
1997 0.0 28.454.9 33,993.0 551.6 809,681,334
1998 0.0 30,314.9 29,169.0 (4,243.5) 018,993.162
1999 0.0 29,357.7 31,631.0 505.7 861,874,549
1990 11.0 20,663.4 41,792.0 (1.352.0) 426,976,100
1991 62.7 23,363.3 47,370.0 (1,368.0) 545,843,787
1992 342.9 24,917.9 51,188.0 (896.2) 620,901,740
1993 16.9 24,546.4 53,003.0 (3.327.0) 602,525,753
1994 1,106.1 27,382.7 53,403.0 (1,650.0) 749,812,259
1995 36.5 30,228.7 62,189.0 (2,163.0) 913.774,304
1996 316.7 29,824.7 63,978.0 (4,343.0) 889,512,730
1997 58.2 30,069.3 63,503.0 (3,560.0) 904,162,802
1998 41.3 32,319.2 63,334.0 (1,702.0) 1,044,530,689
1999 0.0 34,269.3 58,816.0 (2,187.0) 1,174.384,922
1990 0.6 6,678.4 5,024.1 209.1 44,601,027
1991 2.0 6,840.9 5,421.3 (241.1) 46,797,913
1992 16.8 6,486.0 6,202.0 (264.2) 42,068,196
1993 20.7 6,957.9 6,959.3 (95.7) 48,412,372
1994 59.7 7,128.8 7,504.7 15.8 50,819,789
1995 0.0 6,274.8 7,532.8 (369.1) 39,373,115
1996 72.0 6,068.7 7,827.3 (301.9) 36,829,120
1997 652.0 6,021.6 8,245.9 (603.5) 36,259,667
1998 301.8 6,406.9 8,820.2 (1,211.6) 41,048,368
1999 301.7 6,836.8 8,872.2 (1,332.6) 46,741,834
1990 0.0 20,063.9 25,508.0 (1,419.0) 402,560,083
1991 2.7 20,716.2 22,256.0 (1,500.0) 429,160,942
1992 212.4 20,337.7 34,920.0 (2,087.0) 413,622,041
1993 126.6 23,573.1 33,555.0 (2,287.0) 555,691.044
1994 2,840.1 26,527.6 43.290.0 (2,555.3) 703,713,562
1995 1,276.3 30,851.6 51,823.0 (4,116.8) 951,821,223
1996 1,751.4 29,085.9 54,318.0 (3,429.0) 845.989.579
1997 1,158.9 30,325.7 57,782.0 (3,056.0) 919,648,080
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Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
1998 480.0 32,175.3 55,517.0 (3,639.0) 1.035,249.930
1999 286.0 32.283.5 53,705.0 (1,822.0) 1,042,224,372
1990 0.0 30,580.2 44,091.0 (2,695.0) 935.148.632
1991 243.8 32.450.6 45,655.0 (1,034.0) 1.053.041.440
1992 754.0 33.005.0 53,889.0 (1,000.0) 1,089.330.025
1993 1,637.6 35.936.1 55.320.0 (3.016.0) 1,291.403,283
1994 494.0 39,411.6 65,729.0 (2,950.0) 1.553.274.215
1995 207.5 37,829.2 76,165.0 (1,980.0) 1.431,048,373
1996 21.7 40,145.0 86,257.0 (3,953.0) 1,611,621.025
1997 371.4 45,681.8 85,605.0 (4,351.0) 2,086,826.851
1998 0.0 47,793.1 68,326.0 1,546.0 2.284.180.408
1999 230.0 52,021.5 77,967.0 7,909.6 2.706.236.462
1990 62.2 49,366.3 55,619.0 3,067.0 2.437.031.576
1991 337.6 53,420.5 73,630.0 (2,146.0) 2,853,749.820
1992 240.2 48,494.6 82,702.0 (3,104.0) 2.351.726.229
1993 733.4 45.176.4 84,701.0 (5,788.0) 2.040.907.117
1994 641.3 42.552.9 98.990.0 954.0 1.810.749.298
1995 979.6 44,263.2 108,893.0 854.0 1.959,230.874
1996 604.9 43,473.1 129,672.0 (3,264.0) 1,889,910,424
1997 2,246.3 40,401.1 147.694.0 (5,744.0) 1.632,248.881
1998 2,436.1 55.494.0 156,984.0 (6,001.0) 3.079.584,036
1999 3,890.3 54.268.2 154,156.0 (12,487.0) 2.945.037,531
1990 0.0 1,139.9 38,455.000 (3,254.0) 1,299,372
1991 0.0 2.131.4 28,861.000 (1,012.0) 4,542,866
1992 2.6 3,240.1 24,978.000 (1,506.0) 10.498.248
1993 51.2 4,239.3 27.102.000 (1,174.0) 17.971,664
1994 4.4 5,532.5 28,120.000 (428.0) 30.608,556
1995 130.0 6,666.0 31,686.000 (1,774.0) 44,435,556
1996 174.0 8.519.1 32,788.000 (2.571.0) 72.575.065
1997 404.5 9,477.1 31,773.000 (2,137.0) 89,815.424
1998 1,006.0 10,014.3 41,048.000 (2,918.0) 100.286.204
1999 93.0 9,366.7 33,652.000 (1,297.0) 87,735,069
1990 0.0 59,339.60 577,909.0 300.0 3,521,188,128
1991 0.0 67.772.40 540.620.0 400.0 4,593,098,202
1992 0.0 78,651.90 421,488.0 467.0 6,186,121,374
1993 0.0 112,440.40 383,903.0 2,675.0 12.642.843.552
1994 0.0 122,325.20 321,093.0 6,556.0 14,963,454,555
1995 1,001.6 121,722.40 332,098.0 5,595.0 14,816,342,662
1996 0.0 126,621.30 411,384.0 10,284.0 16,032.953.614
1997 0.0 127,664.90 418,764.0 1,552.0 16,298,326,692
1998 909.0 177,710.10 265,929.0 945.0 31,580,879,642
1999 761.0 173,940.40 328,995.0 2,096.0 30,255,262,752
1990 0.0 11,968.0 107,542.0 2.065.4 143,233.024
1991 1,073.3 13.883.0 117,034.0 2,259.7 192,737,689
1992 0.0 16,105.0 127,586.0 1,966.7 259.371.025
1993 0.0 18,681.0 127,743.0 1,502.2 348,979,761
1994 0.0 21.671.0 133,355.0 113.9 469,632,241
1995 0.0 25,358.0 146,238.0 (2,204.2) 643,028,164
1996 122.0 26,050.0 140,727.0 (1,880.7) 676,602,500
1997 1,286.6 25,221.0 145,155.0 (2,273.0) 636,098,841
1998 247.3 24,711.5 130,944.0 (1,935.6) 610,658,232
1999 235.0 24,157.6 133,569.0 (464.4) 583,589,638
1990 18.3 5,863.1 7,889.0 (298.3) 34,375,942
1991 2.1 6,579.1 8,821.0 (594.8) 43.284.557
1992 105.5 6,451.4 9,526.0 (450.7) 41,620,562
1993 52.1 6,844.8 10,214.0 (382.2) 46,851,287
1994 42.2 7,874.1 11,550.0 (757.4) 62,001,451
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Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Venezuela
1995 65.4 8,215.4 12.682.0 (769.9) 67.492.797
1996 77.1 7,984.8 13,636.0 (682.7) 63,757.031
1997 360.6 7,691.7 14,754.0 (394.7) 59.162.249
1998 80.6 8,531.0 15.225.0 (225.4) 72.777.961
1999 0.6 9.472.5 15,702.0 (492.8) 89.728.256
1990 0.0 6,451.1 4,072.0 (558.9) 41,616.691
1991 0.0 6,557.6 4,771.0 (737.5) 43,002,118
1992 2.7 6.677.8 4,414.0 (714.2) 44.593.013
1993 26.8 6,791.1 4,093.0 (894.8) 46,119.039
1994 4.9 7,235.4 4,357.0 (637.4) 52,351,013
1995 76.7 7.405.9 5,130.0 (589.8) 54,847,355
1996 13.4 7,362.0 6,378.0 (412.8) 54,199.044
1997 16.3 7,128.5 7,582.0 (473.4) 50.815,512
1998 110.8 7,633.0 8,534.0 (787.8) 58,262,689
1999 20.7 7,967.5 8,725.0 (593.1) 63,481,056
1990 0.0 28,165.10 96,788.0 (7.281.1) 793,272,858
1991 0.0 37,772.30 108,974.0 (7.571.5) 1,426,746,647
1992 237.5 41,864.40 122,790.0 (6,303.4) 1,752,627,987
1993 471.0 52,717.20 142,294.0 (6,363.6) 2.779,103.176
1994 241.8 65,596.30 165,258.0 (8,085.4) 4,302,874,574
1995 0.0 100.092.70 177,819.0 (13,554.0) 10.018.548,593
1996 290.9 107,777.50 146,830.0 (14,691.5) 11.615.989,506
1997 47.8 109,730.70 108,104.0 (3,021.1) 12.040.826.522
1998 353.0 104,942.80 120,576.0 14,242.5 11,012,991,272
1999 1.343.8 96,335.00 121,051.0 12,427.9 9,280,432,225
1990 1.8 7,689.9 11,882.4 (463.4) 59,134,562
1991 16.8 8,251.4 12,566.2 (469.4) 68,085,602
1992 60.4 8.542.7 14,784.4 (1,103.5) 72,977,723
1993 0.0 8,693.8 13,753.5 (1,323.1) 75,582,158
1994 0.0 9.614.1 14,742.3 (536.8) 92,430,919
1995 32.5 10,819.7 17,111.4 (774.0) 117,065,908
1996 35.9 11,379.1 18,555.5 (477.7) 129,483,917
1997 2.8 11,229.6 17,994.5 (595.0) 126,103,916
1998 364.4 10,850.0 18,979.6 (675.3) 117,722.500
1999 6.4 11,872.3 19,757.0 (442.6) 140,951,507
1990 436.5 49,424.20 152.299.0 (2,625.0) 2.442,751,546
1991 212.2 50.873.50 152,002.0 250.0 2,588,113,002
1992 780.2 56,553.90 161,763.0 (974.0) 3,198,343,605
1993 482.6 68,607.80 181,618.0 (6,433.0) 4,707,030,221
1994 354.3 66,255.20 130,355.0 2,631.0 4,389,751,527
1995 571.8 73,790.10 172,071.0 (2,338.0) 5,444,978,858
1996 297.0 79,641.40 184,215.0 (2,437.0) 6,342,752,594
1997 465.5 84,770.60 194,340.0 (2,679.0) 7,186.054,624
1998 1,016.3 97,212.10 206,135.0 1,984.0 9,450,192,386
1999 38.0 101,795.80 186,490.0 (1,364.0) 10,362,384,898
1990 0.0 2,582.9 4,227.0 (429.1) 6,671,372
1991 0.0 2.777.2 3,263.0 (449.3) 7,712,840
1992 11.8 2,927.5 2,770.0 (337.7) 8,570,256
1993 19.1 3,028.8 3,171.0 (396.1) 9,173,629
1694 23.6 3,371.6 3,935.0 (265.0) 11.367.687
1995 46.7 3,572.5 5,697.0 (444.3) 12,762,756
1996 30.3 3,674.7 6,003.0 (500.0) 13,503,420
1997 20.0 3,913.3 6,281.0 (520.9) 15,313,917
1998 14.8 4,015.6 6,768.0 (706.4) 16,125,043
1999 8.1 4,076.8 6,397.0 (746.3) 16,620.298
1990 9.7 33,170.4 47,149.0 8,279.0 1,100,275,436
1991 2,277.8 34,121.6 52,444.0 1,736.0 1,164,283,587
166
Zambia
1992 140.2 37.848.2 58.944.0 (3,749.0) 1,432.486,243
1993 35.5 37.539.2 58,265.0 (1,993.0) 1,409.191,537
1994 7.8 36.852.5 56,537.0 2,541.0 1,358,106.756
1995 38.8 35.848.2 75,445.0 2.014.0 1.285.093.443
1996 2,017.0 35,360.3 68,818.0 8.914.0 1,250,350,816
1997 1,387.3 35,558.1 86,295.0 3,467.0 1.264,378,476
1998 112.4 37,003.6 93,891.0 (3.253.0) 1.369.266.413
1999 45.6 35.852.0 87,313.0 3,689.0 1,285,365.904
1990 0.0 6,915.9 2,992.0 0.0 47.829.673
1991 0.0 6,968.4 2,867.0 0.0 48,558,599
1992 0.0 6,708.8 3,018.0 0.0 45.007.997
1993 2.5 6,485.0 3,111.0 0.0 42,055,225
1994 13.8 6,803.9 3,228.0 0.0 46,293,055
1995 69.1 6,952.2 3,065.0 0.0 48.333.085
1996 29.8 7.054.4 3.705.0 0.0 49,764,559
1997 302.0 6,654.4 3.024.0 0.0 44,281,039
1998 408.8 6,865.3 2.993.0 0.0 47,132.344
1999 0.0 5,852.8 3,222.0 0.0 34,255,268
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Indebtedness Classifications
Severe Moderate Light
13 17 12
C ountry Indebted  C la ss C ountry Indeb ted  C la ss
1 Argentina S 22 Mexico L
2 Bolivia S 23 Morocco M
3 Brazil s 24 Mozambique M
4 Bulgaria s 25 Nicaragua S
Chile M 26 Nigeria S
6 China L 27 Pakistan s
7 Colombia M 28 Panam a M
8 C6te d'Ivoire S 29 Peru S
9 Croatia L 3C Philippines M
10 Czech Republic L 31 Poland L
11 Egypt, Arab Rep. L 32 Romania L
12 Estonia M 33 R ussian Federation M
13Ghana M 34 South Africa L
14 Hungary M 35 Sri Lanka L
15 India L 36 Tanzania S
16 Indonesia S 37 Thailand M
17 Jam aica M 38 Tunisia M
18 Kenya M 39 Turkey M
19 Lithuania L 40 Uganda S
20 Macedonia, FYR L 41 Venezuela, RB M
21 Malaysia M 42 Zambia S
Investment climate
% of gross 
capital formation 
1990 1999
December 
2000
September
2000
|sa|ptambar
2000
Argentina 9.3 44.2 68.8 45.8 55.0
Bolivia 4.4 64.7 69.5 28.6 42.5
Brazil 1.1 21.3 64.5 45.0 51.3
Bulqaria 0.1 34.1 67.3 37.1 42.5
Chile 7.8 62.8 74.8 67.2 65.8
China 2.8 10.5 73.8 60.6 59.8
Colombia 6.7 10.1 60.3 44.0 48.9
Cdte d'Ivoire 6.6 19.2 54.0 24.1 32.5
Croatia 29.2 70.3 45.8 49.7
Czech Republic 2.4 33.7 73.3 60.9 63.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.9 5.2 69.3 51.0 56.4
Estonia 7.2 23.8 73.8 55.1 55.7
Ghana 1.8 0.9 53.8 29.5 37.6
Hungary 0.0 14.0 72.0 64.9 65.2
India 0.2 2.1 61.8 51.5 53.8
Indonesia 3.1 -9.2 54.8 27.4 38.5
Jamaica 11.7 28.9 67.8 33.8 42.7
Kenya 3.4 1.0 60.3 25.0 37.6
Lithuania 0.0 20.0 71.8 43.7 50.8
Macedonia, FYR 4.1 37.4
Malaysia 16.4 8.8 75.8 59.5 61.1
Mexico 4.3 10.5 73.0 56.7 59.7
Morocco 2.5 0.0 67.8 47.3 55.1
Mozambique 2.3 29.6 55.3 19.8 28.6
Nicaragua 0.0 30.7 52.3 21.8 26.3
Nigeria 14.0 11.8 59.3 18.1 32.1
Pakistan 3.2 4.3 53.8 19.2 32.0
Panama 14.8 0.7 72.8 46.7 52.2
Peru 0.9 17.3 69.5 42.3 39.1
Philippines 5.0 4.0 65.0 49.4 52.8
Poland 0.6 17.8 73.8 62.2 63.6
Romania 0.0 15.4 58.5 30.3 36.6
Russian Federation 0.0 5.3 66.3 26.7 37.9
South Africa 6.7 68.0 55.1 57.7
Sri Lanka 2.4 4.1 59.0 33.3 39.8
Tanzania 0.0 12.1 59.5 20.3 28.9
Thailand 6.9 23.8 75.3 53.2 59.5
Tunisia 1.9 6.3 72.5 54.5 57.5
Turkey ‘ 1.9 1.8 55.5 46.8 52.7
Uganda 0.0 21.1 64.3 22.7 33.7
Venezuela. RB 9.1 20.0 70.0 37.9 43.8
Zambia 35.7 29.6 57.3 15.5 27.0
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Balance of paym ents curren t accoun t
Goods and services
Exports 
$ millions
1999
Imports 
$ millions 
1990 1999
Current
account
balance
$ millions 
1990 1999
Argentina 14,800 27,747 6,846 32,589 4,552 -12,312
Bolivia 977 1.311 1,086 1,989 •199 •556
Brazil 35,170 55,746 28,184 63,648 •3,823 -25,073
Bulaaria 6,950 5,793 8,027 6,558 -1,710 -685
Chile 10,221 19,406 9,166 18,058 •485 -80
China 57,374 218,494 46,706 189,797 11,997 15,667
Colombia 8,679 13,865 6,858 13,351 542 -61
Cdte d'Ivoire 3,503 5,346 3,445 4,137 -1,214 38
Croatia 8,118 9,791 -1,522
Czech Republic 33,188 33,989 -1,032
Eovpt, Arab Rep. 9,151 13,537 13,710 21,109 -634 -1,708
Estonia 664 3,943 711 4,248 36 -295
Ghana 983 2,584 1,506 3,839 -223 -766
Hungary 12,035 27,496 11,017 28,302 379 -2,101
India 23,028 54,047 31,485 67,250 -8,145 •3.669
Indonesia 29.295 55,821 27,511 42,151 -2.988 5.785
Jamaica 2,217 3,356 2,390 3,928 -312 -256
Kenya 2,228 2,653 2,705 3,153 -527 11
Lithuania 4,238 5,337 -1,194
Macedonia. FYR 1,441 1,926 -106
Malaysia 32,665 95.971 31,765 76,140 -870 12,606
Mexico 48,805 148,125 51,915 156,268 -7,451 -14,166
Morocco 6,239 10,624 7,783 11,960 -166 -167
Mozambique 229 586 996 1,638 -415 ■429
Nicaragua 392 839 682 2,011 -305 •587
Nigeria 14,550 13,855 6,909 12,063 4,988 506
Pakistan 6,217 8,838 9,351 11,688 -1,352 -2,187
Panama 4.438 6,888 4.193 7,700 209 -1,333
Peru 4,120 7,636 4,087 8,853 -1,419 -1,822
Philippines 11,430 39,012 13,967 36,767 -2,665 7,910
Poland 19,037 38,522 15,095 52,213 3,067 -12,487
Romania 6,380 9,868 9,901 11,380 -3.254 -1.297
Russian Federation 53.883 84,889 48.915 52,571 468 20,960
South Africa 27.119 33,320 21,017 30,005 2,065 -464
Sri Lanka 2,293 5,566 2,965 6,717 -268 •493
Tanzania 538 1,190 1,474 2,241 -559 •593
Thailand 29,229 71,410 35,870 56,345 -7,281 12.428
Tunisia 5,203 8,793 6,039 9,249 -463 -443
Turkey 21,042 45,724 25,652 48,726 -2.625 -1.364
Uganda 246 726 676 1,834 -429 -746
Venezuela, RB 18,806 22,122 9,451 16,985
£CO 3.689
Zambia 1.360 904 1,897 1,036 -594
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Global financial flows
Not private Foreign direct Portfolio Invsstmant flows Bank and
capital flaws Invsstmant trads-rsiatsd
landing
Bonds Equity
$ millions $ millions $ millions $ millions $ millions
1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999
Argentina -203 32,296 1,836 23,929 -857 8,000 13 404 -1,195 -37
Bolivia 3 1,016 27 1,016 0 0 0 0 -24 0
Brazil 563 22,793 989 32,659 129 2,683 0 1,961 -555 -14,510
Bulgaria -67 1,112 4 806 65 18 0 102 -136 186
Chile 2,098 11,851 590 9,221 -7 862 320 18 1,194 1,750
China 8,107 40.632 3,487 38,753 -48 660 0 3,732 4,668 -2,514
Colombia 345 3,635 500 1,109 -4 1,235 0 25 -151 1,267
C6te d'Ivoire 57 74 46 350 -1 -46 0 8 10 -238
Croatia 2,392 0 1,408 539 0 444
Czech Republic 876 4,837 207 5,093 0 175 0 500 669 -932
Egypt, Arab Rep. 682 1,558 734 1,065 -1 100 0 550 -51 -157
Estonia 569 0 305 45 191 28
Ghana -5 -16 15 17 0 0 0 19 -20 -52
Hungary -308 4,961 0 1,950 921 605 150 592 -1,379 1,813
India 1,872 1,813 162 2,169 147 -1,126 105 1,302 1,458 -532
Indonesia 3,235 -8,416 1.093 -2,745 26 -1,458 312 1,273 1,804 -5,486
Jamaica 92 425 138 524 0 -65 0 0 -46 -33
Kenya 122 -51 57 14 0 0 0 5 65 -70
Lithuania 1,148 0 487 505 0 156
Macedonia, FYR 51 0 30 0 0 21
Malaysia 770 3,247 2,333 1,553 -1,239 747 293 522 -617 426
Mexico 8,253 26,780 2,634 11,786 661 5,621 563 1,129 4,396 8,244
Morocco 341 -118 165 3 0 -35 0 91 176 -177
Mozambique 35 374 9 384 0 0 0 0 26 -10
Nicaragua 20 382 0 300 0 0 0 0 20 82
Nigeria 467 860 588 1,005 0 0 0 2 -121 -146
Pakistan 181 53 244 530 0 -75 0 0 -63 -403
Panama 127 620 132 22 -2 361 0 0 -4 217
Peru 59 3.140 41 1,969 0 -255 0 289 18 1,138
Philippines 639 4,915 530 573 395 3,895 0 422 -286 25
Poland 71 10,452 89 7.270 0 1,096 0 721 -18 1,365
Romania 4 714 0 1,041 0 -681 0 0 4 355
Russian Federation 5,556 3,780 0 3,309 310 0 0 644 5,246 -173
South Africa 4,533 •89 1,376 234 3,855 -932
Sri Lanka 53 109 43 177 0 0 0 6 10 -74
Tanzania 4 171 0 183 0 0 0 0 4 -13
Thailand 4,399 2,471 2,444 6.213 -87 -1,358 449 2,527 1,593 •4,911
Tunisia -121 739 76 350 -60 240 0 0 -137 149
Turkey 1,782 8,667 684 783 597 3,223 35 800 466 3,861
Uganda 16 221 0 222 0 0 0 0 16 -1
Venezuela, RB -126 3,130 451 3,187 345 134 0 67 •922 -258
Zambia 194 151 203 163 0 0 0 0 •9 -12
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Central 
governm ent
f inances
Current
revenue
Total
expenditure
Overall 
budget deficit 
(including 
grants)
Financing 
from abroad
Domestic
financing
Debt 
and Interest 
payments
Total Inter 
set
debt % of 
' %of curre
% of GDP 
1990 1998
% of GDP 
1990 1998
% of GDP 
1990 1998
%
1990
Of GDP 
1998
% of GDP 
1990 1998
GDP
1998
rove
nue
1998
Argentina 10.4 13.8 10.6 15.4 -0.4 -1.5 0.2 3.0 0.2 -1.5 16.2
Bolivia 13.7 17.5 16.4 22.0 -1.7 -2.3 0.7 1.9 1.0 0.5 48.9 9.4
Brazil 22.6 23.9 34.9 24.6 -5.8 - 7.3 14.4
Bulgaria 47.1 33.9 55.1 33.5 -8.3 2.8 -0.8 -0.7 9.1 -2.1 13.0
Chile 20.6 23.0 20.4 22.6 0.8 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 13.9 3.0
China 6.3 6.3 10.1 9.3 -1.9 -22 0.8 0.1 1.1 2.2
Colombia 12.6 11.7 11.6 16.6 3.9 -5.1 1.9 3.2 22.0 24.7
Cdte d'Ivoire 22.0 20.9 24.5 23.5 -2.9 -1.3 4.0 0.7 0.4 0.5 115.0 20.6
Croatia 33.0 45.4 37.6 45.6 -4.6 0.6 0.0 0.1 4.7 -0.7 3.2
Czech Republic 33.1 35.5 -1.6 -0.8 2.4 11.7 3.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 23.0 26.3 27.8 30.6 -5.7 - 2.0 -0.7 - 0.6 6.4 2.6 23.0
Estonia 26.2 31.7 23.7 32.9 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 - 0.4 0.7 4.3 1.0
Ghana 12.5 13.2 02 1.3 -1.5
Hunqary 52.9 36.2 52.1 44.1 0.8 -6.2 -0.5 0.4 -0.3 5.8 61.5 21.3
India 12.6 11.5 16.3 14.9 -7.7 -4.8 0.6 0.1 7.1 4.8 49.7 35.7
Indonesia 18.8 16.0 18.4 17.6 0.4 -2.7 0.7 5.0 -1.1 -2.3 53.3 19.7
Jamaica
Kenya 22.4 27.2 27.5 29.1 -3.8 - 0.9 1.3 - 0.2 4.5 1.1 28.0
Lithuania 31.9 26.7 28.9 30.3 1.4 -0.4 1.8 -1.3 15.6 42
Macedonia. FYR
Malaysia 26.4 23.1 29.3 19.7 -2.0 2.9 -0.7 -0.1 2.8 - 1.2 10.2
Mexico 15.3 13.0 17.9 14.7 •2.5 -1.4 0.3 0.5 2.3 0.9 27.8 16.5
Morocco 26.4 28.8 -2.2 3.9 -1.6
Mozambique
Nicaragua 33.5 72.0 -35.6 12.7 22.9 ..
Nigeria
Pakistan 19.1 16.2 22.4 21.8 -5.4 -6.4 2.3 1.6 3.1 4.8 79.1 42.2
Panama 25.6 24.9 23.7 27.9 3.0 -0.7 -3.4 3.9 0.4 -3.2 17.2
Peru 12.5 17.6 20.6 18.0 -8.1 -0.1 5.4 0.3 2.7 -0.2 10.6
Philippines 16.2 17.2 19.6 19.1 -3.5 -1.9 0.4 0.5 3.1 1.4 66.2 21.7
Poland 35.4 37.5 -1.0 0.2 0.8 42.9 9.1
Romania 34.4 26.5 33.8 31.9 0.9 -3.9 0.0 0.9 -0.9 3.0 13.9
Russian Federation 18.6 25.5 -5.3 3.2 2.1 140.4 29.7
South Africa 26.3 27.3 30.1 30.4 -4.1 -2.6 -0.1 0.0 4.1 2.6 51.0 21.3
Sri Lanka 21.0 17.2 28.4 24.9 -7.8 -8.0 3.6 1.0 4.2 7.0 89.2 31.4
Tanzania
Thailand 18.5 16.2 14.1 22.7 4.6 -7.7 -1.5 1.3 -3.1 6.4 10.6 1.2
Tunisia 30.7 29.3 34.6 31.7 -5.4 -0.4 1.8 0.0 3.6 0.4 59.6 11.6
Turkey 13.7 23.7 17.4 32.1 -3.0 -8.4 0.0 -1.5 3.0 9.0 41.4 49.9
Uganda
Venezuela, RB 23.7 17.2 20.7 20.7 0.0 -3.7 1.0 0.2 -1.0 3.5 13.8
Zambia
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Representative County Debt Tables
ARGENTINA
(USS million, unless otherwise indicated)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
1. SUMMARY DEBT DATA 
62,233 65,403 68,345 70,576 80,338 93,925 105,170 123,221
Long-term debt (LDOD) 48,705 49,374 49.855 58,403 68,956 77,624 86,677 99,365
Public and publicly guaranteed 46,905 47,574 47,611 52,034 55,832 61,557 67,609 73,955
Private nonguaranteed 1,800 1,800 2,244 6,369 13,123 16,066 19,068 25,411
Use of IMF credit 3,083 2,483 2,314 3,520 4,211 6,131 6,293 5,868
Short-term debt s 10,446 13,546 16,176 8,653 7,171 10,170 12,200 17,988
of which interest arrears on LDOD 7,562 8,625 9,076 1 1 0 0 0
Official creditors 132 259 627 0 0 0 0 0
Private creditors 7,429 8,366 8,450 1 1 0 0 0
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD 4,369 4,982 5,782 0 0 0 0 0
Official creditors 224 331 430 0 0 0 0 . 0
Private creditors 4,145 4,652 5,352 0 0 0 0 0
Memo: export credits 8,964 9,608 9,749 11,593 12,514 12,262 11,791 10,517
2. AGGREGATE NET RESOURCE FLOWS AND NET TRANSFERS (LONG-TERM)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF) 
Foreign direct investment (net) 
Portfolio equity flows 
Grants (excluding technical coop.) 
Memo: technical coop, grants
official net resource flows 
private net resource flows
Gross national product (GNP) 
Exports of goods & services (XGS) 
of which workers remittances 
Imports of goods & services (MGS) 
International reserves (RES) 
Current account balance
EDT / XGS (%)
EDT / GNP (%)
TDS / XGS (%)
INT / XGS (%) 
INT/GNP (%)
RES / EDT (%)
RES / MGS (months) 
Short-term / EDT (%) 
Concessional /  EDT (%) 
Multilateral/ EDT (%)
273 3,699 6,742 16,302 10,882 11,148 16,188 19,761
-1,597 798 1,311 7,480 6,555 6,119 10,206 10,844
1,836 2.439 4,012 3,261 3,107 4,783 5,090 6,645
13 420 392 5,529 1,205 211 864 2,236
21 42 27 32 16 36 27 26
84 101 112 138 159 166 228 205
477 802 126 2,704 747 1,473 51 -84
-203 2,897 5,616 13,598 10,135 9,675 16,136 19,835
3. MAJOR ECONOMIC AGGREGATES
135,036 175,308 222,420 254,637 277.957 276.180 293,443 318,617
16,654 16,132 16,832 17,787 21,578 28,260 31,754 34,003
0 0 0 42 47 41 41 41
13,100 17,572 22,955 25,828 31,969 31,419 35,834 44.431
6,222 7,463 11,447 15,499 16,003 15,980 19,719 22,425
4,552 -647 -5,462 -7,672 -10,118 -2,768 -3,787 -10,119
4. DEBT INDICATORS
373.7 405.4 406.0 396.8 372.3 332.4 331.2 362.4
46.1 37.3 30.7 27.7 28.9 34.0 35.8 38.7
37.0 33.6 29.0 36.9 31.0 34.3 44.1 58.7
16.3 18.1 16.8 18.6 19.0 19.0 18.6 21.8
2.0 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.3
10.0 11.4 16.7 22.0 19.9 17.0 18.7 18.2
5.7 5.1 6.0 7.2 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.1
16.8 20.7 23.7 12.3 8.9 10.8 11.6 14.6
0.8 0.9 1.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.4 1.8
8.0 8.3 7.4 10.1 9.6 10.0 9.3 8.3
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